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The Political Economy of Inequality
Introduction
Sisay Asefa
Wei-Chiao Huang
Western Michigan University
The only true and sustainable prosperity is shared prosperity.
—Joseph Stiglitz

Inequalities in our society abound, across space, over time, and in
numerous other dimensions. While income inequality attracts considerable attention in academic and policy arenas, there are many other
aspects of social inequality that also deserve to be studied and addressed,
such as wealth (assets), ability to borrow, education, employment,
health care, political representation, and legal matters. In a sense, all
of these can be generally characterized as inequalities of access or of
opportunities. And all of them, if not resolved or mitigated, bear potentially serious consequences of economic instability and political and
social unrest. Many of these inequalities are also interrelated, making
them vexing and difficult to combat.
But for policymakers to do so, they must understand the extent of
these inequalities, their trends, and, more precisely, how they correlate. What are the underlying root causes of these inequalities? What
are plausible policies that could mitigate their impacts? These questions were recently addressed by six eminent scholars who were invited
to provide insights and views from their respective areas of expertise
through Western Michigan University’s 54th Werner Sichel Lecture
Series, which took place during the 2017–2018 academic year. These
experts’ presentations form the basis of this volume and cover the
challenges of different inequalities in several countries, including the
United States, member nations of the Organisation for Economic Co-
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operation and Development, and developing countries in Africa and
Latin America.
We briefly summarize each of the six chapters in this introduction.
Chapter 2, “The New Inequality: The Distribution of Retirement
and Older Working Time in OECD Countries,” by Teresa Ghilarducci,
the Bernard L. and Irene Schwartz Professor of Economics and Policy
Analysis at the New School for Social Research, indicates that income
and wealth inequality has been on the rise for years in rich nations.
The chapter by Ghilarducci addresses inequality’s economic harms:
inequality skews production toward what the rich want and away from
public spending on education and health. Ghilarducci also notes that
inequality skews political power to the rich, who use that power to create and preserve economic rents, also known as monopoly rents. An
economic rent is any payment to a factor of production that is more than
what is needed to induce that factor to engage in production. Ghilarducci’s chapter addresses a third kind of inequality—paid retirement
time—and its potential damage to workers’ retirement. Retirement is
the period after a lifetime of work and before death when people can
exercise greater control over the pace and content of their time and construct a personal narrative about the meaning of their lives.
As nations grew richer, Ghilarducci says, voters and workers
expanded paid time off, including retirement, widely across socioeconomic classes. But in the late twentieth century, OECD policy shifted
to emphasize austerity and finance-based retirement income, leading
some in the elderly population to work more hours and longer years.
More work at older ages is associated with higher poverty rates and
greater retirement-time inequalities among the elderly. The first part of
the chapter defines retirement time and explores the lopsided distribution of American retirement time. The second section describes changes
in retirement time in the rest of the OECD countries. The third section
discusses how rich nations changed their pension designs toward less
social insurance and more financialization. The fourth section shows
how pension financialization is correlated with increases in older people’s labor-force participation and how nations with higher elderly
labor-force participation also have higher rates of old-age poverty. The
fifth and final section offers a conclusion.
In Chapter 3, “The Economics and Politics of the Fall and Rise of
Income Inequality in the United States,” Charles L. Ballard, professor
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of economics at Michigan State University, explores the issue of how
income inequality in the United States has increased dramatically since
the 1970s. Ballard notes that the U.S. economy actually experienced
an equally dramatic equalization in the 1930s and 1940s. He argues
that, consequently, if we are to develop a complete understanding of
the evolution of the U.S. income distribution, we must analyze the earlier “Great Compression” or “Great Convergence,” as well as the more
recent “Great Divergence.” In this chapter, Ballard begins with a review
of the facts of the changes in income inequality over the past century
in the United States. He then discusses and evaluates the economic
explanations for those trends. However, the economic trends cannot be
understood fully without reference to political factors. He argues that
both the Great Compression and the Great Divergence are primarily
the result of deliberate political choices made by the party in power.
Furthermore, he points out that race is the most important of the many
factors leading to the political shifts that have, in turn, contributed to
the Great Divergence of the past 40 years. Many whites, especially in
the South, reacted to the Civil Rights movement by switching their allegiance from the Democratic to the Republican Party, and this has contributed substantially to the adoption of more antiegalitarian economic
policies. The best starting point for a discussion of long-term trends in
U.S. income inequality, he says, is the journal article “Income Inequality in the United States, 1913–1998,” by Piketty and Saez (2003). Their
original paper contains data through 1998, as the title indicates, but they
have updated the data annually so that we now have a complete series
covering a full century, from 1913 to 2015.
Piketty and Saez (2003) use tax-return data, and this allows them to
produce extremely detailed estimates for the income shares of the very
top income strata. The data reveal that the shares of the top groups fell
from the late 1920s to the early 1970s, and especially sharply in the
early 1940s. Specifically, the share of the top 1 percent plummeted from
15.7 percent of total income in 1940 to 10.5 percent in 1944 because
of various public policies implemented, which are detailed in Ballard’s
chapter. But then, following a decline through the early ’70s, the top
income shares surged upward in the 1980s, almost as dramatically as
they had fallen in the early 1940s. And over the past 10 years, the share
of the top 1 percent has hovered around 18 percent of total income,
which is higher than the average was in the first 15 years of the twen-
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tieth century. Thus, by some measures, the income distribution in the
United States today is more unequal than it was a century ago. Furthermore, the disequalization since the 1970s has been extremely topheavy. A majority of the gains in the share for the top 5 percent went
to the top 1 percent. In turn, a majority of the gains in share for the top
1 percent accrued to the top one-tenth of 1 percent. Finally, about half
the gains in share for the top one-tenth of 1 percent accrued to the top
one-hundredth of 1 percent. While Piketty and Saez’s paper focuses
exclusively on the top 10 percent, Ballard notes that there have also
been changes in the income distribution below the top 10 percent. Census data analysis shows that, since the 1970s, the income of the typical
household at the 90th percentile rose by substantially more than the
income of the household at the 80th percentile.
Chapter 4 is titled “America’s Unequal Playing Field: The Gaps
between Poor and Rich Children’s Resources.” In it, Mary E. Corcoran,
professor emerita of public policy, political science, and women’s studies at the Gerald R. Ford School of Public Policy, University of Michigan, explores the phenomenon that growing up wealthy in the United
States commands wide and profound advantages over growing up poor,
and these advantages do not just involve the extra discretionary money
that rich parents possess to spend on their children. Corcoran notes that,
on average, children of the rich are more likely to avoid the disruption and trauma, both emotional and economic, from absent fathers
due to out-of-wedlock births, divorce, and paternal incarceration. The
rich children’s home environments are more likely to be educationally enriching. These children are more likely to have parents who are
college graduates and less likely to have parents who are high school
dropouts. They are more likely to be raised in safe neighborhoods with
good schools. Rich parents have more money, time, and social capital
to invest in their children.
As a result, it is hardly surprising that rich children fare better economically as adults than do middle-income and low-income children.
Corcoran refers to two recent books, Whither Opportunity? and Dream
Hoarders, and warns that the economic and noneconomic advantages
of being raised by wealthy parents are increasingly bundled together
and are growing rapidly in ways that could imperil the American ideal
of fair opportunity (Duncan and Murnane 2011; Reeves 2017). Since
the 1980s, changes to the economic and demographic landscape and
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to the criminal justice system have widened the gaps between the economic resources and social capital of affluent parents and those of middle-income and low-income families. Corcoran further notes that over
the same period, a college degree has become increasingly important
to children’s adult economic success. And at the same time that investing in children’s education has become more important for their economic mobility, gaps have widened between affluent parents and the
middle- and low-income parents in their financial capabilities to make
such an investment. The recent academic admissions scandal is indeed
a perfect case in point. “This,” Corcoran says, “leads to a very real
worry: is the cherished U.S. norm of a level playing field—i.e., that a
child’s economic origins do not determine his or her economic future—
at risk?” Corcoran’s paper is organized as follows: she begins by presenting a stylized picture of the associations between family income
and children’s adult incomes, followed by a comparison of the rates
of intergenerational economic mobility in the United States to those
in other Western industrialized countries. It is evident that the United
States comes off poorly in these comparisons. Corcoran then delineates
how economic trends, demographic trends, and changes in the criminal
justice system since the 1980s have altered the distribution of resources
and social capital available to children in low-income, middle-income,
and high-income families in the United States. She also documents how
returns to a college degree have increased since 1980 in the United
States.
Corcoran next reviews studies showing that parental income more
strongly predicts students’ achievement-test scores, college attendance,
and college graduation today than it did in the past. She concludes by
speculating on how the trends and evidence reviewed in this chapter
might affect equal opportunity in the United States. She further elaborates on how the background advantages of children from affluent families vis-à-vis children from middle-income and low-income families
have risen significantly. And she notes that college education affects a
child’s adult economic attainments more strongly now than in the past,
and that a child’s chance of acquiring a college degree is more tied
to parental income now than in the past. She concludes by posing the
following questions: Does this inevitably mean that the United States
will become more stratified by income? What policy strategies might
weaken the link between parental income and children’s adult success?
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In Chapter 5, “Why Has Income Inequality Increased while Education Inequality Has Decreased in Many Developing Countries?,” David
Lam, professor of economics at the University of Michigan, points out
that there is a great deal of concern about trends in income inequality
around the world. On the domestic front, rising wage inequality in the
United States has been a focus of attention for the past two decades. In
addition, trends in income inequality in developing countries and in the
world as a whole have been analyzed by the World Bank and a large
number of researchers. However, less focus has been given to inequality in schooling. Lam’s chapter argues that inequality in schooling is a
vital area of research, given the importance of education in affecting
a wide variety of outcomes. Inequality in schooling is also important
because it is integrally connected to income inequality. Several studies
rely on the detailed data that are available on the distribution of schooling for a good number of low-income and middle-income countries.
Comprehensive analysis of these data demonstrates that the distribution
of schooling demographically changes in fairly regular patterns as the
mean level of schooling increases. The standard deviation in years of
schooling, which is shown theoretically to be an important driver of
earnings inequality, tends to increase with mean schooling at low levels of schooling, eventually reaching a peak and then falling as mean
schooling reaches higher levels. This has important implications for
trends in earnings inequality. The coefficient of variation in schooling,
a standard mean-invariant measure of schooling inequality, tends to fall
steadily as mean schooling increases, a result of the “compression” in
schooling that occurs with the rising mean. Given the strong relationship between schooling and earnings, this compression in the schooling
distribution should be expected to reduce income inequality. However,
data from several countries reveal a rather puzzling phenomenon: a
number of African and Asian countries have seen increases in income
inequality while at the same time experiencing significant declines in
schooling inequality.
In this chapter, Lam explores several reasons for this disconnect
between falling schooling inequality and rising income inequality in
those developing countries. One important factor is the convex relationship between schooling and earnings, as implied in the standard
Mincer (1974) earnings equation, in which log earnings are a nonlinear function of schooling. Another important factor is rising returns to
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schooling, especially at the top of the schooling distribution. Lam’s
paper reviews the evidence on trends in income inequality and poverty
for a variety of countries. The paper then looks at the theoretical relationship between schooling and earnings. Data from a large number of
countries from the Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) program
are then used to look at how the schooling distribution changes as mean
schooling increases. These data show a consistent tendency for schooling inequality to decline as mean schooling increases. Lam concludes
his chapter with a detailed analysis of schooling inequality and earnings
inequality in Brazil and South Africa, the two countries with extreme
earnings inequality and high-quality labor-market survey data that can
be used to look at schooling inequality, returns to schooling, and earning inequality over several decades.
In Chapter 6, “Institutions, Structures, and Policy Paradigms:
Toward Understanding Inequality in Africa,” Howard Stein, professor
of Afroamerican and African studies and of epidemiology at the University of Michigan, states that the trajectory of development in subSaharan Africa remains puzzling to mainstream economists. Poverty
stays stubbornly high, growth has been uneven, and life expectancy has
continued to lag relative to other regions despite governments’ adopting
active policies inspired by neoclassical economists. Economists have
offered a host of extraneous explanations for “Africa’s tragedy,” including ethnicity, geography, colonial history, slave trade, poor governance,
and poorly developed social capital. Stein notes that the number of
variables purportedly correlated with growth grew dramatically over
time in the literature and reached, by one count, a rather implausible 86
regressors by the year 2000. His chapter deals with new concerns about
income inequality, and how orthodox economists have tried unconvincingly to explain the pattern of income distribution in Africa.
Contrary to Kuznets’s hypothesis that regions with low industrialization and a high reliance on agriculture should have more equitable distribution of income, sub-Saharan Africa has had high income
inequality, which has been worsening in recent decades, despite evidence of deindustrialization and most of its population living in rural
areas. As argued by Stein, part of the problem with relying on Kuznets’s
formulation is its reliance on the faux naturalism which is embedded in
the neoclassical theory of distribution, in which factors of production
in a competitive market are supposed to be paid according to their mar-
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ginal contribution to production. The belief in a Kuznets curve follows
the erroneous assumption that peasants received income commensurate
with their land and labor in economies dominated by rural production.
With industrialization, the divide between urban-based wage income
and rural income will grow, and income inequality will worsen.
The neoclassical paradigm thus argues that only by shrinking the
rural sector will equality be restored. But when this pattern is not
observed, instead of questioning the underlying assumptions, neoclassical economists tend to search for extraneous factors in an attempt to
explain why the paradigm does not seem to hold true. Stein argues that
to understand income inequality, we need to transcend the faux naturalism of neoclassical economics so as to take into account the evolution
of the institutions, related economic structures, and the way Africa has
been integrated into the global economy—factors that really underlie
the current and historical patterns of income distribution. Stein suggests that the core of explanation lies in the shifting structures of power
which underlie the generation of disparities in material awards. Stein
reviews the trends in income distribution in sub-Saharan Africa using
Gini coefficients to measure inequality. His paper provides a critical
alternative view to the mainstream view of distribution and its applications to understanding inequality in Africa, including its impact on
policy formation, which has contributed to the exacerbation of distribution. The paper discusses the institutional approach to income distribution, which challenges the standard neoclassical economics approach
and claims to offer a better understanding of the income distribution
patterns that we have observed in sub-Saharan Africa.
Stein presents detailed evidence to make a strong case for the institutional theory of distribution. According to Stein, factors of production are integrated, and their ability to affect production is contingent
and interactive. Resources, whether human or inanimate, derive their
utility through their integration into a process dependent on many subprocesses. The power of production is found in systems, not in land,
capital, and labor. Stein further argues that neoclassical economic constructs have been institutionalized and created the dangerous notion that
people are paid according to the natural laws of the market and receive
what is deemed worthy of their contribution. They are not a product
of human agency but of forces beyond human control. In contrast, the
institutional theory of distribution points to the need to understand
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power and its relationship to the contesting of interests at the heart of
the determination of the allocation of the shares of material rewards.
Stein stresses that understanding the forces that select working rules
and that shape and reshape the relative power of the parties involved in
transactions should be at the core of an institutional understanding of
the distribution of income in any society. Transactions are not simply
among domestic players but involve international participants, and the
rules of those transactions are affected by international institutions. So
how does this explain the pattern of income distribution in Africa? The
key, according to Stein, is in understanding the forces that shaped and
altered the conditions and rules that affected the comparative power of
direct producers in transactions over time. Stein provides comprehensive evidence to support the institutional perspective of inequality using
his field studies in Tanzania, Kenya, Malawi, and Uganda.
In Chapter 7, “Income Inequality, Progressive Taxation, and Tax
Expenditures,” the final chapter, James R. Hines Jr., Richard A. Musgrave Collegiate Professor of Economics at the University of Michigan, discusses the effect of progressive taxes and tax expenditures on
inequality, alluding to the following four facts:
1) Income and wealth are unequally distributed in the United
States, and annual incomes appear to have become significantly less equal over the past 40 years.
2) The United States has a progressive income tax system that
imposes burdens based on ability to pay, with rates that rise
sharply with income.
3) The primary function of the tax system is to raise revenue to
finance the government, but in the process, the tax system also
redistributes wealth.
4) The tax system can do quite a bit more on redistribution and
should, but perhaps paradoxically this is possible only by
maintaining and adding to tax expenditures (“tax loopholes”)
for the affluent. In explaining the effect of progressive taxes,
which can reduce inequality, Hines asserts that the prevailing
tax system includes certain preferences, such as deductions
for mortgage interest, charitable contributions, and state and
local taxes that mitigate tax burdens. These are known as “tax
expenditures.”
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Like so much else in the tax system these days, there is partisan
bickering over these “tax expenditures.” Liberals are highly critical that
tax expenditures have been going mostly to the rich—which they do.
Only 30 percent of taxpayers itemize their deductions, and affluent taxpayers are more apt to claim itemized deductions than are the less affluent. Affluent taxpayers have bigger mortgages and more state and local
taxes from which to claim deductions. On the other hand, conservatives
feel that tax expenditures smack of social engineering by government
and prefer lower tax rates instead. Thus, neither political side likes tax
expenditures. Yet, as we will see, they are essential aspects of a progressive tax system. Hines explains who benefits from tax benefits in
various ways. Tax reductions from income tax expenditures go mostly
to high-income taxpayers: 13.6 percent of the total goes to the bottom
income quintile, 61.6 percent of the total goes to the top income quintile, and 27.5 percent goes to the top 1 percent of income. But of course
it is also true that, of the total amount of revenue brought in by taxes,
most comes from high-income taxpayers. Only 0.8 percent of taxes is
paid by the bottom-income quintile, whereas 68.9 percent is paid by the
top income quintile. In fact, 27.9 percent of tax revenue is paid by the
top 1 percent. Tax expenditures roughly track total tax liabilities.
In discussing the equality issues of the U.S. tax system, Hines uses
the example of one tax measure: the child tax credit. This credit reduces
the tax burdens of families with children as compared to otherwise-similar families without children. Is that a good thing to do? The political
system has decided that it is. It is certainly true that a family with two
children and an income of $50,000 is less well off than a family without
children and an income of $50,000. But Hines points out that, after all,
those couples chose to have children, so should we permit them to have
a tax reduction on this basis? Reasonable minds might differ on answering this question, but the majority think that the answer is yes.
Hines also addresses a few issues associated with the effect of eliminating or significantly reducing taxes. He speculates that such a reduction would have mixed effects. As a case in point, he takes the flat tax,
whose advocates offer a coherent, three-step plan:
1) Eliminate all deductions, credits, and exclusions.
2) Impose a flat tax at 19 percent, 23 percent, or some other figure.
3) Permit a zero-bracket amount so that the first $30,000 or so is
untaxed.
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While the flat-tax objectors argue that it is not a very progressive tax
system—in fact it is regressive—it can also be argued that the cost of
tax progressivity is that it creates greater distortions by subjecting some
levels of income to high tax rates. And the more progressive an income
tax system is, the more important it is to be smart about designing the
system efficiently. Hines indicates that this alternative to the flat-tax
system requires lots of special deductions and credits, many of which
are targeted at high-income taxpayers. Advocates will decry these special tax breaks as antiprogressive, whereas exactly the opposite is the
case.
Hines makes it clear that what most voters want are these two things:
1) tax simplicity, to make the system easier to understand and
prevent others from getting unwarranted tax breaks
2) lower tax rates
But with that said, still, many specific tax breaks have considerable political appeal. (In the United States, these would include owneroccupied housing, charitable contributions, employer-provided health
care and pensions, and deductions for state and local taxes, among other
things.) The reality is that governments need revenue, and it is never
going to be popular to get that revenue through taxation. But our history
suggests that governments are aware of the need for tax policies that are
sensitive to individual situations and economic conditions.
Hines makes the following three important and provocative points:
1) There is no principle of efficiency or equity that implies that
the best tax system taxes a very broad definition of income at
relatively low rates.
2) Far from it: the prevailing theory is that taxation should be
highly differentiated and individualized.
3) In fact, the most efficient and equitable system has a relatively narrow tax base with relatively high tax rates. Proposals
(and there are some) to cap all tax deductions or reduce all
tax deductions by a fixed fraction (say, by letting people claim
only 80 percent) look odd through this lens. Hines concludes
that good policy is messy and that we have no choice but to
rely on governments to make it for us. That they have done so
with many tax credits, deductions, and exemptions may not be
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a bad thing, and we may need more of them. These governments may have much clearer appreciation of the nature of the
tax problem than that with which we often credit them.
Social inequality is multifaceted and very complicated. The chapters in this volume can cover only a limited portion of these complexities. Nonetheless, they contain insightful analyses and viewpoints that
are critical for illuminating different types of inequality and providing
context for policies to address them. We invite readers to explore these
insights and inform their own conclusions.

Note
https://inequality.org/ is an online portal to data, analysis, and commentary on income
and wealth inequality. There readers can find information and insights that can help
them better understand our deeply unequal world and how we can work to change it
through the efforts of a think tank called the Institute for Policy Studies, in Washington,
D.C.
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The New Inequality
The Distribution of Retirement and
Older Working Time in OECD Countries
Teresa Ghilarducci
New School for Social Research

Income inequality and wealth inequality have been on the rise for
years in rich nations (OECD 2015a; World Bank 2015a). Chapters in
this volume address inequality’s economic harms: inequality skews
production toward what the rich want and away from public spending
on education and health (Sctivosky 1976; World Bank 2015b). It also
skews political power to the rich, who use that power to create and preserve economic rents (also known as monopoly rents, which encompass
any payment to a factor of production that is more than what is needed
to induce that factor to engage in production (Stiglitz 2012).
This chapter addresses another kind of inequality and the potential
damage it could inflict on workers’ retirement. Retirement is the period
after a lifetime of work and before death when people can exercise
greater control over the pace and content of their time and construct a
personal narrative about the meaning of their lives (Blackburn 2009).
As nations grew richer, workers, through the ballot and their representatives in Congress, expanded paid time off—including pension-funded
retirement through their employers—widely across socioeconomic
classes. But in the late twentieth century, policy at the Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) emphasized austerity and retirement income based on the financial markets, leading some
elderly workers to work more hours per week and years longer. More
work at older ages is associated with higher elderly poverty rates and
retirement time inequalities.
The next section in this chapter defines retirement time and explores
the lopsided distribution of American retirement time. The section fol-
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lowing that describes changes in retirement time in the rest of the countries belonging to the OECD. The subsequent section discusses how
rich nations changed their pension designs toward less social insurance
and more financialization. The penultimate section shows how pension
financialization is correlated with increases in older people’s labor force
participation and how nations with higher elderly labor-force participation also have higher rates of old-age poverty. The last section offers
conclusions.

THE EQUALITY WE FORGET TO CELEBRATE:
THE DISTRIBUTION OF RETIREMENT TIME
Rich and poor workers’ ability to choose to retire or work in old age
is a modern development. Before World War II, most men died during
the time they were still working (Costa 1998), and only the well-off
could choose whether to work or retire. One of the most underappreciated accomplishments of U.S. social policy was the equalization of
the distribution of retirement time across socioeconomic groups after
WWII (Bonen and Ghilarducci 2014). However, since the 1980s, gains
in retirement wealth, longevity, and morbidity have gone mostly to the
highest-income workers, white men, and educated women.
Ghilarducci (2008) was the first scholar to measure the distribution
of retirement time, finding the distribution of retirement time was strikingly equal for people who died between the ages of 50 and 65. (The
data set was limited, and only people under 65 could be analyzed.)
Retired men under the age of 65 in the top 20 percent of the retirement asset distribution accounted for 22 percent of the total amount
of retirement time, while men in the bottom 20 percent accounted for
18 percent. Although the top quintile had 85 percent of all wealth and
the poorest 20 percent were in debt, the distribution of retirement time
before age 65 was almost equal. The distribution of pre-65 retirement
time for women was similarly equal: the top and bottom fifths of women
accounted for virtually the same share of retirement time—22.6 percent
for the top and 22.7 percent for the bottom (Ghilarducci 2008, p. 145).
Retirement time equity was the result of public policy decisions
about pension design. Between the 1950s and the mid-1980s, Social
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Security, defined benefit (DB) pension plans, and disability insurance
allowed pension income to be paid before age 62. That meant people
with shorter life spans could start collecting a pension long before their
mid-60s. More workers from the middle and lower socioeconomic
classes were able to retire when social security old-age benefits and
disability programs expanded significantly from the 1950s to the 1970s.
Medicare, established in 1965, provided universal health insurance for
those over age 65, which significantly improved the health and longevity of the aged of all classes. Broad-based retirement health and pensions gave workers in all socioeconomic groups the ability to control
some of their own leisure time before they died.
Furthermore, the design of workplace pensions and Social Security made retirement income and wealth more equally distributed than
preretirement income in the same time period (Wolff 2015). Unionized
workers—many with physically taxing jobs—were more likely to be
covered by DB pension plans, which enabled earlier retirement to compensate for lower-than-average longevity. DB plan participants retire
about two years earlier than similar workers covered by defined contribution (DC) plans or otherwise similar uncovered workers. The earlier
retirement of workers in DB plans reflects the design of DB plans, which
do not increase pensions after a certain age. This provides an incentive
for workers to retire earlier than they would otherwise (Friedberg and
Webb 2005). Since the retirement income of DC participants depends
partially on returns from financial markets, workers likely adapt to their
considerable financial market risk by working longer.1
But pension designs changed when the increased costs of population aging coincided with austerity movements. Governments cut social
insurance, and employers in the United States and Britain moved away
from defined benefit plans in favor of voluntary, self-directed 401(k)
plans.2 In the United States, Social Security benefits for mid-to-late
baby boomers were reduced by Congress because the age at which people could collect full benefits was increased from 65 to 67. The increase
was phased in over 25 years, starting in 1984. For all workers born after
1960, the normal retirement age is 67. Thus, Social Security was placed
further into a worker’s future. Many OECD nations also reduced benefits from social insurance by raising the normal retirement age.
Over the same time period—1984 to the present—that Social Security and DB pension benefits were falling, longevity and health gains
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disproportionately went to those at the top of the income distribution
(Auerbach et al. 2017; Buckles et al. 2016; Case and Deaton 2017).
Blacks, independent of socioeconomic status, on average become sick
and die sooner than whites (Geruso 2012). In addition, minorities and
lower-income individuals are less likely to have adequate retirement
resources (Even and Macpherson 2007). So the two growing inequalities—longevity and secure retirement income—mean that people dying
sooner cannot retire earlier, and retirement time becomes more unequal.
Using a new and enlarged sample of HRS and AHEAD respondents,
Ghilarducci, Papadopoulos, and Webb (2017) identified a growing gap
in retirement time: the people with the lowest incomes and lowest education average 14.5 years of retirement, whereas those with higher levels of education enjoy, on average, 17 years of retirement. The class
difference in retirement time is strongest for women, and having a DB
pension is the most significant factor in explaining the difference in
retirement time for American men: men with DB pensions live longer
and retire earlier, especially compared to men without any workplace
retirement plan.
Depending on 401(k) plans and individual retirement accounts
(IRAs) and having no workplace retirement plan leads older people
(especially middle- and lower-income older workers) to delay retirement. High earners are more likely to be able to afford retirement
regardless of the type of plan they have. The individually directed and
voluntary nature of 401(k)s and IRAs means that they form a system
that works best for higher-income workers. Higher-income workers buy
assets at the right time—when asset prices are low—because they are
more likely to be employed in down markets. Higher earners also earn
higher returns (because their portfolios are more diversified), pay lower
fees, and have more favorable tax deductions.
In sum, Social Security cuts, the decline of unions and DB plans,
and the rise of financial-based retirement plans will cause the share of
retirement income coming from insurance-based sources (Social Security and DB plans) to fall for American middle-class retirees. Those born
between 1946 and 1955 received 47 percent of their retirement income
from insurance-based sources in 2010; people born between 1966 and
1975 will receive 40 percent of their income from such sources (Butrica,
Smith, and Iams 2012). And the inequality of income among the retired
population is expected to grow (Gist and Hatch 2014). The financializa-
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tion of pension systems means more households are expected to bear
more financial risks, which will affect the distribution of wealth income
and security in old age (Clark, Strauss, and Knox-Hayes 2012). The
lopsided distribution of secure retirement income and longevity gains
means that those who die sooner will work longer, making the form
of equity that often goes unnoticed—equity in retirement time—more
unequal.
As other nations cut social insurance and adopt American-type
financialized retirement systems, some older people will work longer—
perhaps those with the least resources and shorter life spans—or they
will retire with lower incomes, leading to an increase in poverty and
higher rates of labor force participation. Some older people will have to
find and keep jobs in old age to make up for their lower incomes, leading to higher rates of labor force participation among certain groups.

RETIREMENT TIME TRENDS IN THE OECD: TIME HAS
INCREASED, BUT GAINS MAY SLOW OR REVERSE
Over the past 60 years, people in OECD countries are living longer
and retiring for longer periods of time. Simple math computes that if
the average age of retirement is stable and average longevity is growing, then average retirement years will increase. On the other hand,
if elderly labor force participation outpaces longevity improvements,
average retirement time could shrink. It’s projected that from 1958 to
2020, 27 out of 29 OECD nations will have experienced an increase
in retirement time for men, and in all but one nation, women will have
had more retirement time than men. Most of the increase in retirement
time has come from increases in life expectancy outpacing the general
increase in elderly work years.
In 30 OECD nations, the labor force participation of older men and
women has grown significantly since 1993. But the increase in elderly
labor force participation is not explained by increased prosperity, as
measured by the changes in gross domestic product (GDP). More people working more when the economy grows is expected as pay and
working conditions improve, but preliminary evidence does not support the claim. The Pearson correlation between GDP growth and
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elderly labor force participation is low, just 10 percent (Ghilarducci and
Novello 2017).3 Falling pension income would, in theory, cause older
people to work more, as the drop in nonearned income would lower
their reservation wage. (The reservation wage is the lowest wage rate a
worker would accept to move from not working and collecting, say, a
pension, to looking for work.) Evidence suggests a link between falling
pensions and older people working. For all OECD nations, when the
retirement income replacement rate decreases by 1 percentage point,
from, say, 30 percent to 29 percent, the elderly labor force increases by
21 percent (author’s calculations in Ghilarducci and Novello).
The OECD does not measure retirement time from microdata, as
the American study did, but estimates retirement time using the difference between the age a person could retire based on the rules of the
state pension plan and the average estimated age of death for a fiftyyear-old. The average growth in retirement time for 30 OECD nations
between 1958 and 2010 (some countries only had data from 1971) was
only slightly different for men and women: women’s retirement time
increased by 23 percent and men’s increased by a little less, 20 percent. However, the American pattern was quite different: between 1958
and 2010, the difference between women’s effective retirement age and
life expectancy increased by only 15 percent, while American men’s
increased by much more, by 27 percent (Table 2.1).4
Retirement Time Improvements
What causes the variation in retirement time between nations?
Longevity explains most of the variation in changes in retirement time
between nations, but not all of it. The link between changes in male
retirement time and male longevity at age 50 is 51 percent; for women,
Table 2.1 Increase in Retirement Time (%)
OECD countries, 1958–2010
United States, 1958–2010

Women
23
15

Men
20
27

NOTE: Age 50 life expectancy minus effective pension eligibility age, 1958–2010, for
OECD and U.S. by sex.
SOURCE: OECD (2015a).
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the Pearson correlation is a little less, 32 percent. Some of the variation is explained by women shrinking their retirement time by working
more. The increase in the labor force participation rate of elderly men is
correlated by only 6 percent with a decrease in retirement time. Elderly
women’s work effort and changes in retirement time are correlated by
a negative 25 percent.

PENSION FINANCIALIZATION IS ASSOCIATED WITH
HIGHER ELDERLY LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION
RATES AND OLD-AGE POVERTY
The link between shrinking retirement time and elderly people
working longer is smaller than the impact of longevity changes on
retirement time changes, but as pension income shrinks and becomes
more uncertain, I expect more retirement time to be lost because of
an increase in elderly labor force participation. There is evidence for
this view in the simple correlation between the financialization of pensions—the percentage of income coming from capital—and increases
in elderly work effort: 33 percent for men and 40 percent for women. A
multivariate analysis would of course control for the demand for older
workers, including the wage rate, but nations where older workers are
still working are not high-wage nations in general.
Gruber and Wise (1998) argue that across the OECD member countries, the older the age at which workers can collect full pension benefits (called normal retirement age), the greater the increases in their
participation in the labor force. This conclusion makes sense given that
people who do not have access to income without working are more
likely to work.
Gruber and Wise (1998) infer that nations intentionally seek to
encourage older people to withdraw from working or looking for work
because they see a correlation between nations making social security
benefits more generous—as in the 1950s, ’60s, and ’70s—and drops
in elderly labor force participation. They call for nations to reverse the
decline in elderly labor force participation by decreasing the amount of
early retirement benefits and lowering the tax rates for older workers.
Gruber and Wise’s (1998) paper was published at the same time that aus-
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terity programs were being implemented (Huber and Stephens 2001).
Old-age programs that are funded by pay-as-you-go funding mechanisms—current workers’ pay for retired workers’ benefits—become
more expensive if a large cohort is followed by a small one. These were
projected to rise in cost (expressed as payroll tax rates) and so became
an obvious target for austerity policies. However, pay-as-you-go systems never add to the budget deficit because they are closed systems.
If the revenue doesn’t match the liabilities, the revenue is increased or
the benefits are cut.
Gruber and Wise’s (1998) analysis provides a path to obtain social
and economic benefits without obvious costs. Having older people
work more serves to grow economies and increase household income
with no extra effort from state programs—a classic “win-win.” All that
was needed to obtain the gains was for states to change their pension
design to induce older workers to work.
The effect of the OECD pension design changes after 1990 is consistent with Gruber and Wise’s recommendations that nations cut pensions to induce more work among the elderly. Between 1990 and 2011,
more than half of the OECD nations cut pension benefits by raising the
normal retirement age (NRA). Nineteen raised the NRA for women,
and 16 raised the NRA for men (OECD 2011). Raising the NRA—the
age at which people can collect full benefits—effectively cuts benefits
for everyone collecting at any age.
Financializing retirement income shifts various risks to individuals,
making retirement income less secure, so older people work more as
they face higher risks of old-age poverty stemming from social insurance cuts. Gruber and Wise (1998) recommend that nations cut social
insurance to increase the labor force participation of men and women.
When nations get richer, their inhabitants consume more of what
are called normal goods, including paid time off. Holidays, paid vacations, and nonworking weekends become norms. Retirement is also a
normal good; the demand for retirement time increases as nations get
richer.5 However, as Gruber and Wise (1998) and Gruber, Milligan, and
Wise (2009) argue, more retirement could cause a reversal in that affluence if pension expenses increase too much.
The OECD’s “age of effective retirement” is computed based on the
average age at which people withdraw from the labor force in a given
period. In most nations, people retire at younger ages than the age at
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which they can collect full retirement benefits under their nation’s state
pension rules. For instance, in the United States, covered workers can
collect a much-reduced Social Security pension benefit at age 62 or wait
to receive a benefit that is worth more at age 70. Each person decides
his or her time preference and makes an estimate of their longevity and
morbidity in order to choose the age at which to collect reduced or full
benefits. On average, people retire much sooner than the age required to
collect full benefits. This is notable because it means the state systems
are less generous than they would otherwise be.
In the United States, the penalty for collecting at age 62, four years
before the normal retirement age of 66 (for people born after 1960), is
30 percent, and the delayed retirement credit for collecting at age 70 is
32 percent. That means that for every $1,000 of benefit owed at 66, a
worker could collect $700 per month at 62 for life, or $1,320 per month
at 70 for life. More than 40 percent collect at age 62. Retirees in Japan
and Korea are notable exceptions to this tendency. In those countries,
the effective age of retirement, the age at which half of the people actually retire, is close to 70 for men despite a normal retirement age of 60.
The demand for labor could be quite high, so that the wage offered to
older workers is high, thus encouraging them to work; or the retirement
benefits could be low, so that in order to meet a target income, these
men need to work.
Men, on average, are still in the workforce at age 65 in Denmark,
Iceland, Ireland, Portugal, and Switzerland, but have left the labor force
by age 60 in Austria, Belgium, France, Hungary, Luxembourg, and the
Slovak Republic. Women, in general, retire around one to two years
earlier than men do, on average, in the 30–32 OECD nations examined
in this chapter (OECD 2015a).
Overall, the labor force participation rates of elderly men and
women increased in most OECD nations between 1995 and 2011. However, in 10 out of the 30 nations, women’s age of retirement is decreasing, and in 15 nations, men’s age of retirement is decreasing. Women
are working less and men more in New Zealand, Australia, and Russia,
whereas in Greece, women are working longer and men are retiring at
younger ages. The conclusions we draw from the international experience is that there is a general tendency for a national policy that cuts
retirement benefits to lead to increases in retirement ages, but there is a
great deal of variation in that relationship.
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Financialization of pension systems/retirement is defined as having
an increasing share of old-age income originating from financial assets,
rather than from social insurance programs. The degree of financialization varies by country; the elderly in some nations obtain relatively
more income from capital than others (Table 2.2, showing 27 nations).
Table 2.2 Source of Retirement Income from Capital, by Nation
Share of income from capital, for
Country
household heads over age 65
Slovak Republic
0.7
Poland
1.0
Czech Republic
1.5
Hungary
2.5
Greece
4.3
Austria
4.7
Belgium
5.8
Ireland
6.3
Netherlands
6.6
Portugal
7.1
Italy
7.7
Norway
8.6
Finland
8.8
Germany
10.8
Iceland
11.2
Switzerland
11.2
Luxembourg
11.3
Sweden
11.9
Spain
12.4
Mexico
12.8
United States
12.9
Australia
17.0
Denmark
18.7
France
19.7
Turkey
19.8
New Zealand
24.4
Canada
40.6
SOURCE: OECD (2015a,b).
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For instance, Canadian elders get 40 percent of their average income
from stocks and bonds, and Slovakian elders less than 1 percent.
The boost in elderly work caused by shrinking and uncertain retirement income is welcomed by governments that are engaged in austerity policies. At one extreme is the United States, where the Social
Security system has stagnated and job-related defined benefit pensions
have been replaced by voluntary, individually directed, commercially
defined contribution 401(k) plans, where fees vary considerably and
payouts are almost always made in a lump sum.
At the other extreme is Switzerland, where contributions to occupational plans are mandatory, the contribution rates vary with age of
worker, and the government sets the minimum rate of return that the
plan must pay and a mandatory annuity rate at which the accumulation
is converted into a flow of pension payments.
Austerity and financialization affect people in lower socioeconomic classes differently from those at the top. Those who depend most
on social security and have little pension wealth will likely be more
induced to work or look for work than others.
And the negative and unintended effect of inducing more work
from the elderly by eroding pension security, rather than luring more
people into the workforce with better wages and working conditions, is
that the people with the lowest levels of productivity will be forced to
stay in the labor force longer, which causes average productivity to fall
(Burtless 2013). This “forced to work” hypothesis is consistent with
the evidence that increases in labor force participation rates among the
elderly are not correlated directly with GDP growth.6
Since some increases in labor force participation of older workers
are linked to financialization and austerity policies, it is not unanticipated that nations with high rates of labor force participation also show
higher rates of elder poverty.
But just how is pension financialization linked to higher poverty
rates? First, policies that lead nations to shift away from defined contribution–type retirement systems are often a part of larger austerity
measures, in which nations reduce unemployment benefits, increase
the normal pensionable age, and reduce social spending. In addition,
income from personal assets is less secure and is subject to market fluctuations and income shocks such as job loss, divorce, and health crises.
It may be that nations that encourage work to supplement pension and
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social insurance income are nations that tolerate more hardship among
their elderly. There is some evidence for this proposition. Unfortunately, working longer signals poverty; the Pearson correlation between
the labor force participation of older people and elderly poverty rates is
38 percent (Figure 2.1).
In countries where older people have a relatively high share of their
income coming from capital, such as Mexico and the United States, we
also see some of the highest rates of elderly poverty. In countries such as
France, Belgium, and Luxembourg, where income comes mostly from
sources other than capital (e.g., social insurance), we also see some of
the lowest rates of elderly poverty (Figure 2.1). Nations that tolerate
high levels of elderly poverty are more likely to accept riskier pensions.

CONCLUSION
As many nations in the OECD shrink their social insurance programs, more elders will obtain their retirement income from individually saved or invested assets. The shift away from PAYGo (“pay as you
go”) financing (which is a direct transfer from current workers to pensioners) toward prefunded pensions that provide for future income is
occurring in some OECD countries, but the financialization of pensions
has taken place at different rates, intensities, and pacing.
Retirement time will be reduced across income classes, but in particular for those who are unlucky in their finances, have high fees on
their financial transactions, and suffer life shocks that prevented sufficient accumulation of assets.
Higher-income workers are most likely to have economic lives
that are compatible with a financialized retirement system. The highest
earners have better and more stable jobs, have larger and more sophisticated employers, pay lower account fees, have more access to financial
information networks, and benefit disproportionately from tax deductions for retirement fund earnings and contributions.
Many nations in the OECD have adopted some aspects of the
U.S. retirement system so that more elders will obtain their retirement
income from individually saved or invested assets. The privatization
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Figure 2.1 Relationship between Working More at Older Ages and
Poverty Rates at Older Ages, Various European Countries
and Mexico (r = 0.38)
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of risk—and the provision against risk—has been the most dramatic
change in the form of pension provision in the OECD countries.
In sum, there are two potential consequences of pension financialization. First, raising the age of eligibility for full social security
benefits may increase elders’ labor force participation without making
their retirement times shorter. Second, uncertain incomes and the nonredistributive characteristic of financial assets could leave low-income
and less-educated people more at risk of poverty rates in old age. In
other words, retirement time may stay the same, but poverty will likely
increase.
Bottom line: The shift from social insurance to the relative insecurity of financial-based retirement accounts will likely have the intended
effect of increasing elderly labor force participation rates and the unintended effects of shrinking retirement time or not improving retirement
time and increasing old-age poverty in the time of life when time is
more precious.
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Notes
1. Employers can sponsor defined benefit (DB) or 401(k) or other DC retirement
plans. DB entitlements are computed using a formula that considers salary and
length of employment. In contrast, DC plans pay a lump sum equal to employee
and employer contributions plus net return on investments. DB plans are associated with greater retirement security than 401(k) or other DC plans, because
DB plans pay a lifetime annuity, do not allow people to withdraw money before
retirement, earn higher returns, have lower fees, and do not allow nonparticipation
by eligible employees. DB plan participants retire about two years earlier than
otherwise similar workers covered by DC plans or uncovered workers, reflecting
wealth accrual patterns that incent early retirement.
2. Thus, DB plans, which used to pay a stream of income for the rest of a person’s
life (an annuity), were switched to policies encouraging payments from an individually owned retirement account.
3. The Pearson correlation is a measure of the linear correlation between two
variables. I have no good reason to imagine that the relationship between GDP
growth and elderly labor force participation is not linear, though further thought
and research should consider other specifications. The measure takes on values
between +1 and −1, where 1 is total positive linear correlation, 0 is no linear
correlation, and −1 is total negative linear correlation. The size of the correlation
indicates the intensity of the relationship.
4. Retirement time has increased, but the rate of increase has slowed. On average,
we found that the estimated average retirement time for people in the 30 OECD
nations since 1958 (some countries had data only from 1971 on) had increased
by more than 20 percent between 1958 and 1992, with a 29 percent improvement
for women and a 23 percent improvement for men. However, the rate of improvements slowed to 8 percent improvement for women and 13 percent for men in the
second period, from 1993 to 2010.
5. As nations get richer, more resources are devoted to increasing longevity through
public health campaigns, clean water, antismoking campaigns, clean air and water
regulations, access to health care, and technologies for the treatment of heart disease, cancer, and other diseases. Simple two-way correlations between the GDP
growth rate in each OECD nation and the growth of life expectancy for people
over age 65 is 50 percent for men and women together and 64 percent for women
(Ghilarducci and Novello 2017).
6. Because employer health-care costs increase with the age of the employer’s labor
force, the relationship of pay to productivity is distorted: older workers’ total compensation increases as their productivity falls. Though older people are healthier
than older people were in the past, there is evidence that the speed of technology
has made for quicker rates of skill obsolescence, so productivity declines after age
60. The argument that eroding pension security leads to declines in productivity is
important to note because it feeds into one of the perennial policy concerns about
the total productivity of a labor force and its relationship to overall economic
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growth. We are not commenting on the strength of this argument, since other
factors have important impacts on productivity, including, in particular, capital
investment.
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3
The Economics and Politics
of the Fall and Rise of Income
Inequality in the United States
Charles L. Ballard
Michigan State University

Income inequality in the United States has increased dramatically
since the 1970s. However, the U.S. economy also experienced an
equally dramatic equalization in the 1930s and 1940s. Consequently, if
we are to develop a complete understanding of the evolution of the U.S.
income distribution, we must analyze the earlier “Great Compression”
or “Great Convergence,” as well as the more recent “Great Divergence.”
I begin with a review of the facts of the changes in income inequality
over the past century in the United States. I will then discuss and evaluate the economic explanations for those trends. However, the economic
trends cannot be understood fully without reference to political factors.
I argue that both the Great Compression and the Great Divergence are
primarily the result of deliberate political choices. Furthermore, I argue
that race is the most important of the many factors leading to the political shifts that have, in turn, contributed to the Great Divergence of the
past 40 years: Many whites, especially in the South, reacted to the Civil
Rights movement by switching their allegiance to the Republican Party,
and this has contributed substantially to the adoption of more antiegalitarian economic policies.

TRENDS IN INCOME INEQUALITY IN THE
UNITED STATES
The best starting point for a discussion of long-term trends in U.S.
income inequality is the paper by Piketty and Saez (2003). Their origi31
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nal paper contains data through 1998, but they have updated the data
annually, so that we now have a complete series covering a full century,
from 1913 to 2017.1 Piketty and Saez use tax-return data, which allow
them to produce extremely detailed estimates for the income shares of
the very top income strata.
Some of the trends in income shares derived by Piketty and Saez are
shown in Figure 3.1.
The data depicted in Figure 3.1 reveal that the shares of the top
groups fell from the late 1920s to the early 1970s, and especially
sharply in the early 1940s. The share of the top 1 percent plummeted
from 15.7 percent of total income in 1940 to 10.5 percent in 1944. Top
income shares surged upward in the 1980s, almost as dramatically as
they had fallen in the early 1940s. In the most recent 10 years, the share
of the top 1 percent has been around 18 percent of total income, which
is higher than the average in the first 15 years, as shown in Figure 3.1.
Thus, by some measures, the income distribution in the United States
today is more unequal than it was a century ago.
The disequalization since the 1970s has been extremely top-heavy.
A majority of the gains in share for the top 5 percent went to the top 1
percent, a majority of the gains in share for the top 1 percent accrued
to the top one-tenth of 1 percent, and about half of the gains in share
for the top one-tenth of 1 percent accrued to the top one-hundredth of
1 percent.
Piketty and Saez (2003) focus exclusively on the top 10 percent, but
there have also been changes in the income distribution below the top 10
percent. Census data from Semega, Fontenot, and Kollar (2017) show
that, since the 1970s, the income of the typical household at the 90th
percentile rose by substantially more than the income of the household
at the 80th percentile, which rose faster than the income of the household at the 60th percentile, which rose faster than the income of the
median household. However, the incomes of the households at the 40th
and 20th percentiles grew only slightly more slowly than the income of
the median household. Thus, during the Great Divergence, those at the
very, very top of the income distribution pulled away from those merely
at the very top, those at the very top pulled away from those at the top,
and those at the top pulled away from those in the middle. On the other
hand, those in the middle of the income distribution have gained only
slightly when compared with those at the bottom.
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Figure 3.1 Percentage of Income in the United States Received by the
Highest-Income Households, 1917–2015
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ECONOMIC EXPLANATIONS FOR THE GREAT
CONVERGENCE OF THE EARLY AND MIDDLE
TWENTIETH CENTURY
Each explanation described here is a phenomenon that could potentially push the overall degree of income inequality in a particular direction, but each could possibly be offset by any of several other factors.
The story told here is definitely not one of historical determinism or
inevitability.
Increased educational attainment. An increase in education will
increase the supply of more highly skilled workers. All else being equal,
this will tend to reduce wage differentials.
Educational attainment in the United States increased with stunning speed for the first three-quarters of the twentieth century, and the
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evidence suggests that this contributed substantially to the Great Compression. The high school graduation rate increased from about 9 percent in 1910 to about 70 percent in 1960. The rapid rise in attainment
of a high school diploma was the result of a nationwide movement at
the grassroots level. Compulsory attendance laws helped, but Goldin
(1999) argues that an even more important source of change was the
adoption of “free tuition laws,” under which school districts were compelled to provide funds for secondary schools. As a result, by the 1930s
and 1940s, the number of Americans who had acquired enough skills to
compete for jobs above the rank of laborer had skyrocketed. The GI Bill
of 1944 then provided the impetus for a surge in the college-educated
population.
Wage-setting institutions. The National Labor Relations Act of
1935 made it much easier for labor unions to organize successfully. In
1935, about 13 percent of U.S. workers were members of a labor union.
By 1945, the rate of union membership had risen to about 35 percent.
The rapid rise in union membership contributed to the Great Compression, as labor unions helped boost the incomes of Americans in
the lower and middle strata of the income distribution. The Fair Labor
Standards Act of 1938 established, among other things, a federal minimum wage of 25 cents per hour. The minimum wage also contributed
somewhat to the Great Compression.
Goldin and Margo (1992) document the crucial role played by the
National War Labor Board during the Second World War. As part of
the effort to control the inflationary pressures stemming from the war,
the Board was given the power to approve or deny requests for wage
increases. The Board was much more likely to approve wage increases
for low-wage workers, and this contributed substantially to the Great
Compression.
Social norms. Even after the wartime wage controls were dismantled, the income distribution remained much more equal than it had
been a decade before. This was partly due to the continuing trends of
rising educational attainment, stronger unions, and substantial increases
in the minimum wage, as well as to other factors that we will discuss
below. But it was probably also due, at least in part, to a change in
social norms. It appears that the reduced wage differentials came to be
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widely accepted as fair, and that they remained widely accepted for a
generation.
Regulation of financial services. The first century and a half of
U.S. history is littered with financial crises. The largest financial crisis
of all contributed to the Great Depression in the 1930s, and this led the
73rd Congress to establish a strong regulatory regime for the financial services sector. These regulations led to the only time in history
that the United States went for a half-century without a financial crisis,
and the regulations also reduced the incomes of financiers. Since those
who work at Wall Street firms and big banks are very prominent in the
extreme top of the income distribution, the reduction in their incomes
was an important force for equalization.
Progressive taxation. Until the twentieth century, the revenue system of the United States relied primarily on customs duties and excise
taxes, which tend to be regressive. However, during the Progressive
Era, concern about the unequal distribution of income and wealth led to
political pressure for enactment of more progressive revenue sources.
In 1913, with the Sixteenth Amendment to the Constitution, the United
States established a progressive income tax. The marginal tax rate faced
by the highest-income Americans was increased dramatically during
the Democratic administration of Franklin Roosevelt, reaching 94 percent in 1944, and it stayed at 91 percent throughout the Republican
administration of Dwight Eisenhower.
Corporate-source income is disproportionately received by those
with high incomes. Thus, the corporation income tax, established in
1909, also increased the progressivity of the tax system. During the
Second World War, the top marginal rate in the corporation tax reached
53 percent, and the top rate stayed above 50 percent for two decades
after the war. The third key element of the trend toward more progressive taxation was the estate tax—levied, as the name implies, on the
estates of wealthy decedents, and established in 1916. The top marginal
rate in the estate tax reached 77 percent in 1941, and it stayed there until
1976.
Restricted immigration. From 1890 to 1910, the rates of immigration into the United States reached all-time highs. The flood of
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immigrants in the early twentieth century put downward pressure on
the wages of low-skilled native-born workers in the United States. In
reaction against this, Congress passed laws in the 1920s that severely
restricted immigration.
The reduced supply of immigrants led to an increase in wage rates
for low-skilled workers through the ordinary interaction of supply and
demand. Equally important, many of the immigrants who arrived in the
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries eventually became citizens
and were able to vote. This, combined with the decrease in the number
of new arrivals, greatly reduced the size of the low-wage population
that had no political voice.

ECONOMIC EXPLANATIONS OF THE
GREAT DIVERGENCE
I will consider the various explanations for the Great Divergence
in what I consider to be their order of importance. However, I readily
acknowledge that any judgment about the relative importance of these
factors must necessarily be somewhat subjective.
Changes in technology. If technological changes increase the
demand for highly skilled workers and decrease the demand for lessskilled workers, the technological changes will tend to increase wage
differentials.
In the final third of the twentieth century, the growth rate of highly
skilled labor slowed as the high school graduation rate leveled off and
the rate of increase of college completion slowed. At the same time, it
appears that the demand for highly skilled workers rose rapidly. Many
jobs that involved simple, repetitive tasks were replaced by automated
processes.
Predictably, this led to a widening earnings gap between college
graduates and those with only a high school diploma. Not only that,
but, as documented by Lemieux (2006), the earnings gap between those
with education beyond a bachelor’s degree and those with only a bachelor’s degree has also widened.
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Unions lose strength. As mentioned earlier, union membership
soared in the decade following enactment of the National Labor Relations Act in 1935. Figure 3.2 shows that increase, as well as the subsequent erosion of the relative strength of unions, which has now continued fairly steadily for 60 years. As unions weakened, they lost some of
their ability to secure more favorable wages and benefits. Blackburn,
Bloom, and Freeman (1990) estimate that deunionization can explain
20 percent of the increase in wage inequality for U.S. men. Also, unions
have long been a bastion of support for the Democratic Party, which has
been more egalitarian (or at least less antiegalitarian) than the Republican Party during the period studied here.
Deregulation of financial services. We have seen that regulation of
the financial-services sector was greatly strengthened in the 1930s. Not
surprisingly, however, Wall Street fought back. Beginning in the 1970s,
the financial regulations were slowly but steadily stripped away. As a
Figure 3.2 Union Members as Percentage of U.S. Workers, 1930–2018
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result, the incomes of financiers skyrocketed, and in the late 2000s, the
financial system experienced its worst crisis since 1933.
Philippon and Reshef (2012) show that the increased regulation of
the 1930s led to a society in which the earnings of financial workers
were only slightly higher than the earnings of comparably skilled workers in other sectors. When the regulations were removed, it once again
became possible for financial-service workers to earn a very substantial
premium over comparable workers in the rest of the economy. Philippon and Reshef estimate that finance accounts for 15–25 percent of the
overall increase in income inequality since 1980.
Changes in family structure. Increases in the prevalence of singleparent families are likely to exacerbate inequality. In 1950, 7.4 percent
of families with children were headed by a single parent. By 2016, that
fraction had grown to 31.6 percent. Haskins and Sawhill (2016) estimate that these changes in family structure are responsible for at least
15 percent of the increase in inequality, and possibly much more.
A substantial part of the change in family structure is probably due
to changing attitudes toward marriage and divorce. However, mass
incarceration has undoubtedly had an effect on family structure as well.
The rate of incarceration in state and federal prisons was more than five
times as high in the mid-2000s as it had been in 1972. Mass incarceration surely contributed to the breakdown of families, which, as we have
seen, was a major force contributing to the Great Divergence. In addition to this indirect effect, mass incarceration has probably also played
a direct role in the Great Divergence, since convicts often suffer permanent damage to their earnings prospects, even after they are released
from prison. Finally, mass incarceration disenfranchises a part of the
population that is disproportionately poor.
At the same time that the breakdown of the family was increasing
income inequality by increasing the number of single-parent families,
another change in family structure was increasing income inequality
by increasing the incomes of many relatively more affluent families.
Assortative mating is the practice whereby men and women with similar levels of education are more likely to form families than are men
and women with different levels of education. The evidence suggests
that assortative mating has increased in the past few decades. When
we combine increased assortative mating with increased female labor-
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force participation, we have yet another factor that contributes to the
Great Divergence. Greenwood et al. (2014) find that assortative mating
made essentially no difference in 1960, but that it contributed very substantially to inequality in 2005.
Less progressive taxation. We have seen that U.S. tax rates on
those with high incomes and large amounts of wealth were quite high in
the middle of the twentieth century. However, the top marginal tax rate
in the federal individual income tax was reduced to 70 percent in 1964
and to 50 percent in 1981. In 2017, President Donald Trump signed a
reduction in the top rate to 37 percent, once again providing large benefits to the most affluent households.
The time pattern of top marginal tax rates in the federal individual
income tax, shown in Figure 3.3, is roughly inverse-U-shaped. The pattern of top marginal tax rates is somewhat similar to the pattern of unionization, shown in Figure 3.2. The pattern for each of these is roughly the
reverse of the U-shaped pattern for top income shares, shown in Figure
Figure 3.3 Highest Marginal Tax Rate in the U.S. Federal Individual
Income Tax, 1913–2019
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3.1. These data suggest that a wide variety of political and economic
phenomena went in one direction in the early and middle decades of
the twentieth century and then reversed course in the 1970s and 1980s.
The corporate tax rate stayed at 52 percent from 1952 to 1963.
In 2017, it was reduced to 21 percent for domestic-source corporate
income, and to zero for foreign-source corporate income. In 1945, the
corporate tax raised 35 percent of the total revenues of the federal government. This proportion shrank to 22 percent in 1965 and to 10.6 percent in 2015.
The estate tax is a relatively small part of the revenue system, but it
is strongly progressive, since it applies only to very wealthy decedents.
The top rate in the federal estate tax was decreased to 70 percent in
1977 and to 50 percent in 1982. The top rate in the estate tax is now
40 percent, and the fraction of estates that is subject to tax has been
reduced dramatically.
Finally, in addition to cutting the top marginal tax rate generally, the
tax cuts signed into law by George W. Bush in 2001 and 2003 reduced
the tax rates on dividends and capital gains. Each of these types of
income is disproportionately received by high-income households.
International trade. Until the 1970s, international trade played a
fairly small role in the U.S. economy. Thus, it does not appear that
international trade had any substantial role in the Great Compression.
However, the catastrophic effects of the Great Depression and the Second World War led the United States to take the lead in building a more
integrated global economy in the postwar period. The relative importance of international trade increased significantly in the 1970s, and it
has continued to increase since then.
Burtless (1995) suggests that import competition contributed to rising
income inequality, and he was writing at a time when imports from China
were relatively small. After China joined the World Trade Organization
in 2001, the pressure on American manufacturing from Chinese imports
intensified. Acemoglu et al. (2016) calculate that the increase in imports
from China may have been responsible for the direct loss of more than
800,000 American manufacturing jobs between 1991 and 2011.
If we desire to slow down or reverse the increase of income inequality, many policies are available. For example, since the slowdown in
educational attainment has contributed to the Great Divergence, the
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obvious policy prescription is to increase investments in education.
Since deregulation of the financial-services sector has contributed to
the Great Divergence, the obvious policy prescription is to strengthen
the regulation of financial firms. And since the decrease in the progressivity of the tax system has also contributed to the Great Divergence,
the obvious policy prescription would be to reverse the trend by making
the tax system more progressive. Based on my values, which include a
desire for a less unequal distribution of income, all three of the prescriptions described in this paragraph would be sound policies. However,
when we consider the fact that import competition has contributed to
the Great Divergence, the obvious policy prescriptions of tariffs and
import quotas are associated with great risks. A cycle of retaliatory tariffs (such as that which followed the imposition of the Smoot-Hawley
tariffs in 1930) could do profound damage to the export sector. Also,
although tariffs can help domestic producers, they are unquestionably
harmful for domestic consumers, since they bring fewer choices and
higher prices. Although some may contend that tariffs and quotas are a
“cure” for the “disease” of import competition, I believe that the cure
could be much worse than the disease.
Immigration. After immigration restrictions were relaxed in 1965,
the rate of immigration rose substantially. It appears that this increase
in immigration has contributed to the Great Divergence, just as the earlier decrease in immigration contributed to the Great Compression. As
before, the immigration increases of recent years have had both political and economic effects.
The size of the economic effect is a subject of controversy. Blau
and Mackie (2017) have performed an extraordinarily comprehensive
review of the literature. They find that “when measured over a period
of 10 years or more, the impact of immigration on the wages of natives
overall is very small. However, estimates for subgroups span a comparatively wider range” (p. 204). McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal (2016)
emphasize the political effect: there has been a large increase in the
number of low-income Americans who are not eligible to vote.
The political economy of immigration stands in contrast to the
political economy of the other issues discussed here. The antiegalitarian policy reversals in the 1970s and 1980s were pushed by conservative, antiegalitarian forces. However, the relaxation of immigration
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laws in 1965 was supported by those who were otherwise egalitarian.
Ironically, a clampdown on immigration could have mild equalizing
effects, despite the fact that today’s most ardent advocates of reduced
immigration are those who advocate antiegalitarian policies in other
policy areas.
The minimum wage. The inflation-adjusted federal minimum wage
rose substantially in the 1950s and 1960s and reached its peak in 1968.
Since then, however, the minimum wage has failed to keep up with
inflation. Autor, Manning, and Smith (2016) find that the reduction in
the real value of the minimum wage increased inequality in the 1980s,
especially for women. I conclude that minimum wage laws contributed
somewhat to the equalization of the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s, and that
the falling real value of the minimum wage also contributed somewhat
to the widening income gap of the 1980s.
Executive compensation. Davis and Mishel (2014) calculate the
average ratio of compensation of chief executive officers (CEOs) to the
compensation of the average worker in their firms, for a sample of 350
large U.S. companies. In the 1960s and early 1970s, this ratio was in
the low 20s. The ratio then began to rise rapidly, reaching 383 in 2000,
before falling back to “only” 296 in 2013. Bebchuk and Fried (2004)
discuss the explosion of executive compensation in detail. It is possible that some of the rise in CEO compensation may be a response to
improved productivity on the part of executives. However, it is difficult
to escape the conclusion that the phenomenal increases in executive
compensation are largely due to a change in social norms. Skyrocketing
CEO compensation since the 1970s is consistent with a change in social
norms, under which executives and their boards of directors lost the
“outrage constraint” that might previously have prevented them from
pushing CEO compensation to stratospheric heights.

POLITICAL EXPLANATIONS
How could the Great Divergence take place in a country like the
United States, in which many important policy decisions are made by
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elected leaders? The policies of the last 40 years have been extraordinarily beneficial for a relatively small number of affluent Americans,
but these beneficiaries are greatly outnumbered by those whose economic interests have been harmed by the changes. Thus, the question is
why so many congressional and presidential elections have been won
by those who espouse and carry out antiegalitarian economic policies.
Social issues. Very often, candidates for public office who espouse
conservative, antiegalitarian views on economic issues also have conservative views on social issues, such as abortion and gay rights. Thus,
when a voter casts her vote primarily on the basis of opposition to abortion or gay rights, she will usually be voting for a candidate who also
has antiegalitarian views on economic issues. Unless this voter is fairly
affluent, she will thereby be voting against her economic interests.
Frank (2004) argues that conservatives have skillfully used social
issues to drive a wedge between many voters and their economic interests. My view is that, although social issues are only a part of the picture,
they cannot be dismissed. Elections are often won by small margins. If
even a relatively small number of voters are persuaded to vote against
their economic interests by social and cultural appeals, the effects on
policy can be large.
Political organization and voter turnout. Edsall (1984) describes
a business community that developed a sense of class consciousness
and class solidarity. Along with increasingly energetic conservative
ideologues, the business community provided increasingly unified support, and plenty of money, to conservative, antiegalitarian candidates
for public office.
Edsall also identifies a series of changes that unmoored the Democratic Party from its long tradition of strong connections with workingclass voters. In the 1960s and 1970s, antiwar activists, environmentalists, and women’s-rights advocates joined the Democratic Party
in increasing numbers. These groups were not necessarily hostile to
organized labor and working-class Democrats, but workers’ issues and
income inequality were not at the top of their agendas. Thus, the Democratic Party has been less effective than it might otherwise have been
at resisting the antiegalitarian trend. The Reagan tax cuts of 1981 were
passed by a Congress with a Democratic majority in the House of Rep-
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resentatives. Also, much of the deregulation of the financial services
sector took place during the Democratic administration of Bill Clinton.
Edsall also emphasizes that lower-income voters tend to have lower
rates of turnout than those with higher incomes. If turnout in American
elections were anywhere near 100 percent, the Great Divergence might
have been much smaller than it has been.
Electoral institutions. Proportional voting schemes are used in
parliamentary elections in many European countries. These electoral
systems stand in contrast to the “first-past-the-post” system used in
elections for the U.S. Congress. Alesina and Glaeser (2004) argue that
proportional voting schemes contribute to the adoption of egalitarian
policies. The first-past-the-post system rewards political parties whose
supporters are not geographically concentrated, such as the Republican
Party in the United States today.
The first-past-the-post system is also subject to gerrymandering.
Although gerrymandering has benefited Democratic candidates on
some occasions in the past, it tends to benefit Republican candidates
today, since so many state legislatures are controlled by Republicans.
To the extent that the first-past-the-post system has come to favor
Republicans, it has contributed to the Great Divergence. I believe that
this is a relatively important effect.
In the United States, presidents are chosen according to the Electoral College, an eighteenth-century institution that was deliberately
designed to reduce the influence of the broad public. In 2000, the
Republican George W. Bush was elected, despite losing the popular
vote to the Democrat Al Gore by more than 500,000 votes. The Republican Donald Trump was elected in 2016, despite losing the popular
vote to the Democrat Hillary Clinton by more than 2.8 million votes.
Of course, there is no guarantee that the Electoral College will only go
against the popular vote in a way that favors the antiegalitarian candidate. Nevertheless, in 2000 and 2016, what actually happened was that
antiegalitarian Republicans won the Electoral College while losing the
popular vote.
Small effects can accumulate and reinforce themselves over time.
An important example of this is that Supreme Court justices in the
United States are nominated by presidents who win the Electoral College, regardless of whether those presidents won the popular vote.
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Thus, the second-place vote getter in the 2000 presidential election,
George W. Bush, was able to nominate two conservative justices (John
Roberts and Samuel Alito) to the Supreme Court. It is quite likely that
Gore nominees would have voted differently from Roberts and Alito
in two very important cases. The first of these is the 2010 decision in
Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, in which the conservative majority voted to reduce substantially the restrictions on political expenditures. The second is the 2013 decision in Shelby County
v. Holder, in which the conservative majority voted to eviscerate key
provisions of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. If presidential elections
were always won by the top vote getter, it is likely that the decisions
in Citizens United and Shelby County would have gone the other way.
Voter ignorance. Bartels (2005, 2008) emphasizes voter misunderstanding of a variety of policies. For example, although surveys
indicate that a majority of Americans favor a progressive tax structure,
many do not seem to have comprehended the highly regressive nature
of the 2001 tax cuts. However, there is no evidence that voter ignorance
is a new phenomenon. It strains credulity to think that voters were well
informed until the 1970s and then suddenly became ignorant 40 years
ago.
An even more telling piece of evidence against placing too much
weight on the ignorance hypothesis is that the shift toward voting against
one’s economic interests was confined almost exclusively to white voters. African American voters, who are disproportionately represented
on the lower rungs of the income scale, tended to vote for candidates
espousing relatively egalitarian policies in the early and middle part of
the twentieth century (when they were allowed to vote). Black voters
have continued to vote in overwhelming majorities for the Democratic
Party, which is clearly the more egalitarian (or at least the less antiegalitarian) of the two major parties. Thus, in order to place a lot of weight
on the ignorance hypothesis, it is necessary for us to believe that nearly
all black voters avoided ignorance throughout the period studied here
and thus retained their ability to vote in accordance with their economic
interests, while substantial numbers of white voters suddenly became
more ignorant and thus lost the ability to vote their economic interests.
A related possibility is that large numbers of white voters were susceptible to being misled by disinformation coming from certain parts of the
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news media. This leads me to the conclusion that racial issues provide
more fertile ground for understanding the Great Divergence.
Race. In my view, race explains more of the Great Divergence than
any other single influence. This does not mean that I believe that the
other explanations discussed above are invalid. In fact, I believe that
all of them can explain some of what has happened. I cannot overemphasize the fact that many elections are won by margins of 52 percent
to 48 percent, rather than, say, 93 percent to 7 percent. Thus, each of a
number of factors can turn out to be critically important.
My emphasis on the importance of race also does not suggest that
no real progress has been made on racial issues in the United States.
African Americans have made very significant strides in education,
earnings, and income. In addition, as a result of the dismantling of Jim
Crow laws, most African Americans do not have to endure as many
daily humiliations as they once were forced to endure. In 2008 and
2012, an African American, Barack Obama, won the presidential election (with victories both in the Electoral College and in the popular
vote), which would have been unimaginable for almost all of American
history.
My assertion about the importance of race also does not mean that
the attitudes of a substantial portion of the white population have not
changed for the better. Also, I am not saying that anyone whose policy
preferences differ from mine is a racist. Nevertheless, I cannot avoid the
conclusion that race has played a very important role in generating the
Great Divergence, and that the role of race is more important than the
roles of the other influences discussed above.
From 1900 to 1944, Democratic candidates for president averaged
68 percent of the popular vote in the 11 states of the former Confederacy. From 1948 to 2016, this average was 44 percent, a decrease of
24 percentage points.2 Thus the South, and especially the Deep South,
transformed in a generation from solidly supporting the relatively
more egalitarian Democratic Party to instead supporting the relatively
antiegalitarian Republican Party.
It is possible that the switch of political parties among white Southerners was due, at least in part, to something other than race. Perhaps
white Southerners voted for Barry Goldwater in 1964 because of his
lack of enthusiasm for Social Security, or his support for a strong mili-
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tary. However, the racial history of the South leads me to believe that
race was the dominant factor.
The white backlash against the Civil Rights movement has been
stronger in the South than elsewhere. But this does not mean that racial
issues are unimportant in the rest of the country. Race is clearly very
important in Michigan, a state whose largest metropolitan area, Detroit
and its suburbs, is more heavily segregated by race than any other area
in the country.
The racial fears and hatreds of whites have also helped stimulate
the antigovernment sentiments that have become widespread in recent
decades. For most of American history, governments were openly and
actively hostile to the interests of African Americans. Thus, the Civil
Rights Act, and especially affirmative action programs, represented a
dramatic reversal. This was enough to turn some whites against “government” generally. A watershed moment was the assertion in 1981 by
Republican President Ronald Reagan, in his first inaugural address, that
“government is the problem.” Of course, Reagan was really referring
only to some governmental actions. In the same speech, he called for
a more active policy to confront the Soviet Union. This policy was to
be carried out by a large increase in spending by the Department of
Defense, which is indeed a part of the federal government. Thus, antigovernment rhetoric came to be used as code for opposition to some
activities of government but not others. (Antigovernment rhetoric has
been used most prominently by Republicans, but it has also been used
by Democrats such as President Clinton, who famously said in 1996
that “the era of big government is over.”)
Egalitarian government policies were essential to the Great Compression. In my view, although the antigovernment rhetoric of the past
40 years has sometimes had a libertarian element, its main effects have
been to promote antiegalitarian policies, which have contributed to the
Great Divergence.3
If the assertions that I have made here are correct, they represent
a remarkable irony. White voters of modest economic circumstances
supported the egalitarian policies that led to the Great Compression,
and this advanced their economic interests. Economic inequality was
reduced dramatically, and the standard of living of low- and middleincome whites skyrocketed. However, when the federal government
moved to reduce racial inequality, the support for political candidates
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espousing egalitarian economic policies among low- and middleincome white voters fell dramatically. This reduction in support was
enough to usher in the antiegalitarian tide of the past 40 years, to the
detriment of many of those same white voters.

WHAT DOES THE FUTURE HOLD?
Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) describe “critical junctures”—
moments in history that disturb the established system. They show that
small differences in initial conditions can lead to large differences in the
response to a critical juncture. Is the abrupt policy reversal of the 1970s
and 1980s a critical juncture, and if so, where will it lead?
On the one hand, there is plenty of reason to believe that the Great
Divergence will continue, and that income inequality in the United
States will remain very high. Wall Street firms have fought strenuously to water down the implementation of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010. The strength of labor
unions continues to erode. In 2017, a Republican Congress and president passed a set of tax cuts that were very favorable to those with high
incomes, especially those who owned large amounts of corporate stock.
Wealthy antiegalitarians, such as Charles Koch and his brother, the late
David Koch, continue to provide strong financial support for antiegalitarian causes and candidates. The flood of money into the political system was further encouraged by the Citizens United decision (Citizens
United v. Federal Election Commission), and enforcement of the Voting Rights Act was weakened by the Shelby County decision (Shelby
County v. Holder).
On the other hand, many of the egalitarian victories of American
history are still intact. We still have universal elementary and secondary
education. Despite huge reductions in public funding, we still have the
strongest system of higher education in the world. No one is seriously
suggesting that we should repeal the Thirteenth, Fifteenth, or Nineteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. Despite the fact that it is
not in long-run balance, the Social Security system continues to provide
income support for tens of millions of elderly Americans. We still have
an income tax. Moreover, income inequality is probably getting more
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attention than ever before, and some candidates for public office are
campaigning on egalitarian platforms.
Thus, I believe it is impossible to know for certain the future direction of income inequality in the United States. There is a growing clamor
in the press and among Democratic challengers on the campaign trail,
who contend that the majority of Americans would prefer to see a substantial reduction in inequality, and I believe that American democracy
is still sufficiently vital that it is possible this will occur.

Notes
This chapter draws substantially from a revised version of a paper presented at the
conference on “Inequality and Democracy Today,” held at Michigan State University,
October 8–10, 2015. I am grateful to participants in that conference, to participants in a
seminar at Western Michigan University on September 27, 2017, to my students in Economics 495 at Michigan State University, and to Paul Menchik for helpful comments. I
also thank Karan Bhakta, Laura Boisten, Lauren Bretz, Emily Gaertner, Kim Gannon,
Matt Hinkel, Julia Jankowski, Jesse Nelson, and Matt Suandi for outstanding research
assistance. Any errors are mine.
1. The updated series can be found at http://eml.berkeley.edu/~saez/. Because of data
limitations, some of the authors’ series begin in 1917.
2. Note that few blacks were able to vote in these Southern states in the first six
decades of the twentieth century. Thus, the decrease in the overall fraction of the
southern vote going to Democrats is an understatement of the extent to which
white southerners switched parties.
3. The wave of antigovernment rhetoric has sometimes generated remarkable ironies
and paradoxes, such as when a South Carolina woman in 2009 shouted to a member of Congress that he should “keep your government hands off my Medicare.”
Appelbaum and Gebeloff (2012) report on the tendency for conservative critics of
the social safety net to rely on the social safety net, apparently without noticing the
irony.
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4
America’s Unequal Playing Field
The Gaps between Poor and
Rich Children’s Resources
Mary E. Corcoran
National Bureau of Economic Research

Growing up wealthy in the United States confers advantages over
growing up poor, and not just the extra discretionary money that rich
parents have to spend on children. On average, children of the rich are
more likely to avoid the disruption and trauma, both emotional and economic, from absent fathers due to out-of-wedlock births, divorce, and
paternal incarceration. Their home environments are more likely to be
educationally enriching. They are more likely to have parents who are
college graduates and less likely to have parents who are high school
dropouts. They are more likely to be raised in safe neighborhoods with
good schools. Rich parents have more money, time, and social capital
to invest in children. Given this, it is hardly surprising that rich children fare better economically as adults than do middle-income and lowincome children.
The authors of two recent books, Whither Opportunity? and Dream
Hoarders, warn that the economic and noneconomic advantages of
being raised by wealthy parents are increasingly bundled together and
are growing rapidly in ways that could imperil the American ideal of
fair opportunity (Duncan and Murnane 2011b; Reeves 2017). Since the
1980s, economic changes, demographic changes, and changes in the
criminal justice system have widened the gaps between the economic
resources and social capital of affluent parents and those of middleincome and low-income families. Over the same period, a college
degree has become increasingly important to children’s adult economic
success. Investing in children’s education has become more important
for their economic mobility at the same time that gaps were widen-
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ing between the resources of affluent parents and those of middle- and
low-income parents. Duncan and Murnane (2011b) write that this leads
to a very real worry: “Is the cherished U.S. norm of a level playing
field—i.e., that a child’s economic origins do not determine his or her
economic future—at risk?”
This chapter is organized as follows. I begin by presenting a stylized picture of the associations between family income and children’s
adult incomes. This is followed by a comparison of the rates of intergenerational economic mobility in the United States to those in other
Western industrialized countries. The United States comes off poorly in
these comparisons. I then delineate how economic trends, demographic
trends, and changes in the criminal justice system since the 1980s have
altered the distribution of resources and social capital available to children in low-income, middle-income, and high-income families in the
United States, and I document how returns to a college degree have
increased since 1980 in the United States. I next review studies showing that parental income more strongly predicts students’ achievement
test scores, college attendance, and college graduation today than it did
in the past. I conclude by speculating on how the trends and evidence
reviewed in this paper might affect equal opportunity in the United
States. The background advantages of children from affluent families
vis-à-vis the advantages of children from middle-income and lowincome families have risen. College education affects a child’s adult
economic attainments more strongly now than in the past; and a child’s
chance of acquiring a college degree is more tied to parental income
now than in the past. Does this inevitably mean that the United States
will become more stratified by income? What policy strategies might
weaken the link between parental income and children’s adult success?
Figure 4.1 presents a stylized picture of the relationships between
family income during childhood, a child’s education, and a child’s adult
income. Family income is depicted as influencing a child’s adult income
through two distinct paths.
The first path is through education. Parental income is positively
associated with children’s education. Higher education, in turn, leads to
higher adult income. In Figure 4.1, “a” depicts the association of family
income with child education and “b” depicts the association of child
education with child adult income. Mechanisms by which high-income
parents may improve children’s educational outcomes include buying
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Figure 4.1 Intergenerational Income Equality
c

Parental
income

a

Child’s
education

b

Child’s
adult
income

NOTE: The correlation between parents’ income and children’s incomes equals ab +
c, where ab is the indirect effect of parental income on child income through child
education and c is the effect of parental income on child income that is independent
of child education.

homes in affluent communities with good schools, providing a stimulating environment, tutoring, SAT prep classes, hiring coaches to help
students with the college admissions process, and legacy admissions.
Parental income is also correlated with other family resources, such as
parental education or growing up in a stable home, that are associated
with children’s educational attainment.
In the second path, family income can affect a child’s adult income
independently of education. Examples of influences include professional connections, social networks, and income transfers. In Figure
4.1, “c” indicates the association of family income with a child’s adult
income that is independent of the child’s education.

IS THE UNITED STATES MORE ECONOMICALLY
MOBILE THAN OTHER COUNTRIES?
Despite the popular notion that the United States is an open and
mobile society, it is no more mobile—and, in most cases, is actually less
mobile—than comparable Western nations. Jantii (2009) compiled estimates of father-son intergenerational income elasticities for 11 Western

56 Corcoran

industrialized nations. The sons in these studies were typically born
in the 1960s, and their incomes were typically measured over several
years between the ages of 30 and 40. So these elasticities provide estimates of intergenerational inequality for men born and raised prior to
1980. Jantii (2009, p. 190) describes intergenerational elasticity as “a
measure of the number of percentage points by which a son’s income
will increase if a father’s income increases by 1 percent.” The U.S. elasticity of 0.45 is the highest of the 11 countries and is much higher than
the father-son elasticities in the Nordic countries, which range from
0.12 in Denmark to 0.28 in Finland.
Elasticities tell us about overall rates of intergenerational mobility across countries but do not tell us the extent to which children who
grow up in poor families remain poor as adults or the extent to which
children who grow up in rich families remain rich as adults. Nor can
elasticities tell how likely it is that a poor child grows up to be a rich
adult—that is, that the child goes from “rags to riches.”
Jantii et al. (2006) address these questions by estimating mobility
matrices for sons’ adult earnings quintiles by fathers’ earning quintiles
for six countries. If a society were completely mobile, then a son’s earnings quintile as an adult should be unrelated to that of his father. In
this discussion, low earners are men in the bottom earnings quintile,
and high earners are men in the top income quintile. Thus, 20 percent
of the sons of low earners should be low earners as adults; 20 percent
should be high earners; and 60 percent should have earnings that fall in
the middle three quintiles. The same should hold true for sons of high
earners. In contrast, if a society were completely immobile, then a son
should have a 100 percent chance of being in the same earnings quintile
as his father.
The bar graph in Figure 4.2 depicts the chances of going from “rags
to rags” in six countries—that is, the percentage of sons of low-earning
fathers who themselves become low earners as adults. The bar graph in
Figure 4.3 depicts the chances of going from “rags to riches”—the percentage of sons of low earners who grow up to be high-earning adults.
Figure 4.4 depicts the chances of going from “riches to riches”—the
percentage of sons of high-earning fathers who also have high earnings
as adults.
Of these three possibilities, the chances of going from “rags to rags”
are highest in the United States, and the chances of going from “rags to
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Figure 4.2 Rags to Rags: Percentage of Sons of Low-Earner Fathers
Who Are Low Earners as Adults
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Figure 4.3 Rags to Riches: Percentage of Sons of Low-Earner Fathers
Who Are High Earners as Adults
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Figure 4.4 Riches to Riches: Percentage of Sons of High Earners Who
Are High Earners as Adults
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riches” are lowest. The probability that the son of a low-earning father
grew up to also be a low earner was 42 percent in the United States, 30
percent in the United Kingdom, and about 25–28 percent in Denmark,
Finland, Norway, and Sweden. The probability that the son of a low
earner grew up to be a high earner was 8 percent in the United States,
14 percent in Denmark, and 11–12 percent in the other countries. Going
from “riches to riches,” on the other hand, was similar across all of
these countries: from 30 to 37 percent of sons of high earners grew up
to also be high earners as adults.
The Increase in Top Income Shares
Since 1980, income in the United States has become concentrated
among the richest households. In 1980, the richest 1 percent of households held 10 percent of all income, and the richest 10 percent of households held about 35 percent of all income (Saez 2016). By 2015, these
income shares had increased to 20 percent for the richest 1 percent and
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to almost 50 percent for the richest 10 percent of households (Saez
2016).
One result of this increased concentration is that the gaps between the
incomes of high-income families and the incomes of low- and middleincome families similarly widened since 1980. Table 4.1 reports on
mean income (in 2016 dollars) of families in the top, middle, and bottom income quintiles in 1980 and in 2016. (Families are defined as
households that include two or more related individuals.) The mean
income of families in the bottom quintile increased by a mere $300 (1.6
percent) between 1980 and 2016, from $17,900 in 1980 to $18,200 in
2016. The mean income of families in the middle income quintile rose
by $11,600 (12 percent), from $61,400 in 1980 to $73,000 in 2016.
In contrast, the mean income of families in the top quintile rose by
$101,700 (73 percent) over the same period, from $137,800 in 1980 to
$239,500 in 2016. As a consequence, the dollar gap between the mean
incomes of high-income (top quintile) and low-income (bottom quintile) families almost doubled, from about $120,000 in 1980 to about
$221,000 by 2016. The dollar gap in the mean incomes of middleincome families and high-income families also almost doubled, rising
from about $76,000 in 1980 to about $147,000 by 2016.
Wealth Inequality
Wealth inequality is far greater than income inequality. In 2013,
the households in the top wealth quintile controlled 89 percent of all
wealth, and households in the top income quintile controlled 67 percent
of all income (Wolff 2014). In a review of recent research on wealth
inequality in the United States, Pfeffer and Schoeni (2016) identify
Table 4.1 Mean Family Income (2016 dollars) by Quintile, 2016 and 1980
2016 ($)
1980 ($)
Change ($)
Change (%)

Bottom income quintile Middle income quintile
18,200
73,000
17,900
61,400
300
11,600
<2
12

Top income quintile
239,500
137,800
101,700
73

NOTE: “Family” is defined as a household with two or more related individuals.
SOURCE: Table was computed by author from Census Bureau Table F-3, “Mean
Income Received by Each Fifth and Top 5 Percent of Families.”
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two avenues by which parental wealth improves children’s economic
futures: 1) by increasing chances of college graduation and 2) through
direct cash or in-kind transfers.
Wealth inequality, like income inequality, has risen over time (Pfeffer and Schoeni 2016; Wolff 2014). Pfeffer and Gross (2018) examine
the distribution of wealth among households with children under the
age of 18 between 1989 and 2013. Over those 25 years, the percentage
of all wealth held by the wealthiest quintile of such households rose
from 80.2 percent in 1989 to 90.3 percent in 2013, while the wealth
share of the bottom 50 percent dropped from 2.3 percent to 0.2 percent.
Table 4.2 reports dollar changes (in 2013 dollars) in net worth
between 1989 and 2013 for households with children at the 90th, 50th,
and 10th percentiles. The net worth of families at the 90th percentile
rose by $295,000 (from $529,600 to $824,600) over those 25 years. In
contrast, the net worth of the median family dropped by $24,700, from
$67,700 to $43,000, and the net worth of families at the 10th percentile
dropped from zero to a negative $6,300, meaning they went into debt.
Trends in Income-Based Residential Segregation
One way in which high-income, wealthy parents can promote children’s economic futures is by buying homes in high-income, safe communities with good schools and good public services. At the same time
that gaps in families’ incomes and wealth were getting bigger, neighborhoods were becoming more segregated by family income. Fry
and Taylor (2012) computed the proportion of census tracts that were
majority low income and majority high income.1 The percentage of
high-income households who “lived mainly among themselves” (p. 1)
doubled from 9 percent in 1980 to 18 percent in 2010. The percentage
Table 4.2 Net Worth (in 2013 dollars) of Families with Children at the
10th, 50th, and 90th Wealth Percentiles in 1989 and 2013
2013
1989
Change ($)

10th
−6,300
0
−6,300

SOURCE: Pfeffer and Gross (2018).

50th
43,000
67,700
−24,700

90th
824,600
529,600
295,000
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of low-income households who lived mainly with other low-income
households rose from 23 percent in 1980 to 28 percent in 2010.
Richard Reeves (2017) points out that income-based residential
segregation can inhibit intergenerational mobility in two ways. First,
richer communities have bigger tax bases and can allocate more money
to public schools. Second, “economic sorting at the neighborhood level
leads to social activity in terms of schools, churches, and community
groups. This means fewer interactions and social ties across social
classes” (Reeves 2017, p. 106). That is, children who reside in predominantly low- and moderate-income neighborhoods will have less access
to mobility-enhancing social and job networks.
The College Wage Premium
The college wage premium (the ratio of median earnings of a college graduate to the median earnings of those with only a high school
diploma or GED) rose steadily from 1.4 in 1980 to 1.84 in 2011 (James
2012). As a result, two parental advantages, 1) parental income and 2)
parental education, have become more correlated over time. The correlation between parental income and parental education rose from about
0.5 for parents whose children were born in 1960 to almost 0.8 for parents whose children were born in 2001 (Reardon 2011).
The Decoupling of Marriage and Fertility for Women without a
College Degree
McLanahan (2004) claims that in the United States, economic trajectories have diverged for children whose mothers are college graduates versus children of women with less schooling, in large part because
marriage and fertility have become increasingly decoupled for women
without a college degree in recent decades (see also Edin and Kefalas
[2005]). Out-of-wedlock births have risen sharply since the 1960s for
women without a college degree. In 2009, more than half of all births
to women with a high school diploma or less, and 38 percent of births
to women with some college, occurred out of wedlock; in contrast, only
8 percent of births to women with a four-year college degree occurred
outside of marriage (see Figure 4.5).
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Figure 4.5 Percentage of Births Occurring outside of Marriage (to
Women 18 and Older) by Women’s Education in 2009
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SOURCE: Stanford Center on Poverty and Inequality, “Teaching Slides on Inequality,”
from 2012.

Women college graduates also have more stable marriages than
women with less schooling, and this advantage has widened in recent
decades (McLanahan 2004). Figure 4.6 reports trends in divorce rates
within the first 10 years of a first marriage, by year of marriage, for
wives with and without four-year college degrees. For marriages contracted in the 1960s and 1970s, divorce rates grew both for wives with
and without college degrees. Divorce rates then stabilized for wives
without a bachelor of arts degree (BA) and dropped for wives with a
bachelor of arts degree who married in the 1980s to mid-1990s (Martin
2006).
The decoupling of marriage and fertility among mothers without
college degrees, and the increase in marital stability among wives with
college degrees, means that children of college graduates are now much
more likely to grow up in an intact home with both biological parents
than are children of mothers with less schooling. This has implica-
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Figure 4.6 Divorce and Educational Attainment
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SOURCE: Martin (2006).

tions for the amount of time and money parents can devote to children.
Because two-parent families have two potential earners, they typically
have higher incomes than do single-parent families. Moreover, the
income advantage of being raised in a two-parent household has grown
since the 1980s. Increases in the labor-force participation of mothers
with BAs and increases in assortative mating are two reasons for this
growth.
Harsher Sentencing Policies
Analysts only recently began to analyze the impacts of parental
incarceration on children’s emotional, intellectual, and financial wellbeing, perhaps because parental incarceration was considered relatively
unusual before the 1980s. This is no longer true. Sizable minorities of
men with only a high school diploma and of male high school dropouts will spend some time in prison or jail between age 18 and their
early thirties. Many of these young men are fathers at the time they
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enter incarceration. Prison disrupts these young men’s lives just at the
point when they should be investing in education, gaining a foothold in
the labor market, acquiring career-enhancing labor market experience,
and taking on family obligations. It is well documented that incarceration has long-term negative repercussions for ex-prisoners’ economic
futures, making it hard for them to maintain steady employment, earn a
living wage, and support a family (Western 2006).
Having a father go to jail or prison disrupts children’s lives. One
impact is financial: fathers cannot provide financial support while in
prison, and imprisonment severely reduces fathers’ earnings prospects
after prison. Paternal incarceration disrupts children’s lives in noneconomic ways as well. When a father is imprisoned, a child may suffer
emotional trauma. Parental relationships are likely to be strained, and
parental conflicts may cause children to lose contact with their fathers.
Ex-prisoners may not be the best role models for family, work, and
responsibility.
Incarceration rates of noncollege men have more than tripled in the
United States since 1980. In 2008, 12 percent of young (20 to 34) white
male high school dropouts and 37 percent of young African American
male high school dropouts were in prison or jail (Western and Pettit
2010).
The above figures only give annual rates of incarceration. A man’s
chance of being incarcerated at some point between the ages of 18 and
30–34 is much higher. Figure 4.7 compares noncollege men’s cumulative risks of imprisonment by ages 30–34 for two birth cohorts: 1945–
1949 and 1975–1979. Men born between 1945 and 1949 grew up in
the 1950s and 1960s, prior to the rise in incarceration, and turned 30 by
1980. White men in this birth cohort were unlikely to have been imprisoned by ages 30–34. The cumulative risks of imprisonment were higher
for African American men born between 1945 and 1949: 11 percent
of high school graduates and 28 percent of high school dropouts had
been incarcerated by ages 30–34. The cumulative risks of imprisonment
were strikingly higher for both white and African American men who
were born 20 years later, between 1975 and 1979, and who grew up in
the 1980s and 1990s, after the rise in incarceration rates. Among men
born between 1975 and 1979, the cumulative risks of imprisonment
by ages 30–34 were 6 percent for white high school graduates and 21
percent for African American high school graduates. Cumulative risks
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Figure 4.7 Men’s Cumulative Risk of Incarceration by Ages 30–34, by
Birth Cohort
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SOURCE: Western and Pettit (2010).

were even higher for high school dropouts: 28 percent for whites and 68
percent for African Americans.
One consequence of rising incarceration rates is that a sizable
minority of children of less-educated men have a parent who has been in
prison or jail. Wildeman (2009) computes the cumulative risk of paternal imprisonment by the time a child turns age 5 for two birth cohorts
of children: 1979–1986 and 1997–2000 (see Figure 4.8). Cumulative
risks were higher for children born from 1997 to 2000. For this cohort,
the cumulative risks of paternal imprisonment for children of men with
a high school diploma or less education were 10 percent for whites and
35 percent for African Americans. Cumulative risks of paternal imprisonment for children of male high school dropouts were 16 percent for
whites and 39 percent for African Americans.
These high percentages are a worry. In a review of research on how
paternal incarceration affects child outcomes, Murphey and Cooper
(2015) compare the incidence of adverse childhood experiences for
children who ever had a residential parent incarcerated to that for chil-
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Figure 4.8 Cumulative Risk of Paternal Incarceration by Age Five
for African American and White Children, by Paternal
Education and Birth Cohort
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dren who never had a residential parent incarcerated (see Table 4.3).
Fully half (50 percent) of children with an incarcerated parent had
experienced a family breakup, 1 in 10 (10 percent) had experienced the
death of a parent, 3 in 8 (37 percent) had witnessed or been a victim of
domestic abuse, 1 in 3 (33 percent) had witnessed or been a victim of
neighborhood violence, more than 1 in 4 (28 percent) had resided in a
household with someone who had a substance abuse problem, and more
than half (55 percent) had resided in a household with a mentally ill or
suicidal person. Each of these adverse childhood experiences was relatively rare for children who never had an incarcerated parent. Haskins
(2016b) notes that “paternal incarceration has been found to increase
aggression, depression, anxiety, attention problems, and delinquency
in young boys and adolescent men.” Haskins (2016a) shows that paternal incarceration is negatively associated with boys’ cognitive development in middle childhood.
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Table 4.3 Children with Incarcerated Parents Suffer More Adverse
Childhood Experiences (%)
Divorce/separation
Parental death
Domestic abuse
Witnessed/experienced neighborhood
violence
Substance abuse of household member
Mentally ill/suicidal household member

Incarcerated parent No incarcerated parent
57
17
10
3
37
5
33
7
28
55

7
7

SOURCE: Murphey and Cooper (2015, p. 7, Figure 2).

Gaps in Parental Investments in Children by Parental Income
To recap briefly, the gaps in the spending power, income, and wealth
of affluent families versus other families have gotten bigger since 1980.
Families at the top of the income distribution control much larger shares
of income and wealth relative to families at the middle and bottom
of the income distribution. And family advantages are more bundled
together now than in the past. Communities are more segregated by
income. Parental income, parental wealth, and parental education are
more correlated. The majority of children whose mothers have a college
degree will grow up in intact families with both biological parents. The
majority of children whose mothers do not have a college degree will
spend some time in a single-mother home. The cumulative risk of paternal incarceration by the time a child is five years old for children whose
fathers have at most a high school education is considerably higher for
black children than for white children.
At the very same time that parental advantages have become more
bundled together at the top of the income distribution and parental disadvantages have become more bundled together at the bottom of the
income distribution, the payoff to a college degree has doubled. It has
become increasingly necessary for parents to invest in their children’s
education. Economic success depends more on a college degree today
than it did in 1980.
Unfortunately, as Reardon (2013) points out, although all parents
have incentives to invest in improving their children’s cognitive skills,
changes in income and wealth concentration have put high-income
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parents in a better position to afford such spending increases. Reardon notes that while parents at every income level have increased their
investments in time and money on cognitively enriching activities for
children over the past three to four decades, “middle-class and poor
families . . . are not doing so as quickly or as deeply as the rich.”
Duncan and Murnane (2011a) compare the annual spending of
high-income and low-income parents on children’s enrichment activities from 1972 to 2006. They note that such enrichment goods and services include books, computers, private-school tuition, music lessons,
travel, and summer camps. Spending by high-income parents rose 150
percent, from $3,928 in 1972 to $9,856 in 2006, while spending by lowincome parents rose by only 57 percent, from $927 in 1972 to $1,460 in
2006.2 The dollar gap between the spending of high-income parents and
the spending of low-income parents rose from about $3,000 in 1972 to
$8,400 in 2006. Duncan and Murnane warn that the American ideal of
a level playing field is in jeopardy. We have seen how education, particularly a college degree, strongly predicts children’s future economic
attainments. If the correlations between parental income and children’s
educational attainments are increasing, then this could potentially lead
to increases in the correlation between parental incomes and children’s
later adult incomes.
Associations of Parental Income with Children’s
Educational Attainments
Several recent studies find that parental income became more
strongly tied to children’s achievement test scores, college attendance,
and college graduation over the past three decades (Avery and Hoxby
2013; Bailey and Dynarski 2011; Reardon 2011, 2013).
Reardon (2011) tracks the standardized reading and math achievement test scores for public school students from families at the 90th,
50th, and 10th percentiles for children born from 1943 to 2001. Students from high-income (90th percentile) families had higher standardized test scores than did students from low-income (10th percentile)
families. Students from high-income families also had higher test
scores than students from middle-income (50th percentile) families.
These gaps in test scores are large, positive, and stable across the 1950–
1970 birth cohorts. Then the test-score gaps between high-income
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and low-income children (90/10 gap) and between high-income and
middle-income children (90/50) rose substantially for children across
the 1971–2001 birth cohorts. In contrast, the test-score gap between
children from middle- and low-income families (50/10) was relatively
constant across the 1971–2001 birth cohorts.
Bailey and Dynarski (2011) compare college attendance and college completion rates by income quartile for students born 1961–1964
to those of students born 18 years later, 1979–1982 (Figures 4.9 and
4.10). As expected, given the big increase in the college wage premium,
college attendance rates and college completion rates of students within
each quartile increased across cohorts. But absolute percentage-point
gains were small for students in the bottom income quartile and large
for students in the top income quartile. As a result, gaps in the college attendance and college completion rates of high-income and lowincome students grew across cohorts. In the 1961–1964 birth cohort, 5
percent of low-income and 36 percent of high-income students completed college—a gap of 31 percentage points. In the 1979–1982 birth
Figure 4.9 Fraction of Students Entering College, by Income Quartile
and Birth Year
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Figure 4.10 Fraction of Students Completing College, by Income
Quartile and Year of Birth
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cohort, 9 percent of low-income and 54 percent of high-income students completed college—a gap of 45 percentage points.
A particularly worrying statistic is that in both cohorts, the majority
of college entrants from families in the bottom two income quartiles
do not complete college, while the majority of college entrants from
the upper quartile do complete college (see Figure 4.11). For example, in the latter cohort, two out of three college entrants from the top
income quartile completed college. In contrast, less than half of entrants
from the second income quartile and less than one out of three college
entrants from the bottom quartile graduated from college.
A college degree is important for economic success, but not all
colleges confer equal wage advantages. Colleges vary in selectivity,
and selectivity matters for future income (Hoekstra 2009; Long 2008).
Reardon, Baker, and Klasik (2012) report the family incomes of students who entered selective colleges in 1982, 1992, and 2004. They
report that students from the top income quintile were overrepresented
in selective colleges in 1982 and that this overrepresentation appears
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Figure 4.11 Graduation Rates of College Entrants by Income Quartile
(1979–1989 Birth Cohort)
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to have grown from 1982 to 2004. In 2004, 58 percent of students in
highly selective colleges came from the top income quintile, and only
6 percent of students came from the bottom income quintile (Reardon,
Baker, and Klasik 2012). Avery and Hoxby (2013) report that even
when one looks only at high-achieving students—students with high
grades and high test scores—children from low-income families are
much less likely than children from higher-income families to apply to
and attend very selective schools.
Will These Trends Increase Intergenerational Income Inequality?
Most published assessments of intergenerational economic mobility are computed for individuals born in the 1960s and 1970s and raised
in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s.3 But, as I document in this paper, children born and raised after 2000 are in a very different position from
children born in the 1960s and 1970s. The evidence reviewed about
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economic, demographic, and policy changes supports the following
four conclusions:
1) The divides in parental advantages between rich and poor
children and between rich and middle-income children have
grown substantially since 1980.
2) Parental income has become a stronger predictor of parental
spending on child enrichment activities since the 1970s.
3) The gap between the achievement test scores of high-income
children and those of middle- and low-income children has
widened since 1980. The percentage-point differences in college attendance rates and college graduation rates between
high-income students and low-income students widened as
well.
4) Returns to a college degree more than doubled since 1980.
The accumulation of parental advantages for children at the top of
the income distribution suggests that high-income children born and
raised after 1980 may find it easier to maintain that same high level of
income as adults—to go from “riches to riches.” The dollar gaps in the
income and wealth of high-income families versus low- and middleincome families are larger. High-income families now have even more
discretionary income and more wealth than in the past. Parental advantages are now more bundled together. This could lead to tighter preservation of advantage across generations.
The same logic applies to children from low- and moderate-income
families. The gaps in parental resources (income, wealth, chances of
being raised by both biological parents, college-educated parents, a
father without a criminal record), as well as increases in income-based
residential segregation, gaps in parental spending on child enrichment
activities, and gaps in college enrollment rates and graduation rates all
widened between children of high-income families and children of lowincome and moderate-income families. Children born after 2000 may
be more likely than those born in the 1960s to go from “rags to rags”
and less likely to go from “rags to riches.” These changes are not good
news either for children raised in low- and moderate-income families or
for advocates of equal opportunity.
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What’s Next?
Three changes could increase the extent to which children’s economic fortunes are tied to their parents’ economic fortunes. These are
1) the growing gaps in background advantages of high-income
families vis-à-vis low-income and middle-income families,
2) the increases in the associations between parental income and
children’s educational outcomes, and
3) the growing returns to a college degree.
Poor children could become even less able to escape poverty as
adults and even less able to achieve the American ideal of rising from
the bottom-most quintile. Conversely, high-income parents could
become even more likely to pass their advantages onto their children
or to “hoard opportunities,” as Reeves (2017) warns in his book Dream
Hoarders.
One way to change the above scenario is to focus on cushioning the
impacts of these three changes on children’s economic prospects. Let’s
begin with the increases in the resources of rich children relative to those
of poor children. Most rich children do not have a father who has been
in prison. A significant minority of children of less-educated fathers do
have a father who spent time in prison because of the rapid increase in
male incarceration rates since the late 1970s. Prison sentencing reforms
could reduce the incidence of imprisonment among low-skilled men,
and prisoner reentry programs might better reintegrate ex-prisoners into
work and family life. In their recent book, When Parents Are Incarcerated: Interdisciplinary Research and Interventions to Support Children,
Wildeman, Haskins, and Poehlmann-Tynan (2018) review evidence on
interventions to support children of incarcerated parents.
Reardon (2013) writes that the widening gap in family incomes
means that low-income and middle-income parents cannot invest “as
quickly or as deeply” as rich parents can in cognitive-enhancing activities for children. He further notes that 90 percent of the inequality in
children’s achievement test scores by family income is present at the
time children enter kindergarten.4 According to the OECD (2012), the
United States ranks “26th in the percentage of 4-year-olds enrolled in
early childhood education.” Increasing the availability of public preschool programs that are free or offered on a sliding scale might pro-
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vide low-income and middle-income children a wider range of enrichment activities. Other services, such as health screening and health care,
might be included in preschool programs.
Autor and Dorn (2013) and Goldin and Katz (2010) argue that
the college wage premium is so high in the United States because the
growth in the supply of college graduates is not keeping up with the
demand for highly educated workers. These authors maintain that we
need to increase the rates of college attendance and graduation in the
United States. There is certainly room for improving the college enrollment and graduation rates among high school students whose families
are in the bottom half of the income distribution in the United States:
only 9 percent of children from low-income families graduate from college. Moreover, college graduation rates are rising more slowly in the
United States than in other nations. According to OECD: Education at
a Glance: 2012, “Between 2000 and 2010 [higher education] attainment levels increased by an average of 1.3 percentage points annually
in the U.S., while its OECD counterparts boasted a 3.7 percentagepoint change per year.”
Bailey and Dynarski’s (2011) findings suggest that increasing college enrollment rates of children from families in the bottom half of the
income distribution is only a first step. The majority of students from
these families who enroll in a four-year college never obtain a degree.
It is equally important to increase retention and graduation rates. See
Holzer and Baum (2017) for a cogent overview of programs designed
to improve low-income students’ retention and graduation rates.
I end on a note of optimism by describing two promising local higher
education initiatives—the Kalamazoo Promise and the brand-new University of Michigan Go Blue Guarantee. The Kalamazoo Promise was
launched in 2005. It covers up to 100 percent of tuition and fees for four
years at any public or private postsecondary institution in Michigan.
The Kalamazoo Promise was the first place-based scholarship in the
United States. It is open to all students who reside in Kalamazoo and
who attended public high school there from ninth grade on. Since 2005,
about 100 such place-based programs have been launched (Bartik,
Hershbein, and Lachowska 2016).
Bartik, Hershbein, and Lachowska (2017) evaluated the effects of
the Kalamazoo Promise in its initial years. They report, “We estimate
that the Promise increased the chance of students enrolling in any col-
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lege within six months of high school graduation by 14 percent and the
chances of enrolling in a four-year college by 23 percent . . . . As of six
years after high school graduation, the Promise increased the percentage of students earning any postsecondary credential by 10 percentage
points, from a pre-Promise baseline of 36 percent to 46 percent . . . .
About three-fourths of this boost . . . is due to more students receiving
a four-year bachelor’s degree” (pp. 5–6). Furthermore, they report that
the college completion results are not different for students from lowerincome families.
The University of Michigan’s Go Blue Guarantee program was
launched in January 2018. This program provides free tuition for up to
four years for in-state students at the University of Michigan who come
from families with incomes of less than $65,000. Since the average
family income in Michigan is about $64,000, this covers students from
the bottom half of the income distribution.
One strength of the Kalamazoo Promise and the Go Blue Guarantee is that both cover four years of tuition. This reduces pressure on
students to find funding while in college, and it should improve retention and graduation rates as well as enrollment. A second strength is
that both programs’ eligibility criteria provide few conditions and are
easy to understand. This should increase incentives for both parents
and students to begin planning for college early in students’ educational
trajectories.

Notes
I thank Eric VanDeventer for his efficient and careful preparation of this manuscript and
Howard Erman for comments and edits. Neither of these individuals is responsible for
the information or opinions in this chapter.
1. Fry and Taylor (2012) define low-income households as those with incomes of
less than two-thirds of median income ($34,000 in 2010), middle-income households as those with two-thirds to twice the median income ($34,000 to $104,000
in 2010), and high-income households as those with more than twice the median
income (over $104,000 in 2010).
2. Duncan and Murnane (2011a) reported their expenditures in 2008 dollars. I have
converted their numbers to 2016 dollars.
3. The reason for this is that precise measures of intergenerational income elasticities
require several years of data on children’s incomes after age 30.
4. Reardon (2013) writes, “Children from rich and poor families score very differ-
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ently on school reading scores when they enter kindergarten and this gap grows by
less than 10 percent between kindergarten and high school. Evaluation studies find
that high quality intensive interventions between ages 0–5 years positively affect
children’s later educational and work outcomes” (Heckman 2011; Currie 2006;
Knudsen et al. 2006; Waldfogel 2006).
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5
Why Has Income Inequality
Increased while Education
Inequality Has Decreased in Many
Developing Countries?
David Lam
University of Michigan

There is a great deal of interest in trends in income inequality around
the world. Rising wage inequality in the United States has been a focus
of attention for the past two decades (Bound and Johnson 1992; Juhn,
Murphy, and Pierce 1993). Trends in income inequality in developing
countries and the world as a whole have been analyzed by the World
Bank and many researchers (Beegle et al. 2016; Milanovic 2012; Ravallion 2014; World Bank 2011). Less focus has been given to inequality in
schooling. This chapter will argue that inequality in schooling is a vital
area for research. Inequality in schooling is interesting and important in
its own right, given the critical role education plays in a wide variety
of outcomes. But inequality in schooling is also important because it is
integrally connected to income inequality (Knight and Sabot 1983; Lam
and Levison 1992; Ram 1990).
As will be seen below, there are good data available on the distribution of schooling for a broad range of low-income and middle-income
countries. Analysis of these data demonstrates that the distribution of
schooling changes in fairly regular patterns as the mean level of schooling increases. The standard deviation in years of schooling, which
is shown theoretically to be an important driver of earnings inequality, tends to increase with mean schooling at low levels of schooling,
eventually reaching a peak, and then falling as mean schooling reaches
higher levels. This has important implications for trends in earnings
inequality. The coefficient of variation, a standard mean-invariant
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measure of schooling inequality, tends to fall steadily as mean schooling increases, a result of the “compression” in schooling that occurs
with the rising mean. Given the strong relationship between schooling and earnings, this compression in the schooling distribution should
be expected to reduce income inequality. Data from a wide range of
countries, however, show that a number of countries in Africa and Asia
have experienced increases in income inequality at the same time that
schooling inequality has declined. The chapter discusses the theoretical reasons for this disconnect between falling schooling inequality and
rising income inequality in many countries. One important factor is the
convex relationship between schooling and earnings, as implied in the
standard Mincer (1974) earnings equation, in which log earnings are a
linear function of schooling. Another important factor is rising returns
to schooling, especially at the top of the schooling distribution.
The chapter begins by looking at evidence on trends in income
inequality and poverty for a variety of countries. The chapter then
examines the theoretical relationship between schooling and earnings.
Data from a large number of Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS)
are used to look at how inequality in schooling changes as average
schooling increases. These data show a strong tendency for schooling
inequality to decline as the mean level of schooling increases.
The chapter concludes with a detailed analysis of schooling inequality and earnings inequality in Brazil and South Africa, two countries
with extreme earnings inequality and high-quality labor-market survey
data that can be used to look at schooling inequality, returns to schooling, and earnings inequality over several decades. As shown in Lam,
Finn, and Leibbrandt (2015), rising returns to postsecondary schooling
in South Africa help explain why South Africa has had no improvement
in earnings inequality in spite of large declines in schooling inequality,
a contrast with the declines in earnings inequality that have occurred in
recent decades in Brazil. This suggests that rising returns to schooling,
an important factor in U.S. inequality, may be playing an important role
in many developing countries as well, offsetting what would otherwise
be the equalizing effects of falling inequality in schooling.
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EVIDENCE ON TRENDS IN INCOME INEQUALITY
It is useful to begin by looking at evidence on recent trends in
income inequality around the world. Before looking at the data, there
are a number of important issues of definition and measurement that
should be considered. One of the most basic is whether to use income,
consumption, labor-market earnings, or some other concept as the focus
of analysis. This chapter is mainly interested in inequality in labor market earnings at the individual level. Most research on income inequality
in developing countries uses measures of consumption at the household
level, however—usually a measure of per-person household consumption. This is often motivated by an argument that consumption is the
best measure of welfare, with the household being an appropriate unit
of analysis since the household plays a key role in distributing resources
across household members (Deaton 1997). It may also be the case that
consumption is simpler to measure than income, especially in predominantly rural countries with a high proportion of subsistence agriculture.
Another important consideration is whether inequality is measured
before or after redistributive programs such as taxes and social transfer programs. A measure of consumption takes into account all such
transfers, which may be best for measuring inequality in welfare but
will be less informative about trends in inequality in before-tax labor
market earnings. The results presented in this section include studies
using both income and consumption, and the term income will often be
used to represent both. Unfortunately, there is much less data available
on trends in inequality in labor market earnings, the main focus of this
chapter. Since inequality in income and consumption will tend to move
in the same direction as inequality in earnings, the evidence on trends
in income inequality will be taken as informative about trends in earnings inequality, though it must be recognized that they need not move
in the same direction, especially when there are large social transfer
programs. This chapter does not look at inequality in wealth (assets),
which tends to be much more unequally distributed than income and is
both a cause and effect of income inequality.
Ravallion (2014) shows that the population-weighted average of
within-country income inequality (using the mean log deviation measure of inequality) rose between 1980 and 2010 for the developing world
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as a whole, although it has been falling slightly since around 2000.
This overall trend masks considerable regional variation, however.
Ravallion shows a generally rising trend in within-country inequality in
East Asia. Latin America, on the other hand, had increasing inequality
until around 1995, followed by substantial declines in inequality since
then (Lustig, Lopez-Calva, and Ortiz-Juarez 2013; World Bank 2011).
Trends in sub-Saharan Africa, like trends in other regions, are
mixed. A recent World Bank study of poverty and inequality across
Africa found that inequality fell in about half of African countries, while
it increased in the other half, comparing the two most recent surveys in
each country that have data on inequality in household level income or
consumption (Beegle et al. 2016).
The figures below are based on data on income inequality from the
World Bank’s PovCalNet online database (World Bank 2018). The figures show the Gini coefficient, a widely used measure of inequality in
which 0 indicates that all individuals have the same income (perfect
equality) and 100 is maximum inequality (as scaled in these data).
Figure 5.1 shows income inequality in several African countries that
appear to have fairly reliable data over a range of years. South Africa
Figure 5.1 Inequality in Income/Consumption for Selected African
Countries
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has the highest level of inequality in this group, and indeed it has one
of the highest levels of income inequality in the world (Lam, Finn, and
Leibbrandt 2015). Beginning from a Gini coefficient of more than 60 at
the end of apartheid in 1994, the level has increased over time. Ghana,
which has had relatively high economic growth in recent years, has also
experienced a general trend of rising inequality. Rwanda, too, experienced rising inequality, although after 2005 there appears to have been
a decline, according to these data. Uganda’s Gini coefficient has fluctuated, with no strong tendency to increase or decrease over time. These
patterns are consistent with the conclusions of Beegle et al. (2016) that
inequality has been rising in some countries and falling in others.
Figure 5.2 shows inequality for a set of Asian countries. It should
be noted that the Gini coefficient in these countries is generally on the
low side by international standards. The evidence is, once again, mixed.
The Philippines and Pakistan have relatively constant inequality (at
quite different levels), Bangladesh has had a fairly substantial decline
in inequality, and Thailand appears to have rising inequality.
Figure 5.2 Inequality in Income/Consumption for Selected Asian
Countries
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Figure 5.3 shows a group of Latin American countries. All demonstrate the typical Latin American pattern of relatively high inequality, and all have had fairly substantial declines in inequality in recent
decades. This is consistent with the pattern of recent declines in inequality in Latin America as documented in research from the World Bank
(2011) and Lustig, Lopez-Calva, and Ortiz-Juarez (2013).

TRENDS IN POVERTY
While this chapter is mainly interested in inequality, it is important
to note that the mixed evidence regarding trends in inequality in developing countries should not be taken to mean that there has been no
progress in poverty alleviation. There is strong evidence that the proportion of the population in poverty has been declining in most developing
countries in recent decades, including those in which income inequality
Figure 5.3 Inequality in Income/Consumption for Selected Latin
American Countries
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has been rising. Even in sub-Saharan Africa, which has generally had
the slowest declines in poverty, World Bank estimates indicate that the
proportion of the population in poverty fell from 57 percent to 43 percent between 1990 and 2012.
Figures 5.4 through 5.6 show trends in poverty based on the same
World Bank PovNet data used to analyze inequality in Figures 5.1
through 5.3 (World Bank 2018). The poverty measure used here is the
World Bank’s “extreme poverty” measure, the proportion of the population with less than US$1.90 a day in per capita household consumption
based on Purchasing Power Parity adjustments of local currency (an
update of the World Bank’s earlier $1.00 a day measure).
Figure 5.4 shows trends in extreme poverty for the same set of African countries used to plot inequality trends in Figure 5.1. There is a
clear pattern of falling inequality, although Rwanda has rising poverty
between 1984 and 2000, a period that included the devastating period
of genocide in 1994. Uganda shows an impressive decline in extreme
poverty, from 87 percent in 1989 to 35 percent in 2012, even though,
Figure 5.4 Trends in Poverty Rate for Selected African Countries
(% households with less than $1.90 per day consumption
per person)
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as shown in Figure 5.1, inequality was relatively flat over this period.
South Africa and Ghana also show substantial declines in poverty, even
though inequality has been rising in both countries.
Figure 5.5 depicts falling rates of extreme poverty in the four Asian
countries that were used to analyze inequality trends in Figure 5.2. The
biggest drop is in Pakistan, which shows a decline in the poverty rate
from 62 percent in 1987 to 6 percent in 2013, even though we saw fairly
flat inequality over this period.
Figure 5.6 tracks poverty rates in four Latin American countries.
Extreme poverty was already fairly low in Latin America in the 1980s,
and there were some increases in poverty in some countries in the
1990s. However, the trend since 2000 has been for falling poverty in
all four countries shown, a pattern consistent with the evidence for the
region as a whole.
The overall pattern shown in Figures 5.1 through 5.6 is a combination of falling poverty rates and a mixed set of trends for inequality.
Figure 5.5 Trends in Poverty Rate for Selected Asian Countries
(% households with less than $1.90 per day consumption
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Figure 5.6 Trends in Poverty Rate for Selected Latin American
Countries (% households with less than $1.90 per day
consumption per person)
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The falling poverty in countries with rising inequality is evidence of a
fairly common pattern in which incomes have been rising in all parts
of the income distribution but rising faster at the higher income levels. Rising income inequality, while not a universal pattern in developing countries, is a fairly common pattern. I will argue below that one
reason this pattern is surprising is that there has been an almost universal trend toward declines in schooling inequality in these countries.
Given a strong positive relationship between schooling and earnings,
we might expect that falling inequality in schooling should be pushing
toward falling inequality in earnings. The next section will explore this
relationship theoretically, followed by an empirical analysis of trends in
schooling inequality.
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LINKS BETWEEN SCHOOLING INEQUALITY AND
EARNINGS INEQUALITY
As shown in Lam and Levison (1992) and further developed in
Lam, Finn, and Leibbrandt (2015), some key theoretical points can be
seen using a simplified version of the standard human capital earnings
equation. Using the standard theoretical approach developed by Mincer
(1974), and leaving experience and other determinants of earnings
aside, the logarithm of the ith worker’s earnings can be expressed as
(5.1)

logYi = α + BSi + ui ,

where Yi is earnings, Si is years of schooling, and ui is a residual uncorrelated with schooling. Using Equation (5.1), it is easy to see that the
variance of log earnings, a standard mean-invariant measure of wage
inequality, is given by
(5.2)

V(logY) = β2V(S) + V(u) ,

where V denotes variance. This simple result demonstrates an important
point about the link between schooling inequality and earnings inequality. If the relationship between schooling and earnings is log-linear as
in Equation (5.1), then earnings inequality (as measured by the variance
of log earnings) is a simple linear function of the variance in schooling. There are several direct implications related to the links between
schooling inequality and earnings inequality. Suppose, for example,
that we doubled the schooling of every worker while holding returns
to schooling constant. This would quadruple the variance in years of
schooling and thus quadruple the “explained” component of earnings
inequality. If we measure inequality in schooling by some standard
mean-invariant measure of inequality, this doubling of schooling would
imply no change in schooling inequality. Alternatively, giving each
worker one additional year of schooling would unambiguously reduce
schooling inequality, but it would have no effect on earnings inequality. The bottom line of Equation (5.2) is that decreases in schooling
inequality need not translate into decreases in earnings inequality, even
if returns to schooling are constant across schooling levels and constant
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over time, given the convex relationship between schooling and earnings. This was shown by Lam and Levison (1992) to be an important
explanation of why declines in schooling inequality had not translated
into declines in earnings inequality in Brazil in the 1980s, and why they
are likely to be an important factor in many other countries. The finding
suggests that it will be useful to look at both the standard deviation of
schooling and at the coefficient of variation in schooling. This approach
will be taken in the empirical analysis in the next section.

EVIDENCE ON TRENDS IN SCHOOLING INEQUALITY
If we want to analyze schooling inequality in a manner similar to
the analysis of income inequality, we need data on single years of completed schooling. One convenient source of such data for many lowincome countries is the Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS), a rich
set of surveys designed primarily to collect data on fertility and contraceptive use, but also providing data on other key variables such as
education (Demographic and Health Surveys 2018).
It is instructive to begin by looking at how the distribution of
schooling changes over time in some fairly typical developing countries. Panels A and B of Figure 5.7 show the distribution of single years
of completed schooling (i.e., the highest grade completed) for three
cohorts born 20 years apart in Bangladesh. Bangladesh is an interesting
case since, as shown above, it has experienced a combination of rising
income inequality and falling rates of poverty, a pattern often seen in
countries that have experienced economic growth in recent decades.
Looking at the distribution of schooling for the 1950 Bangladesh birth
cohort in Panel A, about 38 percent of men had no schooling, a figure
that drops to 11 percent for the 1990 birth cohort. Comparing this to the
distribution for females in Panel B, we see that 69 percent of women
in the 1950 cohort had zero schooling, with a substantial decline to 12
percent in the 1990 cohort. The percentage completing grade 12 rises
dramatically for both men and women—from 4 percent to 16 percent
for men, and from under 1 percent to 9 percent for women between the
1950 and 1990 birth cohorts.
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Figure 5.7 Distribution of Years of Schooling for 1950, 1970, and 1990
Birth Cohorts, Males and Females, Bangladesh
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Figure 5.7 (continued)
Panel C
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SOURCE: Author’s calculations from Demographic and Health Surveys (2018) data.
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Understanding improvements in schooling from densities like those
shown in Panel A of Figure 5.7 is difficult, since improvements are indicated both by decreases in the proportion with low levels of schooling and increases in the proportion with higher levels of schooling. A
clearer picture comes from looking at cumulative distribution functions
(CDFs), shown in Panels C and D of Figure 5.7. A point on the CDF
can be interpreted as the proportion of the population that has a given
level of schooling or less. Looking at the distributions for the 1950
birth cohort, for example, 69 percent of men and 96 percent of women
had five years of schooling or less. This fell to 37 percent of men and
41 percent of women in the 1990 cohort. Shifts downward in the CDF
show improvements in the distribution. Panels C and D in Figure 5.7
clearly show the steady improvements in the distribution of schooling
in Bangladesh in a way that is difficult to see in the densities in Panels A
and B. Especially clear is the improvement in the proportion advancing
to secondary school, although there is only slight improvement in the
proportions going beyond grade 12. Also clear from Panels C and D of
Figure 5.7 is the enormous decline in the gender gap in schooling, with
the proportions reaching a given level of schooling only slightly less for
women than for men in the 1990 birth cohort.
Figure 5.8 shows key summary statistics for the distribution of
schooling in Bangladesh from the 1930 birth cohort to the 1995 birth
cohort. The top panel shows the mean and standard deviation for males
and females. Mean years of completed schooling have risen substantially for both men and women, with the mean for women actually overtaking the mean for men around the 1990 birth cohort. The standard
deviation, which was shown theoretically above to be a driving factor in
income inequality (as measured by the variance of log earnings), shows
an inverted U-shape for both men and women. For men the peak in the
standard deviation occurs around the 1970 birth cohort, while the peak
for women occurs around the 1980 birth cohort. This inverted U-shape
for the standard deviation in years of schooling is the same result that
was observed by Lam and Levison (1992) for Brazil, a pattern they
argued was important in understanding why income inequality had not
fallen in Brazil in spite of declining inequality in schooling.
The standard deviation is not typically used as a measure of inequality, since it is not invariant to changes in the mean. A doubling of everyone’s schooling, for example, will double the standard deviation, even
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Figure 5.8 Mean, Standard Deviation, and Coefficient of Variation of
Schooling by Year of Birth, Males and Females, Bangladesh
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though mean-adjusted inequality, as conventionally measured, will not
change (the Lorenz curve, for example, will be unchanged by a doubling of schooling). A more appropriate measure of schooling inequality is the coefficient of variation (the standard deviation divided by the
mean), which is invariant to the overall level of schooling. The bottom
panel of Figure 5.8 plots the coefficient of variation (CV) for males and
females in Bangladesh, using the standard deviation and mean in the
top panel. The overall pattern is of steady declines in schooling inequality by this measure. This results from the fact that the standard deviation
rises at a slower rate than the mean during the period in which the standard deviation is rising. This is a simple indicator of the “compression”
in schooling that tends to occur in most populations as the overall level
of schooling increases. Since there is essentially an upper bound on
years of completed schooling, increases in mean schooling tend to take
the form of the CDFs (such as those in Figure 5.7) being shifted down
and to the right, a change that tends to reduce schooling inequality. The
decline in schooling inequality in Bangladesh that is demonstrated by
the coefficient of variation in Figure 5.8 is also found using other measures of inequality, such as the Gini coefficient, and in Lorenz curves,
the most general representation of inequality.
Figures 5.9 and 5.10 show the same information for eight countries
representing a range of levels of economic development in Africa, Asia,
and Latin America. All are plotted using the same scales in order to
demonstrate the wide range of experiences in means, standard deviations, and coefficients of variation in schooling. Figure 5.9 shows four
African countries: Egypt, Kenya, Nigeria, and Ghana. Note that some
of the figures, notably those for Nigeria and Ghana, show erratic movements in the variables. These are likely to be the result of age misreporting that varies systematically with level of education, and so they are
unlikely to reflect actual jumps in schooling, even using the three-year
moving averages that are used for these plots.
One notable feature in Figure 5.9 is rising mean schooling, with a
convergence in schooling for men and women. Nigeria deviates somewhat from this pattern, with little improvement in mean schooling (and
perhaps even a decline starting around the 1990 birth cohort) and little
change in the gender gap. Another important feature is the inverted
U-shape in the standard deviation of years of schooling, a pattern seen
in all countries. Referring back to Equation (5.2), this implies that earn-
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Figure 5.9 Mean, Standard Deviation, and Coefficient of Variation of
Schooling by Year of Birth, Males and Females, Selected
African Countries
Panel A
12

Years of schooling

10
8

Egypt
Mean male
Mean female
SD male
SD female

6
4
2
0
1930

1940

1950

1960

1970

1980

1990

1980

1990

Year of birth

Panel B
Egypt

7

CV male

Coefficient of variation

6

CV female

5
4
3
2
1
0
1930

1940

1950

1960
Year of birth

1970

96 Lam
Figure 5.9 (continued)
Panel C
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Figure 5.9 (continued)
Panel E
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Figure 5.9 (continued)
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Figure 5.10 Mean, Standard Deviation, and Coefficient of Variation of
Schooling by Year of Birth, Males and Females, Selected
Latin American and Asian Countries
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Figure 5.10 (continued)
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Figure 5.10 (continued)
Panel E
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Figure 5.10 (continued)
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ings inequality would have increased and then decreased, following the
pattern of the standard deviation if earnings were log-linear in schooling and the returns to schooling were constant.
Although the standard deviation in schooling rises for some period
in every country, the coefficient of variation tends to steadily decline for
both men and women. The coefficient of variation is higher for women
in the early cohorts that have low mean schooling for women, with a
strong convergence as the mean schooling converges. As was seen in
Bangladesh, there is a strong tendency for schooling inequality, as measured by the coefficient of variation, to fall rapidly as mean schooling
increases.
Figure 5.10 shows similar patterns for Bolivia, Colombia, Pakistan,
and the Philippines. Mean schooling increases, the gender gap declines
or even reverses (reversal is seen in Colombia, Pakistan, and the Philippines), the standard of deviation shows a U-shaped pattern over time,
and the coefficient of variation falls steadily.
Analysis of the differences across time and countries in Figures 5.9
and 5.10 suggests that countries and time periods characterized by low
mean schooling are also characterized by a high coefficient of variation in schooling. There is also evidence that the inverted U-shaped
pattern in the standard deviation of schooling over time is mapping out
an inverted U-shaped pattern in the relationship between the standard
deviation and the mean. In order to analyze this directly, Figures 5.11
and 5.12 show plots of the standard deviation and coefficient of variation against the mean years of schooling.
The top panel of Figure 5.11 shows a clear inverted U-shape in
the relationship between the standard deviation and the mean for men.
Each data point is a birth cohort in a specific country, so the figure combines variation over time in a given country with variation across countries. The inverted U-shape is very clear in the scatter plot, with a cubic
polynomial function fitted to the scatter showing a peak in the standard
deviation at a mean of about five to six years of schooling.
The bottom panel shows the relationship between the coefficient
of the variation and the mean. There is a very strong negative concave
relationship, almost the shape of a rectangular hyperbola. The figure
shows that a quadratric in the log of the mean fits the shape of the scatter quite well.
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Figure 5.11 Standard Deviation and Coefficient of Variation of Schooling
by Mean Schooling, Males, All Cohorts in All DHS Samples
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The two panels give a very clear indication of the compression that
takes place in the schooling distribution as mean schooling increases.
The standard deviation tends to rise more slowly than the mean as the
mean increases, eventually reaching a peak and then falling. The coefficient of variation tends to fall steadily as the mean increases. A similar decline in schooling inequality as mean schooling increases would
be seen for virtually all measures of schooling inequality, including
Lorenz curves.
Figure 5.12 shows that these same patterns apply to female schooling. It should be noted for both male and female schooling that there
is some evidence that the standard deviation levels off when the mean
reaches around 12 years. It is important to keep in mind that only countries with DHS data are used here. This means the data are limited to
low-income and middle-income countries, with relatively few cohort/
country data points having mean schooling above 11 years of schooling. It is beyond the scope of this chapter to analyze schooling inequality at higher levels of schooling, but this is an interesting area for further
analysis.

RETURNS TO SCHOOLING AND EARNINGS
INEQUALITY IN BRAZIL AND SOUTH AFRICA
The evidence on schooling inequality documented in the previous
section makes a compelling case that inequality in years of completed
schooling tends to decline steadily and substantially as mean schooling increases in all parts of the world. Most countries have seen substantial increases in mean schooling, declines in schooling inequality,
and a U-shaped pattern in the standard deviation that has been on the
declining part of the curve in recent decades. If the relationship between
schooling and earnings were remaining constant, these factors should
have produced a decline in earnings inequality in most countries. But,
as shown in the first part of the chapter, inequality in income and consumption has been rising in many countries and has been fairly flat in
other countries. It is important to note that these measures of income
and consumption inequality are not the same as earnings inequality.
Labor earnings are just one component of income and consumption,
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Figure 5.12 Standard Deviation and Coefficient of Variation of Schooling
by Mean Schooling, Females, All Cohorts in All DHS
Samples
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albeit a very important component in most countries. We unfortunately
have good data on labor market earnings only for a much smaller set
of countries, especially across multiple years and especially in Africa.
This section of the chapter will focus on Brazil and South Africa, two
countries that have excellent data on labor market earnings in addition
to education, drawing on results in Lam, Finn, and Leibbrandt (2015).
Brazil and South Africa are particularly interesting cases because they
historically have had two of the highest levels of income inequality
in the world. The data are taken from nationally representative labor
market surveys conducted by the national statistical agencies in each
country. Brazilian data are from the Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra
de Domicilios (PNAD) from 1976 to 2012, collected by the Instituto
Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística (IBGE, various years). The South
African data are from the October Household Survey and the Labour
Market Survey, collected by Statistics South Africa and integrated to
increase consistency across years in the Post Apartheid Labour Market
Series (PALMS, for years 1994 through 2011) (Kerr, Lam, and Wittenberg 2014). All earnings data are monthly and are reported in real
terms, and all data are weighted so as to be nationally representative.
The one major difference between the Brazilian and South African earnings data is that the former are reported before taxes, while the latter are
reported net of taxes. Data after 2012 are not used for either country
because changes in the labor market surveys create inconsistencies in the series.
Figure 5.13 shows the variance of log earnings for Brazil and South
Africa for the sample of all workers, both males and females, with positive earnings, aged 25–60. The data for South Africa, which begin after
the end of apartheid in 1994, can be compared to the series for South
Africa in Figure 5.1, which shows the Gini coefficient for household
income per capita. Both figures show an increase in inequality in South
Africa since 1994, with relatively constant earnings inequality since
about 2000. Comparing South Africa to Brazil, earnings inequality in
Brazil was similar to earnings inequality in South Africa at the time
apartheid ended, and it had been at fairly similar levels in previous
decades. Earnings inequality began to decline in Brazil in the 1990s,
however, falling substantially from 1994 to 2012. As shown in Lam,
Finn, and Leibbrandt (2015), Gini coefficients for earnings show very
similar patterns to the variance of log earnings.
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Figure 5.13 Total Variance and Explained Variance of Log Earnings,
Brazilian and South African Workers Aged 25–60 with
Positive Earnings
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market survey described in the text.

Figure 5.13 also shows the “explained variance” component of the
variance of log earnings. This is the variance of predicted log earnings based on a regression of log earnings on dummy variables for
single years of schooling, along with controls for age and age squared.
Explained variance follows very similar trends to overall variance, with
Brazil showing a decline in explained variance starting around 1994
and South Africa having relatively constant explained variance. This
is important, since it means that some combination of the change in
the distribution of schooling and changes in returns to schooling help
explain the divergent patterns in earnings inequality in the two countries.
Figure 5.14 shows trends in the mean, standard deviation, and coefficient of variation in years of completed schooling for both countries.
As in the patterns shown for many other countries in Figures 5.8, 5.9,
and 5.10, Brazil and South Africa both have increases in mean school-
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Figure 5.14 Mean, Standard Deviation, and Coefficient of Variation of
Years of Completed Schooling, Brazilian and South African
Workers Aged 25–60 with Positive Earnings
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ing, some evidence of a U-shaped pattern in the standard deviation, and
rapid declines in schooling inequality, as measured by the coefficient
of variation. South Africa has higher mean schooling, a lower standard
deviation in schooling, and a lower coefficient of variation, adding to
the puzzle of why it has higher earnings inequality than Brazil and has
had flat or rising earnings inequality during a period in which Brazil has
had falling earnings inequality.
A major factor explaining this puzzle can be seen in Figure 5.15,
which shows what has happened to the relationship between schooling and earnings in Brazil and South Africa over the periods shown.
The two panels show the estimate of the average return to an additional year of schooling for three different schooling ranges that can
roughly be considered low schooling, medium schooling, and advanced
schooling, with natural breaks in each country’s schooling system
used for the breakdowns. The top panel shows the returns to schooling in the 1–7 year range, the 8–10 year range, and the 11+ range—11
years corresponding to completion of secondary school. Returns are
estimated using standard Mincer earnings regressions that estimate a
spline function that is linear within each of the three schooling levels.
For example, the estimate of 0.15 for the 1–7 year schooling level in
Brazil in 1976 means that one additional year of schooling was associated with a 15 percent increase in earnings over the range of schooling
from 1 to 7 years. Returns to one additional year of schooling in the
8–10 year range were almost 20 percent in the 1970s, while returns to
one additional year beyond grade 11 were about 25 percent, a very high
rate of return. Note that these are conventional estimates of returns that
do not attempt to deal with selection bias and should not be considered the causal impact of schooling on earnings. They also do not take
into account the fairly high levels of grade repetition that take place in
both Brazil and South Africa (Lam, Ardington, and Leibbrandt 2011).
They are nonetheless useful in thinking about the relationship between
schooling inequality and earnings inequality.
There are several striking features about the returns to schooling in
Brazil in the top panel of Figure 5.15. Returns to schooling are significantly higher at higher levels of schooling, with the gap between returns
at the postsecondary level and returns at the incomplete secondary level
increasing over time. Returns to schooling in the bottom two levels fall
substantially over time, with returns to a year of incomplete secondary
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Figure 5.15 Estimated Returns to Schooling, Brazilian and South
African Workers Aged 25–60 with Positive Earnings
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school falling roughly in half, from about 20 percent to 10 percent,
between 1976 and 2012. Returns to an additional year of postsecondary school stay relatively constant, with evidence of a decline starting
around 2006.
The bottom panel shows similar estimates for South Africa. Returns
to an additional year of schooling in 1994 are fairly similar to those in
Brazil—about 10 percent in the 1–7 year range, about 20 percent in the
8–11 range, and about 25 percent in the 12+ range, with 12 years marking the end of secondary school in South Africa. As in Brazil, returns to
the lower two levels of schooling fall over time. Returns to each year
of postsecondary schooling dramatically increase over time, however,
rising from 25 percent per year to about 40 percent per year between
1994 and 2011. This is an enormous increase in what were already very
high returns to postsecondary schooling. It should be noted that these
returns are estimated using only the sample of men and women with
positive labor market earnings. In South Africa, there is also a strong
relationship between schooling and the probability of being employed,
with very high unemployment levels at lower levels of schooling.
Incorporating employment into the picture would create an even larger
economic advantage for those with higher levels of education, an additional source of income inequality.
The striking difference between the two panels in Figure 5.15 is
the large increase in returns to each year of postsecondary education
in South Africa compared to flat or falling returns to each year of postsecondary education in Brazil. As shown in Lam, Finn, and Leibbrandt
(2015), this increase in returns to postsecondary schooling in South
Africa is an important factor in explaining why the decline in schooling
inequality in South Africa has not translated into a decline in earnings
inequality. More surprisingly, Lam et al. also show that the decline in
returns to schooling in the incomplete secondary range is also a contributing factor to rising inequality, since this group of workers is now
a relatively lower-earning part of the income distribution. In Brazil,
by contrast, the decline in schooling inequality has not been offset by
increasing returns to schooling at the top. This follows a more general
trend in Latin America in which a decline in the earnings gap between
high-skilled and lower-skilled workers has worked in the direction
of reducing earnings inequality in recent decades (World Bank 2011;
Lustig, Lopez-Calva, and Ortiz-Juarez 2013). The South African pattern

Why Has Income Inequality Increased? 113

is more consistent with the trend toward rising skill premiums, which
has played an important role in explaining rising wage inequality in
the United States (Bound and Johnson 1992; Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce
1993) and other high-income countries. Evidence for low-income and
middle-income countries outside Latin America is much more limited,
however, in part because of the challenges in estimating returns to
schooling in predominantly agricultural economies, and also because
few countries have high-quality labor market survey data that is collected consistently over time to allow comparable measures of returns
to schooling for different time periods.

CONCLUSION
A major goal of this chapter has been to demonstrate that inequality
in years of completed schooling has been declining in most developing
countries in recent decades. Data from a wide distribution of countries
in Africa, Asia, and Latin America demonstrate that increases in the
mean level of schooling tend to be associated with a compression in the
distribution of schooling. Unlike the growth trend that often happens
with a family’s earnings from one generation to the next, the children
of highly educated individuals do not tend to get higher and higher levels of schooling across generations, given the upper bound on years of
schooling. As a result, inequality in schooling, measured here by the
coefficient of variation, tends to fall as mean schooling rises and the
schooling distribution compresses.
Given the strong positive relationship between schooling and earnings, a compression in the distribution of schooling might be expected
to reduce earnings inequality and, more broadly, inequality in household income. There is not, however, a general trend toward declining
inequality in earnings and household income in developing countries,
in spite of the substantial declines in schooling inequality. This chapter provides several explanations for this disconnect between trends
in schooling inequality, which is declining almost everywhere in the
developing world, and trends in income inequality, which is rising or
fairly constant in a number of countries.
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The first explanation for this disconnect is theoretical. When earnings are a log-linear (convex) function of schooling, as predicted by
Mincer (1974) and as found in much empirical research, it is easy to
construct examples in which expansions in schooling that reduce schooling inequality may also increase earnings inequality. Any increase in
the standard deviation of schooling will increase the variance of log
earnings, a standard measure of earnings inequality, even if there is
a decrease in the coefficient of variation and all other mean-invariant
measures of schooling inequality. Empirical evidence on changes in
the distribution of schooling for a large number of low- and middleincome countries using Demographic and Health Surveys data shows
that schooling expansions often follow this pattern. Initial increases in
mean schooling are associated with an increase in the standard deviation of schooling but a decline in the coefficient of variation in schooling. This means that earnings inequality will tend to increase at the
same time that schooling inequality is decreasing, even if the returns to
schooling are constant and there are no other changes affecting earnings
inequality. As mean schooling continues to increase, there is eventually
a decline in both the standard deviation and the coefficient of variation,
changes that would in and of themselves imply declines in both earnings inequality and schooling inequality.
Another factor often works in the direction of increasing earnings
inequality, however, even when changes in the schooling distribution
should lead to declining earnings inequality. This factor is returns to
schooling—the relationship between years of schooling and earnings.
Increases in the returns to schooling, especially at the highest levels
of schooling, have played an important role in the increase in earnings inequality in the United States, and similar patterns are seen in a
number of developing countries. This chapter documents this pattern
for the case of South Africa, where earnings inequality continues to be
one of the most extreme in the world in spite of declines in schooling
inequality that would have otherwise led to falling earnings inequality.
A large increase in returns to postsecondary schooling has had disequalizing effects that offset the equalizing effects of declining inequality in
schooling. This contrasts with the case of Brazil, where there was not
the same increase in returns to postsecondary schooling, with the result
that declines in schooling inequality have produced declines in earnings
inequality.
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Unfortunately, we do not have high-quality labor-market survey
data to analyze trends in returns to schooling in many low-income
countries. It seems likely that in many of the countries that have experienced rising inequality in household income and consumption, there is
an important contribution to be made by increases in returns to schooling, especially at the top of the schooling distribution. These changes
are likely to offset what would otherwise be the equalizing effect of
declines in inequality in schooling. Future research will hopefully
provide a clearer picture of the extent to which other low-income and
middle-income countries are experiencing the South African pattern, in
which increasing returns to schooling are a key factor in the disconnect
between falling inequality in schooling and rising inequality in income.
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Institutions, Structures,
and Policy Paradigms
Toward Understanding Inequality in Africa
Howard Stein
University of Michigan

The trajectory of development in sub-Saharan Africa remains puzzling to mainstream economists. Poverty stays stubbornly high, growth
has been uneven, and life expectancy has continued to lag relative to
other regions, despite governments adopting policies inspired by neoclassical economics. Economists have used a host of extraneous explanations for what some have called “Africa’s tragedy,” including ethnicity, geography, colonial history, the legacy of the slave trade, poor
governance, poorly developed social capital, and other things. The
number of variables purportedly correlated with growth grew dramatically over time in the literature, reaching by one count a rather implausible 86 regressors by 2000 (Chitonge 2015).
More recently, in line with new concerns about income inequality, orthodox economics has turned to trying to explain the pattern of
income distribution in Africa. Contrary to Kuznets’s prediction that
regions with low industrialization and a high reliance on agriculture
should have an equitable distribution of income, sub-Saharan Africa has
had high and worsening income inequality in recent decades, despite
evidence of deindustrialization and despite most of its population living in rural areas. As argued in this chapter, part of the problem with
using Kuznets’s formulation is its reliance on the faux naturalism that is
embedded in the neoclassical theory of distribution, in which factors of
production in a competitive market are supposed to be paid according
to their marginal contribution to production.1
The belief in Kuznets’s curve follows this erroneous presumption—
e.g., that peasants received income commensurate with their land and
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labor, which is comparatively equitable in economies dominated by
rural production. With industrialization, the divide between urbanbased wage income and rural income will grow, and income inequality
will worsen. Only with the shrinking of the rural sector will equality be
restored. When this pattern is not being observed, instead of questioning the underlying assumption, neoclassicals tend to search for extraneous factors that can explain this exceptionalism. As we will argue in this
chapter, the effort to understand income inequality needs to transcend
the faux naturalism of neoclassical economics to focus on the evolution
of the institutions, related economic structures, and the way Africa has
been integrated into the global economy, all of which determine the
current and historical patterns of income distribution. At the core of
the explanation are the shifting structures of power which underlie the
generation of disparities in material awards.
The chapter begins with a review of trends in income distribution
in sub-Saharan Africa, focusing on Gini coefficients. The chapter then
turns to a critical review of the mainstream economic view of distribution and its applications to understanding inequality in Africa, including its impact on policy formation, which has contributed to the exacerbation of distribution. The paper will then discuss the institutional
approach to income distribution. The final section will apply the theory
to understanding the patterns we have observed in sub-Saharan Africa.

TRENDS IN INEQUALITY IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
The picture of income distribution in sub-Saharan Africa is not a
pretty one. Nel (2018) compiled the Gini coefficients on consumption
and wealth dispersal for different regions of sub-Saharan Africa based
on the latest data he was able to access. These are summarized in Table
6.1.
We can see that while there are enormous variations in the Gini
coefficients in Africa, there are a surprising number of countries above
the 50 threshold, which is considered to be highly unequal. Nearly 25
percent of the countries listed in Nel’s Table 8.1 (p. 107) are above 50.
In contrast, only two countries would be deemed to be highly equitable,
or having a Gini below 30 (Kenya in 2007; Niger in 2011). The vast
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Table 6.1 Inequality of Consumption and Wealth: Various Years
Gini of consumption
Gini of wealth
Years
dispersal—mean
dispersal—mean
African region
of survey
and range
and range
Southern
1994–2010
52.4
75.3
Western
2002–2011
41.1
68.7
Central
2003–2011
44.4
69.8
Sahel
2008–2011
37.5
66.0
Eastern
2002–2011
41.0
69.0
Total
1994–2011
44.0 (29.9–73.5)
70.2 (62.4–82.9)
SOURCE: Nel (2018).

majority are above 40, which according to Nel is “surprisingly high,
given the low level of modernization” (Nel 2018). As we will discuss
below, these figures are likely to understate the extent of inequality in
Africa. One should also recognize the variations of dates in which the
surveys were undertaken (these different spans are shown in the column of Table 6.1 titled “Years of survey”). Nel also presents “less reliable” wealth dispersal Ginis, which seem to be more uniformly and
disturbingly high. While this provides a snapshot of the inequality in
the region, it does not tell us if distribution is improving or worsening
over time.
Jirasavetakul and Lakner (2016) have examined the aggregate trends
in the region from 1993 to 2008 based on household budget surveys
that also focus on consumption expenditures. The authors’ approach
is to use interpersonal inequality, in which everyone is assigned his or
her own income, rather than looking at average or weighted averages
of countries. They themselves admit that the numbers are bound to be
understated, because they do not have data on the most fragile country
economies, and because the surveys badly underestimate the consumption expenditures of the richest segments of the population. It should
be noted that these numbers are also likely understated given the wellknown underrepresentation of the poorest segments of the population in
household budget surveys. The study also uses 2011 purchasing power
parity (PPP), which tends to disproportionately raise lower incomes,
given the overrepresentation in international price comparisons of the
nontradable goods, which tend not to be consumed by the poor.2
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Figure 6.1 Lorenz Curve for Africa: 1993–2008

Consumption share of the poorest 100p%

1

1993

2008

Equality

0.8

0.6

0.4

0.2

0

0

0.2

0.4
0.6
Cumulative population share, p

0.8

1

SOURCE: Jirasavetakul and Lakner (2016).

Above, Figure 6.1 shows the Lorenz curve, which clearly illustrates
negative trends. We can see the steady movement to the right of the
Lorenz curve over time, indicating worsening inequality. Data on the
Gini coefficient confirm this. The Gini rises from 51.68 in 1993 to 52.16
in 1998, 54.13 in 2003, and 56.12 in 2008. In 2008, sub-Saharan Africa
had the highest regional Gini in the world. (In 2007, the world’s mature
economies were at 41.1 percent; Russia, Central Asia, and southeastern
Europe at 42.7 percent; Latin America and the Caribbean at 52.2 percent; and East Asia and the Pacific at 45.9 percent.)
Table 6.2 attempts to follow trends over a longer period of time
at the country level. Countries are selected from the UNU/WIDER
inequality data set of the United Nations University World Institute for
Development Economics Research (UNU/WIDER) based on the availability of information over the three periods. As much as possible, we
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Table 6.2 Income Distribution Patterns in a Selection of Sub-Saharan
African Countries
Gini (year), early Gini, middle years
Gini, latest
Country
SAP (’81–’91)
(’96–’02)
(’05–’14)
Botswana
54.21 (1985)
64.73 (2002)
60.46 (2009)
Cameroon
49 (1983)
54.4 (1996)
46.54 (2014)
Côte d’Ivoire
41.2 (1985)
44.0 (1998)
43.94 (2008)
Ethiopia
32.2 (1981)
29.5 (2000)
31.4 (2011)
Ghana
35.99 (1988)
43.4 (1998)
42.77 (2005)
Kenya
57.3 (1981–83)
46.5 (1997)
48.51 (2005)
Lesotho
55.9 (1986)
51.57 (2002)
54.18 (2010)
Madagascar
46.9 (1980)
40.2 (1999)
42.65 (2010)
Malawi
57.3 (1983)
49.3 (1997)
46.12 (2010)
Mali
36.5 (1989)
39.87 (2001)
38.93 (2006)
Mauritania
42.5 (1988)
39.03 (2000)
32.42 (2014)
Mauritius
35.2 (1980)
37.1 (2001)
35.84 (2012)
Nigeria
35.2 (1981)
48.3 (1996)
48.8 (2010)
Rwanda
28.89 (1984)
45.43 (2000)
50.44 (2013)
South Africa
47 (1985)
54.5 (1997)
73.25 (2011)
Tanzania
35.29 (1991)
37.3 (2000)
37.78 (2011)
Uganda
37.13(1989)
43 (1999)
41.01(2012)
Zambia
48.4 (1991)
57.4 (1998)
55.62(2010)
Mean
43.11
45.86
46.15
SOURCE: Stein (2011); WIDER (2017).

have tried to focus on similar methodologies used in each country over
time (though this was not always possible) and to have gaps in the data
in each country in the three columns of at least five years. What we
see on average is a rising trend in inequality over time. As we would
expect, the unweighted average is much lower than the interpersonal
inequality discussed above. Still, two-thirds of the countries have rising
income inequality from the 1980s to the 1990s and early 2000s, and for
more than 60 percent of the countries, the latest Gini coefficients are
above the level of the 1980s. The majority of the declines were tiny—
well under 10 percent. In the column for the latest figures, the majority
of countries on the list have Ginis above 45, a sign of high inequality
which is, as we will see, contrary to what the supporters of Kuznets and
the marginal theory of distribution predict.
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MAINSTREAM THEORY OF DISTRIBUTION
The mainstream literature on inequality has been built around the
myth that income is based on ownership of factors of production and
that these factors are paid according to their marginal contribution to
production.3 To quote John Bates Clark, the wunderkind proponent of
the marginalist revolution in America and an early leader in the antiinstitutionalist movement, “We may now advance the more general thesis . . . that, where natural laws have their way, the share of income that
attests to any productive function is gauged by the actual product of it.
In other words, free competition tends to give to labor what labor creates, to capitalists what capital creates, and to entrepreneurs what the
coordinating function creates” (Clark [1908], p. 13).
Independent of the Cambridge critique of the problematic nature of
measuring the value of capital—and hence the contribution of capital
to production—which goes back to the 1960s, what we have here is
clearly a normative argument dressed up to be objective. The share of
income accruing to resource owners is given by the exchange value lost
if the resource were held back from the production process. Here the
invisible hand of the market ensures that the income received is equivalent to the value contributed by the factor of production at the margin
(Brown 2005).
Hence, in standard economic texts like Mankiw and Taylor (2011),
inequality is linked to the shifts in technology and their availability
in the educational system. If the educational system develops at the
same pace as technology, the highly educated groups will not gain at
the expense of the lower educational ones. However, if it does not, the
educated groups with the appropriate skills will be rewarded relative to
the low-income groups with less education. Even in the face of rapidly
rising inequality for the upper 1 percent, Mankiw defends the theory:
If indeed a year of schooling guaranteed you precisely a 10 percent
increase in earnings, then there is no way increasing education by
a few years could move you from the middle class to the top 1
percent. But it may be better to think of the return to education as
stochastic. Education not only increases the average income a person will earn, but it also changes the entire distribution of possible
life outcomes. It does not guarantee that a person will end up in the

Institutions, Structures, and Policy Paradigms 123
top 1 percent, but it increases the likelihood. I have not seen any
data on this, but I am willing to bet that the top 1 percent are more
educated than the average American; while their education did not
ensure their economic success, it played a role. (Mankiw [2011],
quoted in Syll [2014])

The argument has allowed some of the more prominent members of
the economics profession to dismiss concerns about income inequality.
The Nobel Prize winner Robert Lucas (2004), for example, stated, “Of
the tendencies that are harmful to sound economics, the most seductive, and in my opinion the most poisonous, is to focus on questions of
distribution” (p. 20). How can one mess with the market when people
are getting the rewards for the intrinsic worth that they have provided
to the production process?
Moreover, inequality for neoclassicals is at the heart of an incentive system that compensates people for talents, sacrifice, and risk taking. Regimes that fail to properly reward such behavior are doomed to
failure and will encourage the human propensity to shirk and free-ride
(Brown 2005).
This has led mainstream economists to argue for the classic tradeoff
between efficiency and equity, which is drummed into multiple generations of students. Okun (1975) sums it up nicely: “Any insistence on
carving the pie into equal slices would shrink the size of the pie. That
fact poses the tradeoff between economic equality and economic efficiency” (p. 46).
To Okun, inefficiencies arise because redistribution is like a leaky
bucket created to move income from the rich to the poor. Sources of
leaks include the losses from administrative costs, a reduction and misdirection of work effort, and less motivation to undertake efficiencyenhancing activity.
To others working outside this paradigm, inequality is a disease that
cripples those who are economically and socially disadvantaged from
participating more fully in life processes. It is not a product of individual choices but a result of social dynamics that divide people into
gender, race, nationality, religion, and class, which form the core of the
divisive separation between those enjoying privilege and those undergoing deprivation. The idea of a trade-off between efficiency and equity
is perverse, and it effectively justifies the vested interests associated
with the status quo (Dugger 1998).
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MAINSTREAM REACTIONS TO HIGH
AFRICAN INEQUALITY
While there was some growing concern by the late 1990s about the
welfare implications of rising inequality, posed in the works of some
mainstream writers like Stiglitz (1998) and Rodrik (1999), other economists were less worried about the pathologies of inequality and more
worried about the inconsistency of the pattern relative to the predictions arising from its theoretical propositions. Higgins and Williamson
(1999) examine the Kuznets hypothesis around the world and claim
that the African dummy—the dummy variable used to assess whether
a country is African—is responsible for a Gini coefficient 10 points
higher than predicted.
Milanovic (2003), a member of the Development Research Group
of the World Bank (“the Bank”) at the time, attempts to “explain away”
the African dummy by running a series of regressions using 1,067 Gini
observations from countries in different regions between 1950 and
2000. He draws on political and social factors to try to explain the determinants generating this higher-than-anticipated inequality in Africa.
His independent variables in a series of regressions include variations
on real GDP per capita, political measurements like political openness,
type of political systems and index of government cohesion, an index of
ethnic fragmentation, the extent of commodity independence, an interactive term for fractionalization, and the Africa dummy. The key is to
identify the variables that remove the significance of the Africa dummy.
Milanovic settles on an equation that has a strongly positive interactive term between the dummy for Africa and ethnicity, while the
dummy variable itself becomes insignificant. Ethnolinguistic fractionalization also remains positive. He also finds that inequality is related
to ethnic fractionalization in a few of his equations, looking only at
a much smaller sample of African countries. However, it disappears
when adding an interactive party competitiveness variable.
Variables like ethnicity are attractive to econometricians focusing
on explaining economic patterns in Africa like inequality or growth,
since they avoid the common problem of endogeneity with other variables like governance (Jerven 2015). However, their meaning remains
mysterious. Milanovic himself is uncertain how to interpret the results,
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since he does not know why inequality is higher in the face of ethnic
fractionalization compared to more homogenous societies, nor can he
discern any policy implications. This reminds us that correlation is not
causation.
However, the real problem here is that Milanovic and others are
asking the wrong questions—partly because they are in a faux natural
world that assumes a singular direction based on the “laws” of neoclassical economics. Hence, the search from their perspective is for some
other “natural” cause that explains an outcome that disrupts these laws.
One salient problem is that rising inequality within African countries or
between African countries cannot be explained by a variable like ethnicity, which by its nature is invariant. Second, once one moves away
from the “natural” exogenous-type causes of inequality, then one needs
to understand the role of policy choices over time, and the way that role
has influenced the institutions and structures that dictate how income is
distributed in domestic and global production.

POLICY AND INCOME DISTRIBUTION
The history of African economic policy reflects the shifting modalities of aid and the policy paradigms associated with development assistance. Following independence, government-sponsored planning and
industrialization were based on import-substitution models and a heavy
emphasis on the expansion of infrastructure. The 1970s saw a greater
focus on integrated rural development strategies and social spending.
Both approaches were rather skeptical of the ability of the market to
deliver a distribution of income that would raise the standard of living
for the majority of the population.
After 1980, African countries began to follow the dictates of the
neoclassical-inspired World Bank/IMF structural adjustment policies known to some as the Washington Consensus, with the promise
of improved gains in both poverty reduction and income distribution.
The arguments were firmly based on the neoclassical theory of distribution. The Berg report, Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa
(World Bank 1981), authored by Elliot Berg, very much set the adjustment agenda in that region of the globe. It argued that a country should
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specialize in “those things that it can best produce as compared to
other countries” (p. 24) and “produce them with the least use of limited
resources” (ibid.) or static comparative advantage and static efficiency
gains. In the latter case, the emphasis of the report is on improvements
in allocative efficiency in line with the removal of state-imposed distortions that have disrupted the ability of prices to properly reflect their
scarcity values.
The agenda on poverty reduction and income distribution was more
implicit in the Berg report.
The fundamental error of African governments was their ‘‘bias
against agriculture’’ (World Bank [1981], p. 25)—even though that is
the sector in which ‘‘most of the population earns its livelihoods’’ (p.
45)—in favor of urban populations. In other words, African government policies impeded farmers from producing crops consistent with
the comparative advantage of the country, which curtailed the earning
power by disrupting the ability of the market to effectively reward them
in line with their contribution to production. The policies hurt the rural
poor and exacerbated income distribution. The bias against agriculture
was manifest in a number of ways, including import restrictions (tariffs
and quotas), which forced farmers to purchase high-cost local inputs
and raised the cost of consumer goods. Trade and exchange-rate policies also reduced the prices farmers received for their export crops.
Price controls by state marketing boards and overvalued exchange rates
greatly curtailed the incomes of farmers in local currency terms (p. 26).
The key to raising farmer incomes was through devaluation, privatizing the marketing of input and outputs, removing pan-territorial pricing
so farmers could specialize in the crops they produce most efficiently
in their region, and removing subsidies on inputs like fertilizer. In this
world, once governments removed the fetters to the operation of the
market and specialized according to their comparative advantage in the
international market, the standard of living for their population would
rise relative to that of the developed world.
The urban bias argument as a cause of inequality has its origins in
the work of Lipton (1977) and was adopted by Bates (1981) to explain
poor agricultural performance in Africa in the 1980s. The arguments
and recommendations to reverse urban bias were promoted by chief
economist Anne Krueger in the 1980s and culminated in a five-volume
study on the political economy of agricultural pricing (Krueger, Schiff,
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and Valdes 1991). Liberalization aimed at removing urban bias was
widespread by the 1980s throughout sub-Saharan Africa. In the preadjustment period, 25 of 28 governments surveyed set export crop prices.
By the mid-1990s, only 11 were still setting prices (Boratav 2001).
The trends were not at all surprising given the ubiquity of structural
adjustment.
Karshenas (2001) looks more systematically at the urban bias position and the attempt to reverse it through liberalization. Contrary to the
urban bias arguments, agriculture terms of trade in the preadjustment
period were actually rising in sub-Saharan Africa at a rate that exceeded
the sample of Asian countries (1.3 percent versus 0.8 percent). However, in the period of liberalization, the reverse occurred, with relative
prices declining by an average of 0.6 percent per year, contributing to
the rising income inequality. How do we explain this result, which was
contrary to the predictions of orthodoxy?

TOWARD AN INSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF
DISTRIBUTION WITH APPLICATIONS TO SUBSAHARAN AFRICA
At the heart of the institutional theory of distribution is the rejection of the idea of value in severalty. Factors of production are integrated, and their ability to affect production is contingent and interactive. Resources, whether human or nonhuman in origin, derive their
utility through their integration into a process, as Veblen put it, which
“presupposes the proper working of many other processes” and needs
the “running maintenance of interstitial adjustment between the several
sub-processes” (1975; quoted in Brown [2005], p. 919). The power of
production is found in systems, not in land, capital, and labor. Neoclassical economic constructs have been institutionalized and created the
dangerous notion that people are paid according to the natural laws of
the market and receive what is deemed worthy of their contribution.
They are not a product of human agency but of forces beyond human
control (Brown 2005).
In contrast, the institutional theory of distribution points to the need
to understand power and its relationship to the contestation of inter-
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ests at the heart of the determination of the allocation of the shares of
material rewards.4 As Brown (2005) puts it, “A theory of distribution
should be indistinguishable from a theory of power.” Brown continues:
“A satisfactory theory of power would, beyond defining what power
is, elucidate principles to explain how power is established, enlarged
or diminished, protected and perpetuated, redistributed, exercised, and
rendered legitimate or illegitimate” (p. 920). Power is generally seen as
the ability to act in a particular way to affect outcomes.
Power is not simply the ability to coerce; rather, it gains effectiveness when it is legitimate. Legitimate power arises when it stems from
the “internalized values” of those who are subject to that power. Also
important are the symbols of power, which are linked to how people
interpret situations and, in turn, how they respond to them. Distributive mechanisms are a product of power relations and are institutionalized processes that are related to habits, customs, rules, and systems of
belief. These generate the habits of thought that define the parameters
of acceptable behavior.
Power in a market context is related to transactions. “The ratio of
exchange,” Commons writes, “measures the degree of power because
it measures the ratio between what I give up and what I get back in the
exercise of power” (Commons 1924, p. 30). Brown (2005, p. 22) says
markets are contained within institutions and should be seen as “clusters of working rules that guide conduct of transactions.” The working
rules of transaction reflect the shifting nature of power asymmetries
that affect the terms of transactions, which better or worsen outcomes
of transactions. Understanding the forces that select working rules and
that shape and reshape the relative power of the parties to transactions
should be at the core of an institutional understanding of the distribution of income in any society. Transactions are not simply those made
among domestic players but involve international participants, and the
rules of those transactions are affected by international institutions.
So how does this explain the pattern of income distribution in subSaharan Africa? The key is in understanding the forces that shaped and
altered the conditions and rules that affected the comparative power of
direct producers in transactions over time. “Direct producers” are overwhelmingly peasant farmers in sub-Saharan Africa.
The story of skewed income distribution starts with the colonial
experience. Colonization in Africa tended to have low settler popula-
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tion, was extractive in nature, and relied on a small, elite group of indirect rulers and well-paid administrators to run the country. These people
used fines and minimum acreage laws to encourage farmers to produce
cash crops. Export crops were frequently sold to state marketing boards
at a fraction of their value. The income garnered was used to support
the high salaries of administrators, not to finance economic development or encourage the intensification of agriculture through improved
infrastructure, extension, or better inputs, which could have altered
the systems of production and potentially raised farmer incomes (van
de Walle 2009). Commerce among Africans was actively discouraged
with laws that restricted the access of Africans to credit. Manufacturing
was tiny except for that which took place in settler colonies like South
Africa and Kenya.
Following independence, many governments Africanized civil services but frequently left the same pay scales in place, creating an elite of
well-paid bureaucrats with earnings well above median incomes. Marketing boards were kept in place and sometimes extended to new crops
with comparatively little invested in agriculture, although fertilizer was
subsidized in a number of countries. In some places, pan-territorial
pricing was used, which provided a huge subsidy to farmers in remote
areas of the country, and some farmers got access to credit at subsidized
interest rates. Income from taxing cash crops was used to expand manufacturing. However, the power of workers to raise incomes was carefully controlled. In some countries like Tanzania, pay scales were set by
the government, strikes were illegal, and the head of the unions became
the Minister of Labor. Though data on income distribution is scarce, it
is likely that there were some improvements in income distribution in
the early postcolonial period.
However, this changed with the arrival of neoliberalism, which dramatically altered the terrain of power and the working rules affecting
the terms of transactions for farmers and workers in African countries.
Spending on agriculture was further curtailed. Fertilizer use collapsed
with the removal of subsidies, and farmer incomes plummeted because
of the arrival of exploitative middle men and collusive purchasing. Poor
roads, declining access to credit, lack of transportation, and a paucity
of storage facilities weakened the power of farmers in transactions and
forced them to sell their crops at a fraction of their wholesale price. In
our nine-year study of 40 villages in Tanzania, we found farmers in
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some villages getting as little as 50 percent of the wholesale price of
maize. Farmers frequently complained about the exploitative nature of
middlemen but felt they had no power to alter the terms and conditions
(Maganga et al. 2016).
The structural adjustment period also dramatically cut state or parastatal wage and employment levels, which accounted for most of the
formal-sector labor prior to 1980 and dramatically weakened labor’s
market power, with implications for inequality. In Kenya, for example,
wages and salaries consumed 31.7 percent of the budget but fell after a
decade of adjustment to only 15.6 percent by 1990–1991. The proportion of spending on economic and social services fell from 33.0 and
35.0 percent in 1975 to 20.5 and 32.9 percent, respectively, with much
of the decline going to service debt (Rono 2002).
Austerity combined with liberalization and failed privatizations
frequently led to the contraction of economic activity and the loss of
employment. For example, of the 183 state divestments in Tanzania
through 1998, only 83 were true privatizations. The rest were bankruptcies and liquidations of assets, and they carried with them the loss of
thousands of jobs (Gibbon 1999).
Beginning in 1981, Malawi adopted a series of structural adjustment programs following the global economic crisis of 1979–1981
and local factors like the closure of access to ports through Mozambique. Like so many African countries, there was rapid growth of
formal-sector employment, which expanded by an average of 9.5 percent per annum during the 1970s. While in some countries employment
increased more in the public sector, in Malawi, the expansion was 11.5
percent per annum in the private sector, compared to 3.75 percent in the
government.
The impact of adjustment on formal-sector employment growth
was almost entirely negative, with an increase in only one sector of
production—mining and quarrying—compared to the 1970s. Overall
growth fell to an average of only 2.96 percent during the adjustment
period through 1995. By 1990, formal-sector employment dropped to
only 11.6 percent of the labor force. Real monthly average wages fell by
an astounding 41 percent. Contrary to the theory held by the proponents
of orthodoxy, there was a rise in the ratio of urban to rural wages over
the adjustment period. In the wake of the shrinking of the formal labor
sector, the informal sector, which generally has much lower wages,
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grew and was likely affected by the comparative decline in real wages
in the formal labor market (Chirwa 1999).
Van der Hoeven (2000) examines the impact on income inequality in labor markets arising from structural adjustment. On a theoretical level, he argues that short-run policy changes under adjustment
are generally aimed at improving allocative efficiency; this is done
through cost cutting in labor markets and the removal of impediments like minimum wage regulation, which invariably leads to cuts in
formal-sector employment. At the same time, adjustment often deals with
balance-of-payment crises, which leads to tightened monetary policy
and additional cuts in employment. The feedback effect of falling
demand further exacerbates formal-sector employment. Along the same
lines as with Malawi, Van der Hoeven finds widespread declines in
formal-sector employment relative to the total labor force in five African countries studied, led by a drop of 25 percent in the ratio in Uganda
between 1990 and 1995. Given the focus of adjustment, the fall in public-sector employment was particularly acute. In four countries over the
same period, it fell by an average of 30 percent to a level of only 6.6
percent of the total labor force. In a fifth country (Zimbabwe), it stayed
roughly constant at an already-low 4.5 percent.
The rapid decline of formal-sector employment weakened labor,
which presented implications for workers’ standard of living. The wage
share of value added in manufacturing fell in seven African countries
undertaking adjustment, for which data was available from the years
1980 to 1985 and 1985 to 1992. In some cases it was to ridiculously low
levels (e.g., wage share in Ghana was only 13.8 percent in 1985–1992,
or a fall of one-third compared to the late 1970s). Not surprisingly,
with falling formal-sector employment and declining wage shares, real
wages also declined by an average of 40 percent in five of the African
countries between the late 1970s and early 1990s, also contributing to
rising inequality.
Trade union density also fell to very low levels in a number of
African countries, further weakening the power of labor with implications for the distribution of income (Van der Hoeven 2000). One study
showed a highly negative and significant correlation between income
inequality and coordination in collective bargaining (−0.597). Countries with significant coordination had a Gini coefficient slightly lower
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than 30, while countries with lower coordination had an average Gini
coefficient above 45 (ILO 2000).
Inequality was further exacerbated by an appreciable decline in government social spending on health and education. Van Der Hoeven estimates that social spending fell to around 5.3 percent of GDP after adjustment in sub-Saharan African countries from 5.9 percent. The data on
actual expenditures provides an even more depressing picture. A survey
of real health expenditures in 12 countries, undertaking some adjustment over the 1980s, indicated an average real per capita spending
decline of close to 20 percent. These statistics on government expenditure, however, were only a small part of the impact of adjustment.
User fees in health and education, which were part of adjustment
packages, caused a dramatic decline in attendance at health facilities
and, when paid, reduced the real income of the poor (Stein 2015).5 On
average, gross enrollment rates in primary and secondary schools in
sub-Saharan Africa fell by an average of 0.5 percent per annum during
adjustment and −4 percent after adjustment, compared to a rise of 4.7
percent prior to adjustment, potentially harming the earning power of
people at the lower spectrum of income (Van der Hoeven 2000). There
was a similar impact on higher education.
Following independence, there was enormous emphasis placed
on higher education as part of the national development project. The
expansion of higher education in almost every African country was
seen as a key to overcoming the colonial inheritance and putting in
place the resources to train a new generation of Africans that could
take on vital new roles as doctors, teachers, lawyers, and civil servants.
But the optimism of the 1960s and early 1970s gave way to growing
pessimism and crises in the latter part of the 1970s. The crises pushed
African governments to be more dependent on agencies like the World
Bank for financial support for higher education, and with that aid came
the conditionalities associated with the loans (Samoff and Carrol 2004).
Increasingly in documents in the 1970s and ’80s, the Bank became
more hostile to higher education in Africa. Higher education was seen
as consuming too many educational resources relative to the education needs elsewhere and as being inequitable, because higher income
groups were overrepresented. Rather than alleviating poverty, higher
education was adding to it. Universities were putting out too many
graduates and emphasizing the wrong training relative to the needs of
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labor markets. Hence, the Bank argued, resources should be directed
away from higher to primary education (though in practice primary
education also suffered), which gave higher net rates of return and so
would lead to greater efficiency for the economy. The inevitable cutbacks in higher education would be offset by charging tuition, raising
class sizes, cutting back on nonacademic staff, and increasing private
education (Samoff and Carrol 2004; Chachage 2016).
The cutbacks imposed by the World Bank and the IMF were devastating to universities. Expenditures fell by an average of 74 percent in
the 1980s at African universities. Salaries collapsed and staff vacancies
rose as universities, in order to cover their expenses, were forced to dramatically increase the number of students they accepted. For example,
by 1991, the University of Dakar was forced to enroll 20,000 students
on a campus meant for 3,500 students. In that same year, at Makerere
University in Kampala, Uganda, lecturers were earning only $19 a day,
and massive staff departures created vacancies of 48 percent. By 1992,
the average salary in Nigeria was 10 percent of what had been paid in
1978. At many African universities, infrastructure badly deteriorated
and libraries became neglected. A survey of 31 African countries found
that by 1990 the number of books per student had fallen by 86 percent
(World Bank 1994).
The neglect of higher education had a dramatic impact on the ability of African countries to participate in the global economy in a manner that would have improved their standard of living and equality of
income. At a time when global production was increasingly moving
toward a greater reliance on information and technology, sub-Saharan
Africa found itself marginalized and unable to gain the benefits from
these shifts.

AFRICA AND GLOBAL STRUCTURES OF TRADE
AND DISTRIBUTION
On a global scale, the marginal theory of distribution provides the
theoretical core of the Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson (HOS) model and
the factor-price equalization theorem. In the world of HOS, free trade
and specializing in producing a commodity that draws on the factor of
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relative abundance will lead to a one-world price for labor and capital. The theory can be questioned for its ridiculous assumptions such
as pure competition, equal access to technology for all countries, and
single commodity prices everywhere. However, none is more absurd
than the assumption of factor immobility in a world where capital has
increasingly flowed freely between countries and where the mix of production in a country is a product of the strategy of large multinational
companies.
Inequality has grown with the increasing expansion of global value
chains, which have typically been driven by lead firms that link the
production process, either through affiliates or subcontracting. A value
chain “describes the sequence of activities that lead up to the sale of a
final product, adding value at each stage of the process. Those activities
can be contained within a single firm or divided among different firms
and include, inter alia, design, production, marketing distribution, and
postsale service” (UNCTAD 2015, p. 12). Companies divide and subdivide activities based on a host of production, coordination, transportation, and technological costs. Increasingly, global value chains have
become more fragmented as production networks have extended across
space with little regard for national boundaries.
World manufacturing trade, as a percentage of world manufacturing, tripled from 1970 to 2000 to nearly 130 percent, as trade moved
from finished goods produced in one country to trade that linked each
stage of production under the supply chain of multinationals in multiple
countries. This has been driven by changes in technology, deregulation,
and financialization. Transportation and the cost of coordination have
dramatically declined because of new technologies spurring global
value chains.
The ease of doing business internationally has also been driven by
deregulation. UNCTAD, for example, estimates that 9 out of every 10
new policy measures linked to the internationalization of production
and the related ease of capital flows were aimed at increasing liberalization. Financialization has also had a profound impact on corporate
governance structures by applying heightened shareholder pressures,
which altered corporate pay structures. This greatly increased salaries
and stock options at the upper end, squeezing labor costs and shortening horizons, with an emphasis on maximizing shareholder value.
The functional redistribution of income toward profits at the expense of
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wages abounds. Transnational corporations (TNCs) have been allowed
greater space to generate new revenue, protect the rents associated with
key assets, and dramatically squeeze the lower levels of the value chain,
which is where most African countries find themselves. This is not an
inevitable outcome of some law of globalization but a deliberate reflection of how states have set policy and the nature of the international
power structure underlying the terms and conditions in which countries
find themselves in the global distribution of value added (UNCTAD
2015).
In Africa, neoliberalism increased the reliance of African countries
on exporting unprocessed raw materials and demobilized the ability of
governments to alter the terms and conditions of international exchange
by removing restrictions on capital flows, privatizing state enterprises,
and liberalizing trade. Increasingly, value in production has moved to
developed countries and offshore tax havens buttressed by international
institutional structures, like the WTO, that reinforce the financial and
technological power of transnational corporations. Data from UNCTAD
indicates that exports in the 2000s in Africa and other developing countries increased substantially without a comparable expansion in domestic value added (de Medeiros and Trebat 2017). Being relegated to primary producers in the global value chain has meant that these African
nations have had to forgo huge amounts of income because of a lack
of value addition. Added to this has been the loss of associated formalsector jobs that could have helped reverse the trajectory of inequality
in African countries. Instead, countries are subject to the vicissitudes
of prices, which are driven today more by the speculative activities of
hedge funds and other purveyors of global wealth than by the underlying producers and users of commodities. (UNECA 2013).

WORLD BANK AND THE POST–WASHINGTON
CONSENSUS
Over time, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund
began to shift their attitude toward cutbacks in education and health care,
partially due to a new commitment to poverty reduction in line with the
acceptance of the 2000 Millennium Development goals. The IMF’s Heav-
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ily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative allowed for a large increase
in expenditures in social spending in line with the stipulation in the debt
relief initiative that money released from debt servicing needed to be
reallocated to spending on education and, to some extent, on health care.
Following the Foreign Operations Appropriations Bill of 2001, which
ordered the U.S. Executive Director of the World Bank to stop approving loans conditional on charging a user fee, the Bank stopped demanding user fees in health care and primary education.
The withdrawal of user fees in a number of countries has had a dramatic effect on enrollment rates in those countries. In Burundi, 234,000
more children were enrolled in 2005 compared to the previous year—
an 88 percent increase—after a $4.50 school fee was abolished. Similar
responses have occurred in Tanzania (2001) and Kenya (2003) after the
fees were abolished. Net primary-school enrollment rates, which were at
56 percent in sub-Saharan Africa in 1999, improved to 64 percent by 2004
(60 percent for females and 68 percent for males) (Stein 2015).
In line with these trends, mainstream economists continue to focus on
the flawed relationship of productivity to income, discussed above. In this
world, the key to improving income inequality is to increase investment
in human capital. For decades, since economists came to dominate the
World Bank, the argument put forward is that improvements in education
will, ipso facto, lead to higher incomes, since “private and social returns
to education have consistently been high” (World Bank 2009, p. xxi).
Adjustments in the 1980s, particularly, emphasized cutbacks at the tertiary level in education and linked “short- to medium-term overproduction of high-level manpower” to the “growing problems of unemployment and underemployment among graduates” (World Bank 1988, pp.
69–70). After 2000, the bias against tertiary education began to change
because “private returns to tertiary education in low-income countries
are now frequently on par with the returns from primary education”
(World Bank 2009, p. xxi). Human capital growth is seen as the main
route to growth and transformation in the continent and “would enable
African economies to increase allocative efficiency and maximize the
returns from (initially) limited supplies of physical capital” (p. xx).
The problem with this approach is that it ignores the broader structural
configuration of African economies, which have performed poorly in generating job opportunities that would improve income distribution. One
particularly disturbing element is the poor quality of economic growth in
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sub-Saharan Africa. The poverty and employment elasticities of growth
are very low in those countries. A percentage increase in GDP leads to
a fall in poverty of only 0.95 percent, which is anemic by global standards. Sub-Saharan Africa has the lowest income elasticity of poverty
among the six developing areas of the world (Page and Shimeles 2014).
Even more disturbing, sub-Saharan Africa’s elasticity of employment
relative to growth declined by nearly 30 percent between 1991–1995
and 1999–2003 (Kapsos 2005).
A key element in poverty reduction is the movement of the labor
force from low to higher value-added activities, which has the potential to pay out higher wages. Institutionalists recognize that economic
development requires structural transformation of the economy and that
markets are not always effective in shifting resources between sectors.
Industry, and particularly manufacturing, tends to have higher valueadded than the service and agricultural sectors.
On average, in lower-income Africa, productivity in manufacturing compared to agriculture is roughly 3.8 to 1. Structurally changing
economies, from agriculture to industry, can have a significant impact
on income. What is required is a commitment to industrial policy or the
selective intervention of governmental policy that attempts to alter the
sectoral structure of production toward areas that are expected to offer
better prospects for raising incomes. This will mean not only changing
the domestic mix of economic sectors but also altering the incentives,
organization, and capabilities to improve the position of African production in the global supply chain (Stein, Kinuthia, and Elhiraika, in preparation). However, that in itself is not sufficient to improve inequality.
It will also require a systematic change in the configurations of power
structures in support of labor and farmers to ensure that improvements
in value added are passed on as higher incomes.

CONCLUSION
This chapter has documented and assessed competing explanations
of income inequality. Gini coefficients in sub-Saharan Africa are high,
and by some measures they have been worsening in recent years. This is
inconsistent with Kuznets’s mainstream distribution, as it predicts that
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regions with low industrialization and a high reliance on agriculture
should have an equitable distribution of income. The Gini coefficient
based on household budget surveys adjusted for PPP rose from 51.68
in 1993 to 56.12 in 2008. By 2008, sub-Saharan Africa had the highest
regional Gini coefficient in the world. The remainder of the chapter has
endeavored to explain this pattern.
The mainstream literature on inequality has been based on the notion
that income is derived from the ownership of factors of production, and
that these factors are paid according to their marginal contribution to
production. The argument is flawed in multiple ways and is largely a
normative argument dressed up to be objective. Factors of production
are integrated, and their ability to affect production is contingent and
interactive. The power of production is found in systems, not in land,
capital, and labor. Neoclassical economic constructs have been institutionalized and have created the dangerous notion that people are paid
according to the natural laws of the market and receive what is deemed
worthy of their contribution. In other words, the theory espouses that
wages are not a product of human agency but of forces beyond human
control.
In contrast, the institutional approach to distribution points to the
need to understand power and its relationship to the contestation of
interests at the heart of the determination of the allocation of the shares
of material rewards. Power in a market context is related to transactions
in which the working rules of transaction reflect the shifting nature of
power asymmetries. Understanding the forces that select working rules
and that shape and reshape the relative power of the parties to transactions should be at the core of an institutional understanding of the distribution of income in any society. Transactions are not simply among
domestic players but involve international participants, and the rules of
those transactions are affected by international institutions.
In Africa, much of the deterioration of income distribution in recent
decades can be traced to shifting policy regimes often generated by the
same flawed neoclassical economic theories that weakened the power of
direct producers in transactions, with implications for their income. On
a global scale, the flawed marginal theory of distribution provided the
core of Hecksher-Ohlin-Samuelson theory that free trade would lead to
the equalization of income in the world. The theory can be questioned
for many ridiculous assumptions, including pure competition and equal
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access to technology for all countries. However, none is more absurd
than the assumption of factor immobility in a world where capital has
increasingly flowed freely between countries and where the mix of production in a country is a product of the strategy of large multinational
companies.
Inequality has grown with the increasing expansion of global value
chains, which have typically been driven by lead firms that link the production process, either through affiliates or subcontracting. In Africa,
neoliberalism increased the reliance of African countries on exporting
unprocessed raw materials and demobilized the ability of governments
to alter the terms and conditions of international exchange. African
nations were relegated to being primary producers in the global value
chain, which meant they had to forgo huge amounts of income because
of a lack of value addition. This carried with it a loss of associated
formal-sector jobs, which could have helped reverse the trajectory of
inequality in African countries. Instead, countries are subject to the
vicissitudes of prices, which are driven today more by the speculative
activities of hedge funds.
In recent years, the World Bank, the leading international agency
in sub-Saharan Africa, has rediscovered the importance of all forms of
education. However, in line with these trends, mainstream economists
continue to focus on the flawed productivity-to-income relationship outlined in the paper. In this world, the key to improving income inequality is
to increase investment in human capital. However, that in itself is insufficient. It will also require changes in institutions to support laborers and
farmers by making sure that improvements in value added are passed
along to them in the form of higher incomes.

Notes
1. Faux naturalism refers to the false or artificial referencing of laws similar to
those governing the natural world when presenting economic theories and related
behaviors. Typically, in the axiomatic world of neoclassical economics, “laws”
are not rejected; instead, extraneous explanations are introduced that are aimed at
perpetuating the “laws.” See Stein (2015) for a discussion of this.
2. For example, the Gini below for Tanzania in 2011 is 37.8. However, our own
survey of household imputed income in 40 randomly sampled villages in eight
districts in Tanzania between 2010 and 2016 indicates much higher inequality.
The Ginis for districts ranged between 56.3 (Mbarali) and 72.3 (Kasulu), with an
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overall level of 66.5. The data is compiled from the project “Transformations in
Poverty and Property Rights in Rural Tanzania,” undertaken with my colleagues
Faustin Maganga, Rie Odgaard, and Kelly Askew.
3. There is little doubt that the myth that factors of production are paid in accordance
to the value of their marginal contribution to production is also buttressed by the
neoclassical utility theory of value, which replaced the labor theory of value.
Instead of social classes battling with capitalists over who gets the shares of production, atomistic utility-maximizing exchanges generate the prices, which in turn
help determine the reward given to the individualized contributions to production.
Hence the focus should not be on how much income capitalists were getting compared to workers, but on the utility people were deriving. The danger that people
might argue that the marginal utility of rich people was lower than that of poor
people, and hence utility might be maximized through redistribution, was soon
undercut by the introduction of Pareto optimality, which denied the possibility of
interpersonal comparisons (Cook 2018).
4. It still is useful to talk of average productivity per worker, income per worker, or
value added per worker. Raising productivity is still important for the potential to
pay higher incomes to workers. However, productivity does not guarantee higher
wages, since any increase can go to greater wages, profits, or lower prices, which
will be a reflection of the kinds of power configurations discussed in this section.
From an institutionalist perspective, the rise of productivity can come from multiple sources, which may or may not have anything to do with worker efforts. This
possibility is a product of the contingent and interactive nature of production.
5. The World Bank (1986) argued, “One way to increase the efficiency and equity of
a public education system is to impose selective charges” (p. 17). Efficiency and
equity would be improved, since it would get rid of excess demand while giving
government revenue to the state to expand the school system with higher spending
per pupil. To the Bank there would be little or no effect, since “evidence . . . suggests that household demand for education is relatively unresponsive to increases
in private costs” (p. 18). The reality has been dramatically different. The education
of much of a whole generation of Africans was lost following the imposition of
user fees.
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There are important and growing concerns about income inequality
in the United States and other high-income countries. These concerns
reflect rising apprehension about the political and social consequences
of inequality and worries that the advance of technology, expanding
international trade and investment, and other economic developments
may have significantly widened income gaps in recent decades and will
continue to do so in the future. In the United States, these concerns have
prompted renewed calls for political activism and vigorous searches for
policy measures that might improve the relative economic positions of
low- and middle-income Americans.
There are many ways in which government policies can and do
influence the distribution of income, though redistributive policies can
be costly from the standpoint of economic efficiency and growth. Since
as a realistic matter it is unlikely that feasible reforms to any one individual government program would fully address current income distribution concerns, it is useful to consider a range of policy options and
their likely effects on the distribution of income and the performance
of the economy. It is particularly valuable to identify measures that
address distributional concerns efficiently.
This chapter considers the design of a tax system in an economy
with significant income inequality, focusing on the impact of provisions—such as tax deductions and tax credits—that offer benefits to
some but not all taxpayers. Taxation directly affects the distribution of
after-tax incomes by imposing larger burdens on some than it does on
others, and it indirectly affects the distribution of income through the
government programs it finances. A tax program designed to address
income distribution concerns is one that imposes burdens based on abil-
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ity to pay and that guarantees adequate funding for appropriate government programs; consequently, tax reforms can be evaluated based on the
extent to which they permit the tax system to perform these functions.
The U.S. federal income tax imposes tax burdens based largely on
ability to pay. The U.S. tax system is progressive, meaning that a taxpayer’s burden measured as a percentage of income generally rises with
income. The U.S. tax system achieves this progressivity largely with
tax rates that increase with income and with the provision of refundable
tax credits to low-income working families. As a result, most of the
revenue raised by the U.S. federal income tax comes from high-income
taxpayers, with a sizable portion of the income-earning U.S. population
paying zero or negative federal income taxes.
Despite the progressivity of the U.S. income tax, there are frequently voiced concerns that the system affords too many unwarranted
tax breaks, particularly for high-income taxpayers.1 These concerns are
understandable but misplaced. They are understandable because much
of the popular discussion of tax policy focuses on apparent inequities
created by the availability of tax preferences for which certain taxpayers and not others are eligible. For example, only those taxpayers who
itemize their tax deductions are able to receive tax reductions due to
mortgage payments, charitable contributions, and state and local tax
payments. Prior to passage of the 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, only
about 30 percent of the taxpaying population chose to itemize deductions, with the remaining 70 percent claiming the standard deduction
instead.2 Since the 30 percent who itemized their deductions were
concentrated among high-income taxpayers, it follows that this highincome group received most of the benefits of the favorable federal tax
treatment of mortgage interest, charitable contributions, and state and
local tax payments. By increasing the standard deduction, the Tax Cuts
and Jobs Act significantly reduced the number of U.S. taxpayers claiming the standard deduction, and in the process it further concentrated
the benefits of tax deductions among the wealthy. Hence, a simple calculation of the distribution of the benefits of itemized deductions might
conclude that the provision of these deductions reduces tax equity by
providing benefits almost entirely to taxpayers with high incomes.
On closer examination, it becomes apparent that equity-based concerns about these tax preferences are misplaced, because in fact tax
preferences are critical features of progressive tax systems—and indeed,

Income Inequality, Progressive Taxation, and Tax Expenditures 147

are what make it possible for tax systems to exhibit high degrees of
progressivity, with all the social benefits that are associated with progressivity. There are two reasons for this, the first of which is that tax
preferences make it possible to design taxes efficiently, since by providing preferential taxation of highly responsive activities it is possible to
differentiate taxes in a way that is less costly to the economy. The economic distortions associated with high tax rates are important considerations in limiting the extent of taxation and tax progressivity, both in
theory and in practice. Since high marginal tax rates discourage income
production, the cost of imposing high tax rates rises with the degree
to which economic activity is sensitive to taxation. Governments can
choose to offer tax preferences for activities that are highly sensitive
to taxation, which subjects these activities to lower effective tax rates,
and thereby subjects relatively insensitive activities to comparatively
higher rates of taxation. This type of tax design reduces the efficiency
cost of high tax rates and thereby makes it feasible to implement a more
progressive tax system.
The second reason tax preferences facilitate tax progressivity is that
properly designed tax preferences adjust tax burdens according to ability to pay, which increases the attractiveness of imposing a highly progressive tax-rate structure. One of the important equity concerns about
high degrees of tax progressivity is that high tax rates may be unduly
burdensome to taxpayers in certain circumstances. For example, even
a very-high-income taxpayer may find it impossible or infeasible also
to pay federal income taxes at high rates if simultaneously confronted
with a combination of extraordinary medical bills, high state taxes,
high alimony payments, and other claims on resources. The adoption
of sympathetic tax treatment in the form of deductions for medical and
other expenses makes legislators and the general public more willing
than they would otherwise be to impose high tax rates on those with
very high incomes.
As a result, an equitable tax system has a relatively narrow tax base
and high tax rates, with rates that increase sharply with income. By
applying high tax rates to affluent taxpayers, the system can raise revenue that more than compensates for revenue lost from tax deductions
and tax credits, and that has desirable distributional properties in the bargain. Such a system offers favorable rates, refundable credits, and other
tax benefits for low-income families. The tax system thereby imposes
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tax burdens according to ability to pay and raises revenue sufficient to
fund needed government programs. By imposing burdens according to
ability to pay and in offering a sound system of government finance, a
tax system with high rates and appropriate deductions and tax credits
automatically addresses the income-distribution concerns that appropriately motivate much of the current tax-policy discussion.
There is an alternative to such a system: it is a much more strippeddown income tax that offers very few if any deductions and tax credits.
There is considerable popular appeal to such a broad-based, low-rate
tax system, due in part to its simplicity and in part to the low rates. The
archetypal broad-based, low-rate tax system is known as a Haig-Simons
income tax, after the fundamental contributions of Robert Murray Haig
(1921) and Henry Calvert Simons (1938). In the Haig-Simons income
tax, all income is subject to taxation, without provision of deductions or
tax credits corresponding to individual taxpayer situations. The virtue
of such simplicity is not to be lightly dismissed, but this form of simplicity comes at the cost of considerable loss of tax equity, because such
a tax fails to accommodate individual circumstances, and it is unrealistic to think that a Haig-Simons income tax would ever be imposed at
highly progressive rates. Indeed, even the appeal to low tax rates immediately reveals that there is a limit to the range of possible tax progressivity, which limits the extent to which those who are best positioned
to pay taxes ultimately do so. Those who advocate for broad-based,
low-rate tax systems frequently fail to recognize the intimate connection between the breadth of the tax base and the extent to which the
government is able to adopt a system that taxes according to ability to
pay. The purpose of this chapter is to draw attention to this connection,
and to recommend that the United States and other countries do more to
tailor their tax systems in ways that make them more progressive.

DISTRIBUTIONAL PROPERTIES OF THE U.S.
INCOME TAX
The U.S. federal government collects revenue from several sources,
of which two are by far the most important: 1) employment-related payroll taxes, which finance Social Security and Medicare, and 2) the per-
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sonal income tax, which finances most of the rest of the government.3
This paper focuses on the income tax, which is the primary discretionary source of revenue for the federal government—and which by its
nature is the part of the revenue system that is most amenable to the
imposition of burdens according to ability to pay. U.S. payroll taxes
are unlike income and other taxes in that eligibility for retirement benefits, disability insurance, and medical insurance requires payment of
employment taxes—whereas receipt of other federal benefits are not
conditional on paying income taxes. For example, workers who have
higher wage and salary income, and therefore pay greater Social Security taxes, receive higher monthly benefits from the Social Security system when they retire. Furthermore, the Social Security system provides
benefits in a highly progressive way, with income replacement rates
that are much higher at low incomes than they are at higher incomes.
Consequently, the Social Security system achieves its distributional
objectives not through its tax features but instead through its benefit
formula—which would make any distributional examination of Social
Security taxes incomplete, given the close connection of Social Security taxes and benefits.
U.S. federal income-tax burdens rise with income, largely reflecting the progressive nature of tax rates. The latest available data cover
pre-2018 federal law, with Table 7.1 presenting calculations for tax year
2014. In that year, an adjusted gross income of $465,600 put a taxpayer
in the top 1 percent of the income distribution, and such taxpayers faced
average tax rates of 27.2 percent. This top 1 percent of the U.S. income
distribution had 20.6 percent of aggregate U.S. personal income that
year and paid 39.5 percent of total federal income taxes. An adjusted
gross income of $189,000 put a taxpayer in the top 5 percent of the
income distribution; and this group faced average tax rates of 23.6 percent, earned 36 percent of aggregate U.S. personal income that year,
and paid 60 percent of federal income taxes. By contrast, the half of the
United States that had incomes below $38,200 faced average tax rates
of just 3.5 percent, had only 11.3 percent of personal income, and paid
just 3.5 percent of federal income taxes.
Federal personal-income tax burdens in 2014 (and in other years)
rise with income levels. This is largely the product of tax rates that
increase with income, exempt amounts, and standard and personal
deductions that permit taxpayers to earn significant income before it
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Table 7.1 Income Distribution, Tax Rates, and Tax Payments, 2014
Income
Income cutoffs Average tax
Cumulative Cumulative tax
groups (%)
($ 000s)
rates (%)
incomes (%) payments (%)
Top 1
465.6
27.2
20.6
39.5
Top 5
189.0
23.6
36.0
60.0
Top 10
133.4
21.3
47.2
70.9
Top 25
77.7
17.8
68.9
86.8
Top 50
38.2
15.5
88.7
97.3
Bottom 50
3.5
11.3
3.5
NOTE: The table presents average federal income tax rates, total incomes, and total
federal income tax payments by six income groups for tax year 2014. Income groups
are classified by adjusted gross income (AGI) as reported on tax forms. Income cutoffs
denote the minimum AGI to be included in the group. Cumulative incomes denote the
fraction of total U.S. AGI earned by members of the income group; similarly, cumulative tax payments denote the fraction of total U.S. federal income tax payments by
members of the group.
SOURCE: Dungan (2017).

becomes taxable, as well as refundable tax credits available to lowincome earners. In 2014, a married couple was not taxable until its
income exceeded amounts covered by exemptions and deductions, and
then was initially taxable at just 10 percent for the first $18,150 of net
taxable income. Such a couple then faced a 15 percent tax rate until its
taxable income reached $73,800, after which point the marginal tax rate
became 25 percent. The marginal income-tax rate rose to 28 percent at
an income of $148,851, 33 percent at an income of $226,851, 35 percent
at an income of $405,101, and 39.6 percent on any portion of income
exceeding $457,601. Furthermore, the Earned Income Tax Credit and
the Child Tax Credit were available primarily for low-income families.
Despite the evident progressivity of the federal income tax, it is possible for tax reform to make the system much more progressive than it
was in 2014 or is today. One aspect of federal taxation that is commonly
argued to work against tax progressivity is the provision of exclusions,
deductions, and tax credits, all of which are commonly called “tax
expenditures” (Surrey 1973). The most important single “tax expenditure” is the tax exclusion for employer-provided health insurance. Other
significant tax expenditures include the preferential treatment of retirement accounts; deductions for state and local taxes, mortgage interest, and charitable contributions; the favorable tax treatment of capital
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gains; and various tax credits. Table 7.2 displays the largest federal tax
expenditures for Fiscal Year 2016, with accompanying magnitudes of
forgone federal tax revenue because of these tax expenditures. Many of
these tax expenditures benefit high-income taxpayers.
Table 7.3 presents the distribution of federal personal income tax
expenditures by income group for Tax Year 2013. The first column
offers evidence on tax exclusions, which consist of the benefits of the
favorable tax treatment of employer-provided health insurance, pension
contributions, and income; the favorable tax treatment of capital gains
on assets held until death; and other smaller exclusions. As the table
indicates, 7 percent of the aggregate value of these tax exclusions is
enjoyed by taxpayers whose incomes are in the top 1 percent of the U.S.
income distribution. While the aggregate value of these benefits for the
top 1 percent is obviously disproportionate to the number of taxpayers,
it is actually rather small compared to the roughly 39.5 percent of tax
Table 7.2 Largest Individual Tax Expenditures, 2016
Tax expenditure
Exclusions from taxable income:
Employer contributions for health care and insurance
Employer pension contributions and earnings
Social Security and railroad retirement benefits
Capital gains at death
Interest on state and local government bonds
Fringe benefits provided under cafeteria plans
Capital gains on sales of principal residences
Tax deductions:
State and local income, sales, and property taxes
Mortgage interest on owner-occupied residences
Charitable contributions
Reduced tax rates on dividends and long-term capital gains
Tax credits:
Earned Income Tax Credit
Child Tax Credit

2016 amount
($ billions)
164.6
156.1
38.4
32.9
32.9
31.3
29.2
96.6
59.0
55.2
130.9
73.0
55.0

NOTE: The table presents the aggregate dollar values (in billions) of the largest individual tax expenditure items for Fiscal Year 2016.
SOURCE: Joint Committee on Taxation (2017a).
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Table 7.3 Share of Tax Expenditures by Income Group, 2013
Tax
Income
exclusions
group (%)
(%)
Top 1
7
Top 20
45
60–80
23
40–60
16
20–40
10
Bottom 20
5

Tax
Capital gains
deductions preferences
(%)
(%)
30
68
81
93
13
5
4
2
1
0
0
0

Tax
credits
(%)
0
3
12
19
29
37

Total tax
expenditures
(%)
17
51
18
13
10
8

NOTE: Figures in the table report the fraction of total U.S. tax benefits of each tax
preference category received by each of the designated income groups, as defined by
adjusted gross income. “Tax exclusions” consist of tax benefits from the exclusion
from taxable income of employer-provided health insurance, net pension contributions and earnings, capital gains on assets transferred at death, a portion of Social
Security and railroad retirement benefits, and other items. “Tax deductions” consist of
tax benefits from the itemized deductions for state and local taxes, mortgage interest,
charitable contributions, and others. “Capital gains preferences” are the benefits of the
preferential tax rates at which long-term gains are taxed. “Tax credits” consist of tax
benefits from the Earned Income Tax Credit, the Child Tax Credit, and other available
credits. “Total tax expenditures” is the sum of all of these tax benefits.
SOURCE: CBO (2013).

payments (and 20.6 percent of income) accounted for by the top 1 percent of taxpayers. Table 7.3 indicates that the top 20 percent of income
earners in 2013 received 45 percent of the tax benefits from tax exclusions—which, again, while disproportionate to that group’s numbers, is
rather less than the share of this top-income quintile in tax payments or
income. By contrast, taxpayers whose incomes are in the bottom two
income quintiles received 15 percent of the aggregate tax benefit of
exclusions, which is a sizable benefit considering that the bottom half
of income earners has 11.3 percent of aggregate income and pays just
3.5 percent of aggregate U.S. income taxes.
The second column of Table 7.3 presents information on the distribution of the benefits of tax deductions, which include benefits from
deducting state and local taxes, mortgage interest payments, charitable contributions, and other expenses. These benefits are more heavily
concentrated among high-income taxpayers than are the benefits of tax
exclusions. As the table indicates, taxpayers whose incomes are in the
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top 1 percent receive 30 percent of the aggregate benefits of tax deductions; income earners in the top quintile of the distribution receive 81
percent of the aggregate benefits of tax deductions. These percentages
correspond roughly to shares of aggregate tax payments. By contrast,
income earners in the bottom quintile of the distribution receive only
negligible benefits from tax deductions, reflecting both the low tax
rates against which they take deductions and the very small fraction of
such taxpayers who itemize deductions rather than taking the standard
deduction.
The third and fourth columns of Table 7.3 display information on
distributions of the benefits of capital-gain preferences and tax credits.
These two series exhibit very different distributional properties. The
benefits of capital-gain preferences—the low rates at which long-term
capital gains are taxed—are very strongly concentrated among highincome taxpayers, with the top quintile of income earners enjoying
93 percent of the aggregate benefit of these low tax rates, while the
bottom two quintiles of income earners enjoy only negligible benefits.
The opposite is true of the benefits of tax credits, which arise almost
entirely from the Earned Income Tax Credit and the Child Tax Credit.
The bottom two quintiles of income earners enjoy 66 percent of the
aggregate benefits of tax credits, whereas the top quintile of income
earners receive only negligible benefits.
The fifth column of Table 7.3 displays shares of aggregate benefits
from all tax expenditures taken together. Because of the significance of
tax deductions and capital-gain preferences, aggregate tax expenditure
benefits are again concentrated among high-income taxpayers, with 17
percent accruing to the top 1 percent of taxpayers, and 51 percent to the
top quintile. By contrast, the bottom quintile of income earners receives
only 8 percent of the aggregate benefits of tax expenditures, and the
20–40 percent quintile receives 10 percent of the aggregate benefits.
Table 7.4 presents information on the benefits of aggregate tax
expenditures expressed as shares of after-tax incomes. This method of
presenting the values of tax expenditures implicitly modifies the entries
to adjust for the dollar values of the benefits provided by different types
of tax expenditures. For example, since the aggregate dollar value of tax
exclusions greatly exceeds the aggregate dollar value of tax deductions,
the distribution of tax exclusions has greater impact on the final distribution of after-tax incomes than does the distribution of tax deductions.
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Table 7.4 Values of Tax Expenditures as Shares of After-Tax Income, by
Income Group, 2013 (%)
Tax
Tax
Capital gains
Tax
Total tax
Income
exclusions deductions preferences
credits expenditures
group (%)
(%)
(%)
(%)
(%)
(%)
Top 1
3.2
3.9
5.3
0.0
13.1
Top 20
4.7
2.5
1.7
0.1
9.4
60–80
5.2
0.8
0.2
0.7
7.3
40–60
5.0
0.4
0.1
1.5
7.3
20–40
4.5
0.2
0.0
3.3
7.9
Bottom 20
4.2
0.0
0.0
8.1
11.7
NOTE: Figures in the table report values of total U.S. tax benefits of each tax preference
category received by each of the designated income groups, expressed as fractions
of group income. “Tax exclusions” consist of tax benefits from the exclusion from
taxable income of employer-provided health insurance, net pension contributions and
earnings, capital gains on assets transferred at death, a portion of Social Security and
railroad retirement benefits, and other items. “Tax deductions” consist of tax benefits
from the itemized deductions for state and local taxes, mortgage interest, charitable
contributions, and others. “Capital gains preferences” are the benefits of the preferential tax rates at which long-term gains are taxed. “Tax credits” consist of tax benefits
from the Earned Income Tax Credit, the Child Tax Credit, and other available credits.
“Total tax expenditures” is the sum of all of these tax benefits.
SOURCE: CBO (2013).

Despite a normalization by after-tax incomes, it remains the case that
the values of tax deductions and capital-gain preferences appear to be
concentrated among high-income taxpayers: the top 1 percent receive
benefits from tax deductions equal to 3.9 percent of their incomes, and
they receive benefits from capital-gains preferences equal to 5.3 percent
of their incomes. By contrast, taxpayers with incomes in the bottom 40
percent of the income distribution receive benefits from tax deductions
equal to just 0.2 percent of their incomes and receive only negligible
benefits from capital gains preferences. The benefits of tax exclusions
in Table 7.4 appear to be spread across the population roughly in proportion to after-tax incomes, and the benefits of tax credits are very
strongly concentrated among low-income taxpayers, with those in the
bottom quintile of the income distribution receiving tax credits worth
8.1 percent of their incomes. By contrast, taxpayers in the top quintile
of the income distribution receive benefits from tax credits equal to just
0.1 percent of their incomes.
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The fifth column of Table 7.4 presents the distribution of the dollar values of tax expenditures measured as percentages of after-tax
incomes. This distribution of benefits is largely flat across the middle
three quintiles of the income distribution, with somewhat greater density in the bottom and top quintiles, and a mild concentration of benefits
for the top 1 percent of income earners.
The evidence indicates that taxpayers in the top 20 percent of the
U.S. income distribution receive a majority of the benefits of tax expenditures, from which many people quite understandably draw the conclusion that tax exclusions, deductions, and credits are antiprogressive.
One problem with this inference is that existing tax expenditures offer
benefits roughly in proportion to after-tax incomes, suggesting that they
serve largely as factors that reduce effective tax rates by somewhat constant amounts. The second problem is that evaluating tax expenditures
in isolation relies on a view of the world in which everything else—
notably including tax rates—stays unchanged while tax preferences
disappear. This is unrealistic; governments choose tax rates together
with tax preferences, and if tax preferences were reduced in magnitude,
then government would also change tax rates. Consequently, in order
to know just what effect tax expenditures have on the distribution of
income, it is necessary to understand the principles that governments
apply in designing their tax systems.

THE 2017 TAX CUTS AND JOBS ACT
In December 2017, the United States enacted a major tax reform,
commonly known by the bill’s original title, the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act
(TCJA). This legislation was initially directed at reforming the U.S.
system of corporate and international taxation, and while the TCJA did
reduce the U.S. corporate tax rate from 35 percent to 21 percent and
introduce major changes to the U.S. system of taxing foreign income,
the final bill also included significant cuts to individual taxes and the
taxation of income earned by unincorporated businesses. As a result,
forecasts predicted that the TCJA would reduce federal revenue collections by $1.456 trillion over 10 years; and even in the scenario in which
the tax reduction has the effect of stimulating the economy, federal rev-
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enues over that time period would decline by $1.071 trillion because of
the bill’s provisions (Joint Committee on Taxation 2017b).
The 2017 legislation significantly reduced individual taxes by lowering tax rates, almost doubling the standard deduction, doubling the
Child Tax Credit, increasing the exempt amount under the individual
alternative minimum tax (AMT), and making several other changes.
There were also several provisions that increased individual taxes, notably by removing personal exemptions, reducing and eliminating several
popular itemized deductions, and changing the method by which bracket
amounts are indexed to inflation. The combination of rate reductions
and limits on itemized deductions produced a lower-rate, broader-based
personal income tax system. It also produced a personal income tax
system with burdens less well targeted to ability to pay.
The 2017 TCJA reduced average effective tax rates at every income
level. Table 7.5 presents a distributional analysis of the effect of the
TCJA, comparing tax burdens by income level in 2017 (prior to application of the TCJA’s provisions) and 2019. As the table indicates, the
TCJA reduced personal income taxes by $259.5 billion in 2019, lowering the average personal income tax rate from 20.7 percent to 19.0
percent. The tax reductions were concentrated among higher-income
taxpayers, in part reflecting the reality that these individuals pay the
majority of federal income taxes. The roughly 1.7 million taxpayers
with incomes of $500,000 and above saw their aggregate federal taxes
decline by $60.8 billion between 2017 and 2019, whereas the 37.5 million taxpayers with incomes in the $20,000–$40,000 range received an
aggregate tax reduction of just $8.4 billion.
The second and third columns of Table 7.5 present average tax rates
in 2017 and 2019 for each of the listed income groups. Average tax rates
declined for each of these groups by between 0.5 and 3.1 percent, with
most of the large reductions materializing for high-income taxpayers.
For example, the average tax rate of taxpayers with $1 million or more
of income fell from 32.5 percent in 2017 to 30.2 percent in 2019; and
the average tax rate of taxpayers with annual incomes in the $500,000
to $1 million range declined from 30.9 percent in 2017 to 27.8 percent in 2019. By contrast, the average tax rate of taxpayers with annual
incomes in the $20,000–$30,000 range fell by only 0.5 percent, from
3.9 percent to 3.4 percent. As a result, the 2017 TCJA delivered its larg-
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Table 7.5 2019 Distributional Effects of the 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act
Income category
($ 000)
Less than 10
10–20
20–30
30–40
40–50
50–75
75–100
100–200
200–500
500–1,000
1,000 and over
Total

Tax reduction
($ billions)
0.4
1.8
3.0
5.4
6.7
23.0
22.4
70.4
65.5
23.9
36.9
259.5

Average tax rates (%)
2017
2019
9.1
8.6
−0.7
−1.2
3.9
3.4
7.9
7.0
10.9
9.9
14.8
13.5
17.0
15.6
20.9
19.4
26.4
23.9
30.9
27.8
32.5
30.2
20.7
19.0

Number of
taxpayers (in
millions)
19.3
20.6
21.5
16.0
12.8
27.4
17.8
30.7
9.2
1.1
0.6
177.0

NOTE: The table presents the aggregate tax reductions between 2017 and 2019, and the
average federal income tax rates in 2017 and 2019, for 11 income groups classified by
adjusted gross income as reported on tax forms.
SOURCE: Joint Committee on Taxation (2019).

est tax reductions (as measured relative to pretax incomes) to the most
affluent taxpayers.
Table 7.6 explores the sources of tax burden changes for affected
taxpayer income groups. Entries in the table represent the aggregate
magnitudes of tax reductions between 2017 and 2019 for which the
listed tax bill provisions were responsible. Thus, for example, the tax
rate reductions in the 2017 bill lowered by $57.8 billion the aggregate
2019 tax liabilities of taxpayers in the $200,000–$500,000 income
group. The same taxpayer group also received $23.8 billion in aggregate tax savings from the 2017 bill’s significant reduction in the alternative minimum tax but paid an additional $25.8 billion in aggregate taxes
because of the removal of personal exemptions.
Some patterns are evident from the information in Table 7.6. The
tax rate reductions in the 2017 bill reduced aggregate 2019 tax collections by $198.4 billion, with the benefits concentrated among highincome taxpayers. The 2017 bill reduced aggregate tax collections
under the alternative minimum tax by $38.6 billion; almost all of this
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Table 7.6 2019 Distributional Effects of Specific Provisions of the 2017
Tax Cuts and Jobs Act
Income
category
($ 000)
Less than 10
10–20
20–30
30–40
40–50
50–75
75–100
100–200
200–500
500–1,000
1,000 and
over
Total

Alternative
Rate
minimum Personal Standard Itemized Child Tax
reduction tax (AMT) exemptions deduction deductions Credit
($ billions)
($)
($)
($)
($)
($)
0.0
0.0
0.3
1.3
2.7
12.3
14.7
61.1
57.8
18.6
29.5

1m
4m
0m
2m
6m
9m
9m
690 m
23.8 b
13.2 b
873 m

−1 m
−932 m
−2.8 b
−3.8 b
−4.9 b
−16.5 b
−17.7 b
−54.6 b
−25.8 b
−39 m
−1 m

182 m
3.3 b
5.9 b
7.0 b
7.7 b
20.4 b
16.8 b
37.2 b
9.6 b
1.1 b
425 m

0
−4 m
−60 m
−153 m
−231 m
−1.1 b
−1.7 b
−9.1 b
−21.5 b
−12.3 b
−30.0 b

82 m
1.0 b
2.4 b
3.5 b
4.3 b
9.8 b
7.7 b
23.9 b
13.5 b
93 m
0

198.4

38.6 b

−127.1 b

109.5 b

−$76.2 b

66.4 b

NOTE: The table presents the aggregate tax reductions between 2017 and 2019 due to
various provisions of the 2017 TCJA, distinguished by income groups as classified
by adjusted gross income reported on tax forms. The first column reports tax reductions due to lower tax rates introduced by the TCJA. The second column reports tax
reductions due to changes in the alternative minimum tax. The third column reports
tax reductions (all of which are negative, so therefore correspond to tax increases)
that are due to the elimination of personal exemptions. The fourth column reports tax
reductions due to increases in the standard deduction. The fifth column reports tax
reductions (all of which are negative, so therefore correspond to tax increases) that
are due to limitations on itemized deductions. The sixth column reports tax reductions
due to increases in the Child Tax Credit.
SOURCE: Joint Committee on Taxation (2019).

tax reduction was enjoyed by taxpayers in the $200,000-to-$1-million
income range. The elimination of personal exemptions increased aggregate tax liabilities by $127.1 billion, most of it paid by taxpayers earning between $100,000 and $500,000, and virtually none of which paid
by taxpayers earning $500,000 or above (whose personal exemptions
had been already largely phased out under pre-2018 law). Increasing
the standard deduction reduced total tax collections by $109.5 billion,
and almost 70 percent of these benefits were received by taxpayers
with incomes between $50,000 and $200,000. Increasing the Child Tax
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Credit reduced total tax collections by $66.4 billion, with the benefits
concentrated among taxpayers with middle-to-high incomes; those with
incomes below $20,000 or above $500,000 received almost none of the
benefits.
The 2017 legislation made several changes to itemized deductions, limiting the ability of taxpayers to claim deductions for state and
local tax payments, mortgage interest payments, casualty losses, moving expenses, alimony payments, and various miscellaneous itemized
deductions, including expenses incurred in income-earning activities.
In total, these restrictions reduced tax collections by $76.2 billion, with
the burden heavily concentrated among high-income taxpayers. For
example, these limits on itemized deductions increased by $30.0 billion the aggregate tax liabilities of taxpayers with incomes of $1 million or more, despite the relatively small number of such taxpayers; by
contrast, taxpayers with incomes below $100,000 (who itemize their
deductions at relatively low rates) were largely unaffected.
Those who have long advocated for broad-based, low-rate income
taxation got a version of what they asked for with the 2017 Tax Cuts
and Jobs Act. The 2017 TCJA reduced rates and removed deductions
and exemptions, moving federal income taxation in the direction of
a flatter—and some would argue, simpler—tax system. The federal
income tax now collects less money than it would have absent the 2017
changes and does so in a manner that corresponds less to assigning
burdens according to ability to pay. While the individual income tax
features of the 2017 legislation move the federal revenue system in an
unfortunate direction according to these criteria, one way in which the
2017 TCJA is useful is that it illustrates what direction not to take in
crafting more wholesale reforms to the tax system.

PRINCIPLES OF INCOME TAXATION
Countries impose taxes in order to raise revenue to finance their
governments. The cost of raising revenue is that the accompanying
taxes impose burdens on individuals and businesses that pay the taxes,
and these taxes also impose costs on the economy as a whole by distorting economic incentives. Income taxation discourages income pro-
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duction, thereby reducing the efficiency of the economy and running
counter to most government objectives. The economic costs of the
distortions produced by income taxation almost always rise with the
amount of revenue collected,4 and with the extent of tax progressivity,
so a more distortionary tax system puts downward pressure on government spending and on the extent to which a government will be willing
to impose progressive taxes.
The cost of economic distortions is a function of the degree to
which price distortions discourage and alter economic activity. Properly designed income exclusions, tax deductions, and tax credits make
the tax system less distortionary by directing tax burdens at economic
activities that are less responsive to taxation. For example, while all
income taxes discourage labor supply, the effects are more dramatic in
some instances, and for some groups of workers, than they are for others. Age is an obvious dimension along which the labor supply effects
of taxation will usually differ. For example, workers over 60 years old
are at far greater risk of retiring than are workers in their forties, so
high tax rates are much more likely to drive older workers out of the
labor force than they are to induce exit by middle-aged workers. Consequently, an efficient tax system would offer preferential treatment of
older workers, all other things being equal. And if a tax system does not
offer special exemptions, deductions, or tax credits to elderly workers,
then the labor supply responsiveness of this group will put downward
pressure on income tax rates in general, since the government will know
that higher tax rates significantly reduce the labor supply of a significant
portion of the population.
Similar considerations apply to the tax treatment of working families with young children. Since children require care and supervision,
parents who work full time must incur out-of-pocket child-care costs,
many of which are avoidable if at least one of the parents were to stay
home with the children. High tax rates on working parents discourage labor force participation by reducing the net return from working—which has particularly strong effects on income production by
parents of young children. The tax system can address this problem
most directly by providing tax deductions or tax credits for child-care
expenses incurred to accommodate the careers of working parents,
which has the effect of more nearly taxing the net economic return to
working. While the U.S. tax system currently offers modest versions of
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these deductions and credits, they are very much incomplete, which is
why high tax rates on labor income would strongly discourage parental
labor-force participation.
Certain forms of capital income are similarly sensitive to taxation.
Capital gains offer an important example. Capital gains are taxed on
realization rather than accrual, so high rates of capital income taxation strongly discourage owners of appreciated assets from selling their
holdings, a phenomenon known as the “lock-in effect.” Owners of
homes, shares of stock, small businesses, and other valuable properties
commonly retain their holdings far longer than they would otherwise
want to, in order to delay triggering capital gains taxes. By delaying
realizations, an owner implicitly earns returns on the taxes that are not
paid in the meantime. To the extent that capital income taxes apply to
capital gains, these taxes distort the economy by keeping homeowners
in homes they no longer want, investors in shares of companies they
no longer want to hold, and business owners in businesses they would
prefer to sell to others. Furthermore, anticipation of these taxes discourages investments in the first place. The reality that capital-gains tax
realizations are highly sensitive to taxation accounts for the favorable
tax treatment that the federal income tax currently affords to income
from long-term capital gains. In the absence of such favorable treatment, there would be very strong downward pressure on income tax
rates, as governments recognize that the lock-in effect makes high rates
very costly.
The examples of the effects of high tax rates on labor supply by
elderly workers, labor supply by working parents, and capital gains realizations, are just that: examples. In fact, there are scores of dimensions
along which economic activity is more and less responsive to taxation,
and which therefore from an efficiency standpoint justify favorable tax
treatment of certain taxpayers and activities, and less favorable treatment of others. In the absence of such tax differentiation, the system
becomes less efficient and more costly, which makes governments less
willing to impose the high tax rates necessary to fund significant government operations and to do so in a progressive manner.
The efficiency considerations that argue in favor of an extensive
system of tax preferences in the form of exclusions, deductions, and
credits simply add to traditional equity considerations. Taxpayers in
different situations, and with different forms of income, have differing
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abilities to pay taxes, and therefore should be subject to taxation at different rates. Children again offer an obvious example. A married couple
with labor income of $80,000 is clearly in a different economic position
from a family consisting of a married couple and five children with a
family income of $80,000, and it is obvious that the childless couple has
in a very practical sense greater real income and therefore greater ability to pay taxes. The U.S. tax system offers only very modest benefits
to families with children and would need to do much more in order to
adjust properly for the effect of family size on taxpaying ability. Failure
to adjust taxes properly for family size means not only that tax burdens are inequitably distributed between taxpaying families, but also
that there is downward pressure on tax rates in general, since high tax
rates without proper adjustments for family size would impose severe
burdens on families in certain circumstances.
Casualty losses offer another example. A family whose home burns
down or whose car is stolen incurs significant economic losses in addition to life disruption, insofar as any losses are uninsured. There is a
very real sense in which the family’s economic income in the year of
the incident is lower by the amount of the uninsured loss; and an uninsured loss certainly diminishes a family’s ability to pay federal income
taxes without incurring significant economic hardship. Until 2018, it
was possible for U.S. taxpayers to claim deductions for casualty losses
to the extent that such losses exceeded 10 percent of adjusted gross
income, but provisions of the 2017 TCJA all but eliminated this deduction. The result is not only the serious inequity that follows from subjecting people to taxation based on inaccurate measures of their annual
incomes, but also downward pressure on tax rates, to prevent federal
income taxes from imposing significant hardship on families incurring
casualty losses and other major economic disruptions.
There are many other dimensions along which the economic situations of taxpaying families differ, and which bear on their ability to
pay federal taxes. Families incur medical and educational expenses, job
disruptions, investment reversals, loan demands from friends and relatives, and many other circumstances that could be reasonably accommodated by provisions in the tax system. It is a reality that tax breaks
given to one group of taxpayers must be made up by higher burdens on
other taxpayers, but fortunately there is a simple legislative method of
performing such an adjustment, which is to increase tax rates.
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INCOME DISTRIBUTION AND INCOME TAXATION
A properly designed income tax offers many exclusions, deductions,
and credits that accommodate individual situations and thereby adjust
tax burdens according to ability to pay. Such a system also imposes
relatively heavier burdens on income sources that are least responsive
to taxation. These features give the tax system a narrow base and relatively high rates. The high rates are indeed important attributes: a tax
system that imposes burdens in accordance with ability to pay has tax
rates that rise sharply with income, making the tax-rate schedule highly
progressive.
Under any circumstance, it is in the national interest to adopt an
income tax that imposes burdens according to ability to pay, but at a
time of heightened concern over the distribution of income there is even
greater need to adhere to sound principles in crafting income tax provisions. Sound tax design addresses income distribution concerns in several ways. The first is by accommodating individual circumstances and
needs, implicitly adjusting tax burdens for differences in real incomes.
The second way in which sound tax design addresses income distribution concerns is by facilitating the imposition of a highly progressive
tax-rate schedule, one in which high-income taxpayers shoulder much
more of the tax burden than do low-income taxpayers. And the third
way is that sound tax design makes it feasible to finance significant
government expenditures at a reasonable cost, which makes it possible
for the government to adopt spending measures that assist low-income
and otherwise vulnerable portions of the population.
The United States already has a progressive personal income tax,
and it already permits many exclusions, deductions, and tax credits that
narrow the base and, to a degree, adjust tax burdens to individual situations. These features of the income tax are widely criticized, notably
by advocates for greater tax progressivity, who feel that higher-income
taxpayers receive most of the benefits of exclusions, deductions, and
tax credits. Evidence from tax filings confirms that this observation
is largely correct: high-income taxpayers do indeed benefit from tax
expenditures, with slightly more than half of the benefits going to people in the top quintile of the income distribution, and just 8 percent of
the benefits going to people in the bottom quintile.
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It is a mistake to conclude from this observation, as so many have,
that the answer to making the tax system more progressive lies in selective reductions in tax expenditures. On the contrary: in order to make
the tax system more progressive, it is necessary to expand significantly
the number of tax expenditures, particularly those that benefit highincome taxpayers. The tax-rate schedule can be made more progressive
only by adjusting the taxation of high-income earners for aspects of
their economic activities and personal situations that bear on their ability and willingness to pay taxes. Put simply, with different design, it is
possible to impose higher tax rates on those with high incomes—but
this design will certainly entail significant tax breaks for some with high
incomes. The tax system can thereby do much more to align tax burdens
with abilities to pay, and to relieve burdens on those who are struggling
economically—but such a system lies open to critique by well-meaning
critics who do not appreciate the connection between the breadth of the
tax base and the progressivity of tax rates.
Recent legislative developments are far from encouraging. The 2017
Tax Cuts and Jobs Act gave the tax system a narrower base and lower
rates, reducing its progressivity and also reducing total tax collections.
In eliminating or restricting tax deductions for casualty losses, alimony
payments, moving expenses, state and local income tax payments,
mortgage interest payments, and expenses incurred in income-earning
activities, the 2017 TCJA significantly reduced the extent to which tax
burdens align with ability to pay. The tax-rate reductions enacted by the
TCJA simply add to the mismatch between tax burdens and taxpaying
ability, and the reduced tax collections make it ever more difficult to
maintain government programs directed at those in challenging economic circumstances. The TCJA was the product of a political process
driven by many considerations, but underlying some of the changes that
it enacted was a mistaken sense that a broad-based, low-rate income tax
is better than the alternative. Certainly this is not the case if one desires
a tax that imposes burdens according to ability to pay and does so in
a progressive manner. But even if one’s goal is merely efficiency, not
equity or progressivity, a good tax system is highly differentiated, offering multiple exclusions, deductions, and credits.
It is important not to overlook efficiency in designing a tax system, whether or not analysts and advocates are motivated by a desire
to distribute tax burdens equitably. A more efficient tax system offers
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greater opportunity to pursue all objectives, including those related to
equity; and in particular, a more efficient tax system can support a more
progressive tax rate structure at lower cost than does a less efficient
tax system. In addition, a more efficient tax system makes it feasible
for the government to finance worthwhile expenditures, including those
that may have redistributive effects. Properly crafted tax expenditures
enhance the efficiency of the tax system by directing tax burdens to
where they have the least effect of discouraging income production,
thereby making the economy more productive.
Postwar U.S. history includes long stretches of time over which tax
rates were high and the tax system offered extensive exclusions, deductions, and tax credits. The recent movement has been in the opposite
direction, and to little good effect from the standpoints of aligning tax
burdens with ability to pay and financing the U.S. government. Those
inclined to criticize tax breaks as giveaways to the rich might do well
to reflect on the alternative, which is a stripped-down tax system with
relatively flat rates and little if any accommodation for the needs of
individual taxpayers. In fact, the tax system needs more of what it once
had, with high tax rates but also extensive tax preferences for certain
types of income and taxpayers in specified circumstances. Only then
will it be possible to address the income distribution concerns, and the
government financing concerns, that properly motivate those interested
in contemporary U.S. economic policy.

Notes
1. See, for example, Pechman (1977), Century Foundation Working Group (2002),
Reid (2017), and Sarin and Summers (2019).
2. In tax year 2015, 44.6 million U.S. tax returns itemized deductions out of
150.5 million returns filed, representing 29.6 percent of the total. These and
other tax-return data are available at https://www.irs.gov/statistics/soi-tax-stats
-individual-income-tax-return-form-1040-statistics.
3. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO 2019) reports that, in 2018, total U.S.
federal government revenues were $3,329 billion, of which $1,684 billion (50.6
percent) represented individual income taxes, and $1,171 billion (35.2 percent)
were payroll taxes.
4. Atkinson and Stern (1974) identify exceptional cases in which higher tax revenues
can be associated with reduced economic distortions; see Dahlby (2008) for a
review of this literature.
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5) the Employment Management Services Division, which administers publicly funded employment and training services as Michigan Works! Southwest
in the Institute’s local four-county area.
The broad objectives of the Institute’s activities are to 1) promote scholarship and evidence-based practices on issues of employment and unemployment policy, and 2) make knowledge and scholarship relevant and useful to
policymakers in their pursuit of solutions related to employment and unemployment.
Current areas of concentration for these programs include the causes,
consequences, and measures to alleviate unemployment; social insurance
and income maintenance programs; compensation and benefits; workforce
skills; nonstandard work arrangements; and place-based policy initiatives for
strengthening regional economic development and local labor markets.
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